

External End-of-Project Evaluation

**IPC Regional Project, Phase II – Consolidation of the IPC in the Volatile Humanitarian Context of
the Central and Eastern African Region**

(OSRO/RAF/907/EC)

Final Report

January 2011

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid



United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

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ACRONYMS

AAA	Agro Action Allemande
ACF	Action Contre Faim
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ALDI	Association Locale pour le Développement Intégral
BADEC	Bureau d'Appui au Développement et à l'Entraide Communautaire
BINUB	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies à Burundi
CAR	Central African Republic
CESVI	Cooperazione e Sviluppo
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CISV	Comunita Impegno Servizio Volontariato
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
COPED	Conseil pour l'Education et le Développement
CPIA	Comité Provinciale Inter Agences
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Directorate General
DR	Democratic Republic
DSA	Daily Settlement Allowance
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FH	Food for the Hungry
FNSWG	Food and Nutrition Security Working Group
FS	Food Security
FSIT	Food Security Information Team
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
FSNIS	Food Security & Nutrition Information System
GoT	Government of Tanzania
GoU	Government of Uganda
GSAN	Groupe Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle
GSADRE	Groupe Sectoriel Agriculture, Développement Rural et Environnement
HAG	Humanitarian Advocacy Group
HCB	Help Channel Burundi

HQ	Head Quarters
IAWG	Interagency Working Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGEBU	Institute Géographique du Burundi
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ISTEEBU	Institut de Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques du Burundi
KFSM	Kenya Food Security Meeting
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
JMM	Joint Monitoring Mission
LL	Lessons Learned
LVIA	Lay Volunteers International Organisation
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries
MAFC	Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MICS	Multiple Index Cluster Survey
MINAGRI	Ministère de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage
MINAGRIE	Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage
MINIPLAN	Ministère du Plan
MINISANTE	Ministère de la Santé
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODDBU	Organisation Diocésaine pour le Développement de Burundi
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PENHA	Pastoral Environmental Network for the Horn of Africa
ProNaNut	Programme National de Nutrition
REOA	Regional Emergency Office for Eastern and Central Africa
RESO	Rassemblement, Echange et Solutions entre ONGs
RVA	Rapid Vulnerability Assessment
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAP/SSA	Système d'Alerte Précoce et de Surveillance de la Sécurité Alimentaire
SC	Steering Committee

SCF	Save the Children Fund
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SNSA	Service Nationale de Statistiques Agricoles
TANDREC	Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of trainers
TWG	Technical Working Group
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WFS	World Food Summit
WHO	World Health Organisation
WVI	World Vision International

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following conclusions and recommendations have been generated and reflect the most important findings and observations by the evaluation mission of the consolidation of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in Central and Eastern Africa. This evaluation report assesses the overall results and impact of the programme from inception to date and provides an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the IPC approach in the 5 core countries under consideration (Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). The external evaluation took place between November 2010 and January 2011.

A. Relevance of IPC tool

Conclusions

1. The IPC tool, process and products have been found relevant in all countries to differing degrees, all within the context of the disaster management cycle.
2. The IPC tool, its promotion among stakeholders at regional and (sub-) national level is coherent with the mandates of ECHO, FAO and other IPC Global Partners and initiatives that aim to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid as well as accountability of the donors and other actors operating in this field.

Recommendations

1. Continue focus of IPC classifying severity of transitory food insecurity as part of the disaster management cycle (proven demand and relevance). If relevant, countries should be allowed to experiment with classifying chronic food security in their respective settings.
2. It is recommended that IPC remains a meta-analysis tool for situation analysis and is not confused with other FSIS functions such as baseline assessments, emergency needs assessment, M&E and early warning.

B. Project results

Conclusions

1. The project has generally accomplished the results listed in the logical framework at output level:
 - a. Analytical products have been produced at country level as scheduled and incorporated into regional analysis. The FSNWG has provided its regional clientele with monthly updates.
 - b. The project has been largely successful in incorporating the tool into existing seasonal assessments or food security analytical systems.
 - c. The project has also accomplished clear evidence of effective use of the information generated through the tool, in particular by national governments (Disaster Management Teams).
 - d. Best practices and lessons learning exercises have generally been consistently held at country level.

2. Expenditures have been found more or less in line with their original allocations, although it is difficult to ascertain details of large project expenditures.
3. The mission has found several examples of interventions based on the IPC analysis, particularly by national governments. This is proof that the IPC has successfully been incorporated in the respective national disaster management structures.
4. UN agencies and NGOs have used the information for adaptations in their programmes and projects, illustration of needs in project proposals, justification of geographical targeting and advocacy with government.
5. The use by governments of IPC varies: In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda governments are frequent users but in DR Congo and Burundi, the governments are not always participating strongly, in part due to a lack of capacity and awareness.
6. The team has not observed evidence that the information from the IPC tool has led directly to measures addressing chronic food insecurity at country-level.

Recommendations

1. The mission would recommend that the regional project team completes detailed histories for all 5 core countries – containing details as to the context, institutional framework, progress made over time with the tool, assessment/ analysis, and use of the products to compliment the LL exercise.

C. Project management/coordination/HR

Conclusions

1. The coordination structure of TWGs put in place to support the adoption of IPC at regional as well as national level has worked reasonably well.
2. The full-time national IPC consultants residing within the FAO Country Representations have been a clear asset to the project.
3. The project could have performed better if FAO had recruited according to the posts allocated in the original project document.
4. A funding strategy for global, regional and country levels, as proposed through the JMM in June 2010 and in particular within the institutionalization efforts, to ensure long-term funding for IPC country activities has only been developed towards end of 2010 by the GSU.
5. High staff turnover, among all partners including project staff, was mentioned by many interviewees as a limiting factor for sustainability in all of the countries.

Recommendations

1. IPC in Central and Eastern Africa needs continued support from FAO-REOA, a fact that was confirmed by all stakeholders, including donors.
2. The mission feels there is a special obligation for FAO-TCE to sponsor IPC activities, because it misses a dedicated information service to inform their significant and growing country programmes. In contrast, WFP programming is at least informed by their VAM- unit. Therefore, FAO is encouraged to keep national IPC/FSIS consultants in place, and incorporate them into the FAO country programmes.

D. Funding Issues

Conclusions

1. Even though the countries are in various stages of institutionalization of IPC, sustainability is by no means guaranteed. Without external funding, IPC will come to a standstill in some of the countries (Burundi, CAR and DR Congo).
2. Funding up to now has been mostly project-based and from one donor only (ECHO), which has resulted in a situation where there is no direct funding available and no clear outlook for the coming years.

Recommendations

1. Funding proposals for Burundi, CAR, DRC, Tanzania and Uganda should be developed as a matter of priority to prevent the breakdown of capacity built up over the past 2-4 years.
2. All partners, at global, regional as well as country level, need to be reminded of their responsibility, if possible, to contribute in financial and technical terms. Pooling of resources by all stakeholders is preferable.
3. It may be justified for ECHO and other donors to continue financial support to IPC in countries such as Burundi, CAR, and DR Congo on the “user pays” principal.
4. FAO and WFP may take it upon themselves to promote IPC as a standard tool in the Humanitarian Food Security Clusters with core funding from the two agencies.

E. Communication/awareness raising

Conclusions

1. IPC has played a major role with regard to raising awareness on the food security situation, including measures for analyzing severity of food insecurity, root causes and initial responses at (sub-)national level; although publication of outputs has not always coincided with the planning cycle of partners and government.
2. Communication has not received enough attention by the project, especially at country level, in part due to a weakness in the project design (lack of budget).

Recommendations

1. Communication and advocacy are integral part of information management and need to be appropriately budgeted for in future. The mission feels that appropriate internal and external advocacy would go a long way into the successful application and use of the tool and products with global partners and active partners at the (sub-)national level.

F. Capacity Development / Lessons learning

Conclusions

1. The project's capacity development efforts in food security analysis have been key to galvanizing the collaboration and spearheading the main project outputs. These include the introductory or FSIS foundation courses (based on EC/FAO E-learning courses) that addressed general weaknesses in understanding of FSIS among IPC stakeholders.
2. IPC training material, including User Guide, has been found to be of satisfactory quality but translation into French has taken a lot of time; this has impacted negatively on operations in Burundi, DR CONGO and CAR.
3. The project has targeted most of the capacity activities at individual rather than at an organizational level.
4. There is a general lack of FSIS experts within the region and available to FAO.

Recommendations

1. To address a shortage of IPC practitioners and trainers like it has been faced in the past years, a capacity development strategy should be developed for concerned parties.
2. The large need for FSIS expertise and training should be addressed collectively by all stakeholders in the FS sector, including governments, UN, NGOs, and institutions of higher learning. Separate capacity development programmes (outside IPC) would be appropriate and very much needed.
3. Capacity development of IPC experts, and in particular providing technical backstopping to country teams and generation of normative guidance, should become a priority for FAO itself if it is serious about the promotion of IPC and its use. It is felt that the capacity within FAO (ESA in particular) has decreased significantly over the past 10-15 years, while TCE has not yet built up this function sufficiently.

G. Technical Development

Conclusions

1. The project has made positive contributions to the development of the tool. It has been successful in testing and incorporating innovations, in particular as to redefining the IPC phase classifications 1 a/b, 2 and 3.
2. An overall IPC analytical framework has not yet been developed.
3. Guidance on the appropriateness and limitations in the use of proxy-indicators has been limited.
4. Access to livelihood baselines (descriptions and profiles) has proven to be beneficial to the interpretation of reference indicators as it provides an improved context.
5. Quality control through internal peer review mechanisms has functioned well during the current project phase, while external peer reviews from the region or GSU have been too limited.
6. The mission has not been able to find a possible alternative for IPC with the same quality and possibilities as IPC, a fact that was confirmed by almost all stakeholders.

Recommendations

The IPC initiative should:

1. Develop a clear analytical framework to show the cohesion, the weighting between elements and the causal relationships between the different elements and indicators.
2. Develop guidelines on the appropriateness and limitations with regard to the use of various proxy indicators by sector.
3. Develop standards or minimum requirements for an IPC analysis to allow for comparability across borders.
4. Improve quality control and peer review mechanisms of processes and products, in part through the development of guidelines.
5. Promote livelihood baselines (descriptions and profiles) to support the interpretation of reference indicators through an improved context.
6. Address the underlying weaknesses in data together with all stakeholders (technical partners, government, donors and academic institutions) towards improved access to agreed key reference indicators that would improve the relevance and quality of output of the meta-analysis tool.

H. Partnerships

Conclusions

1. The involvement of global partners at country level varies considerably and especially the input of Oxfam is quite weak.
2. Cooperation between IPC and FEWS NET is generally good, even though FEWS NET is not established in all countries.
3. Global partners like USAID and WFP use IPC reports and maps to some extent. Other global partners use IPC often only at a limited scale.
4. Partners are active to various degrees in IPC activities but in most cases there is not yet true ownership and most of the partners are not willing or capable to contribute financially.
5. Most stakeholders feel that the project has successfully targeted the governments as the real custodians of the IPC process.

Recommendations

1. There is a strong need for global partners to step up their contribution to the IPC process at country-level, including better reporting on specific strategies in place that articulate their commitment and engagement to IPC with a geographic scope.
2. Cooperation with regional institutes like East Africa Community, IGAD and COMESA may add to the sustainability and impact of IPC. Stronger advocacy is needed in that regard at regional and global level.
3. There is scope for the involvement of institutions of higher learning as full partners to contribute to technical assistance and training, but also to incorporate FSIS methodologies/tools and technical skills into their curricula.

RÉSUMÉ

La mission d'évaluation de la consolidation de l'Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) en Afrique centrale et orientale a généré les conclusions et recommandations suivantes, reflétant les observations et les résultats les plus importants. Le rapport évalue les résultats et l'impact global du programme depuis sa création jusqu'à maintenant et permet de mieux comprendre les forces et les faiblesses de l'approche de l'IPC dans les 5 pays à l'examen (Burundi, RD Congo, Kenya, Tanzanie et Ouganda). L'évaluation externe a eu lieu entre Novembre 2010 et Janvier 2011.

A. Pertinence de l'outil IPC

Conclusions

1. L'outil IPC, le processus et les produits ont été trouvés pertinents dans tous les pays concernés à des degrés divers, dans le cadre du gestion des catastrophes.
2. L'outil IPC et sa promotion auprès des parties prenantes au niveau régional et (sous-) national sont cohérents avec les mandats d'ECHO, la FAO et d'autres partenaires mondiaux de l'IPC et les autres initiatives qui visent à améliorer l'efficacité et le bon fonctionnement de l'aide humanitaire ainsi que la responsabilisation des bailleurs de fonds et d'autres acteurs opérant dans ce domaine.

Recommandations

1. Continuer l'accent de l'IPC sur classer la gravité de l'insécurité alimentaire transitoire, dans le cadre du cycle de gestion des catastrophes (si la demande et la pertinence sont avérées). Le cas échéant, les pays devraient être autorisés à expérimenter avec la classification de sécurité alimentaire chronique dans leurs cadres respectifs.
2. Il est recommandé que l'IPC reste un outil de méta analyse pour faire une analyse de la situation et ne se confond pas avec les autres fonctions FSIS tels que des évaluations de référence, l'évaluation des besoins d'urgence, suivi et évaluation et l'alerte précoce.

B. Les résultats du projet

Conclusions

1. Le projet a généralement accompli les résultats énumérés dans le cadre logique au niveau des activités:
 - a. Produits analytiques ont été produits au niveau des pays comme prévu et intégré dans l'analyse régionale. Le FSNWG a fourni à sa clientèle régionale mises à jour mensuelles.
 - b. Le projet a en grande partie réussi à intégrer l'outil dans les évaluations existantes saisonniers ou dans des systèmes d'analyse de la sécurité alimentaire.
 - c. Le projet a également réalisé une preuve claire de l'utilisation efficace de l'information générée par l'outil, en particulier par les gouvernements nationaux (équipes de gestion des catastrophes).

- d. Exercices par rapport aux meilleures pratiques et leçons apprises ont généralement été menés régulièrement au niveau des pays.
2. Les dépenses ont été trouvées plus ou moins en ligne avec leurs allocations initiales, mais il est difficile de vérifier les détails des dépenses des grands projets.
3. La mission a trouvé plusieurs exemples d'interventions fondées sur l'analyse de l'IPC, en particulier par les gouvernements nationaux. C'est la preuve que l'IPC a été incorporé avec succès dans les structures nationales de gestion des catastrophes.
4. Agences de l'ONU et les ONG ont utilisé l'information pour les adaptations de leurs programmes et projets, des illustrations des besoins dans les propositions de projet, la justification de ciblage géographique et pour plaider avec le gouvernement.
5. L'utilisation de l'IPC par les gouvernements varie: au Kenya, à la Tanzanie et à l'Ouganda les gouvernements sont des utilisateurs fréquents, mais en RD Congo et le Burundi, les gouvernements ne participent pas toujours aussi fortement, en partie parce que il y a un manque de capacités et de sensibilisation.
6. L'équipe n'a pas trouvé des preuves que l'information générée par l'IPC a mené directement à des mesures de lutte contre l'insécurité alimentaire chronique au niveau des pays.

Recommandations

1. La mission recommande que l'équipe de projet régionale complète des histoires détaillées pour les 5 principaux pays - contenant des détails sur le contexte, le cadre institutionnel, les progrès réalisés au fil du temps avec l'IPC, l'évaluation et l'analyse, et l'utilisation des produits pour compléter l'exercice des leçons apprises .

C. La gestion de projet / coordination / RH

Conclusions

1. La structure de coordination des groupes de travail techniques mis en place pour soutenir l'adoption de l'IPC au niveau régional comme au niveau national a raisonnablement bien fonctionné.
2. Les conseillers nationaux IPC résidant dans les représentations nationales de la FAO ont été un atout indéniable pour le projet.
3. Le projet pourrait avoir eu de meilleurs résultats si la FAO aurait recruté en fonction des postes alloués dans le document original du projet.
4. Une stratégie de financement pour le niveau mondial, régional et national, tel que proposé par le JMM en Juin 2010 et en particulier par rapport aux efforts d'institutionnalisation, pour assurer un financement à long terme pour les activités des pays de l'IPC n'est pas développée.
5. Roulement élevé du personnel parmi tous les partenaires, y compris le personnel du projet, a été mentionné par plusieurs interviewés comme un facteur limitant pour la durabilité dans tous les pays.

Recommandations

1. IPC en Afrique centrale et orientale a besoin de poursuite du soutien de la FAO-REOA, un fait qui a été confirmé par toutes les parties prenantes, y compris les donateurs.
2. La mission estime qu'il y a une obligation spéciale de la FAO-TCE à parrainer des activités de l'IPC en tant qu'il manque un service d'information dédié à informer leurs programmes de pays importants et croissants. En revanche, la programmation du PAM est au moins informée par leur VAM-unité. La FAO est encouragée à maintenir les conseillers nationaux IPC / FSIS en place et à les intégrer dans les programmes de pays de la FAO.

D. Les questions de financement

Conclusions

1. Même si les pays sont à divers stades d'institutionnalisation de l'IPC, la durabilité n'est pas garantie. Sans financement extérieur, l'IPC sera au point mort dans certains pays (Burundi, République centrafricaine et République démocratique du Congo).
2. Le financement jusqu'à présent a été principalement axé sur l'approche projet et d'un seul bailleur de fonds (ECHO), qui a abouti à une situation où il n'y a pas de financement direct disponibles et aucune perspective claire pour les futures années.

Recommandations

1. Le développement des propositions de financement pour le Burundi, RCA, RDC, Tanzanie et l'Ouganda est une priorité si on veut empêcher la dégradation de la capacité acquise au cours des 2-4 dernières années.
2. Tous les partenaires, au niveau régional et global, ainsi que au niveau des pays, doivent être rappelés à leur responsabilité de, si possible, contribuer sur le plan financier et technique. La mise en commun des ressources par toutes les parties prenantes serait préférable.
3. Il peut être justifié pour ECHO et d'autres donateurs à continuer de soutenir financièrement à l'IPC dans les pays comme le Burundi, la RCA et la RDC sur la principe de « utilisateur payeur ».
4. FAO et le PAM peuvent prendre la responsabilité de promouvoir l'IPC comme outil standard dans les clusters humanitaires de la sécurité alimentaire avec un financement de base des deux organismes.

E. Communication/sensibilisation

Conclusions

1. L'IPC a joué un rôle majeur en ce qui concerne la sensibilisation sur la situation de sécurité alimentaire, y compris des mesures pour analyser la gravité de l'insécurité alimentaire, les causes profondes et premières réactions au niveau (sous-) national, bien que la publication des produits IPC n'aie pas toujours coïncidé avec la cycle de planification des partenaires et du gouvernement.
2. Communication n'a pas reçu assez d'attention par le projet, en particulier au niveau des pays, en partie à cause d'une faiblesse dans la conception du projet (manque de budget).

Recommandations

1. Communication et sensibilisation font partie intégrante de la gestion de l'information et doivent être dûment inscrits au budget pour l'avenir. La mission estime que plaider de manière appropriée interne et externe aidera à faire réussir l'application et l'utilisation de l'outil IPC et ses produits avec des partenaires mondiaux et des partenaires actifs au niveau (sous-)national.

F. Renforcement des capacités / Leçons apprises

Conclusions

1. Les efforts du projet de renforcement des capacités dans l'analyse de la sécurité alimentaire ont été la clé pour stimuler la collaboration et initier les résultats principaux. Il s'agit notamment des cours de base d'introduction ou FSIS (sur la base CE / FAO E-learning) qui corrigent les faiblesses dans la compréhension générale concernant FSIS des parties prenantes de l'IPC.
2. Le matériel de formation de l'IPC, notamment Guide de l'utilisateur, a été jugé de qualité satisfaisante, mais la traduction en français a pris beaucoup de temps, ce qui a eu un impact négatif sur les opérations au Burundi, en RD Congo et la RCA.
3. Le projet a ciblé la plupart des activités de renforcement sur les individus plutôt que sur le plan organisationnel.
4. Il y a un manque général d'experts du FSIS dans la région et à la disposition de la FAO.

Recommandations

1. Pour adresser une pénurie de praticiens et des formateurs de l'IPC, comme il a été confronté ces dernières années, une stratégie de développement des capacités devrait être développée pour les parties concernées.
2. Le grand besoin de l'expertise FSIS et la formation devraient être abordés collectivement par tous les intervenants dans le secteur de sécurité alimentaire, y compris les gouvernements, l'ONU, des ONG et des institutions d'enseignement supérieur. Des programmes distincts de développement des capacités (en dehors de l'IPC) seraient opportuns et très nécessaires.
3. Le développement des capacités des experts de l'IPC, et notamment fournir un appui technique aux équipes de pays et la génération d'orientations normatives, devrait devenir une priorité pour la FAO si elle est sérieuse au sujet de la promotion de l'IPC et de son utilisation. Il est estimé que la capacité de la FAO (ESA en particulier) a diminué de façon significative au cours des 10-15 dernières années, tandis que le TCE n'a pas encore mis en place cette fonction suffisamment.

G. Développement technique

Conclusions

1. Le projet a apporté une contribution positive au développement de l'outil. Il a réussi dans les tests et l'intégration des innovations, en particulier quant à la redéfinition des classifications IPC phase 1 a / b, 2 et 3.
2. Un cadre d'analyse générale de l'IPC n'a pas encore été développé.

3. D'orientation sur la pertinence et les limites dans l'utilisation des indicateurs proxy a été limité.
4. L'accès aux lignes de base des moyens de subsistance (les descriptions et profils) s'est avérée bénéfique pour l'interprétation des indicateurs de référence car elle fournit une amélioration du contexte.
5. Contrôle de la qualité par le mécanisme interne d'examen par les pairs a bien fonctionné dans la phase actuelle du projet, tandis que les examens externes par des pairs de la région ou du GSU ont été trop limités.
6. La mission n'a pas été capable de trouver une alternative possible pour l'IPC avec la même qualité et les possibilités que l'IPC, ce qui a été confirmé par presque toutes les parties prenantes.

Recommandations

L'initiative de l'IPC devrait:

1. Élaborer un cadre analytique clair pour montrer la cohésion, la pondération entre les éléments et les relations de causalité entre les différents éléments et indicateurs.
2. Élaborer des lignes directrices sur la pertinence et les limites concernant l'utilisation des indicateurs proxy différents par secteur.
3. Élaborer des normes ou des exigences minimales pour une analyse de l'IPC qui permet des comparaisons à travers les frontières.
4. Améliorer la qualité et le contrôle des mécanismes d'examen par les pairs des procédés et produits, en partie par élaborer de lignes directrices.
5. Promouvoir les lignes de base des moyens de subsistance (les descriptions et profils) pour appuyer l'interprétation des indicateurs de référence par l'amélioration du contexte.
6. Remédier aux faiblesses sous-jacentes dans les données en collaboration avec les parties prenantes (les partenaires techniques, le gouvernement, les donateurs et les institutions universitaires) vers un meilleur accès aux indicateurs de référence qui permettrait d'améliorer la pertinence et la qualité de la production du méta analyse.

H. Partenariats

Conclusions

1. L'implication des partenaires mondiaux et au niveau des pays varie considérablement et en particulier la contribution d'Oxfam est faible.
2. La coopération entre l'IPC et FEWS NET est généralement bonne, même si FEWS NET n'est pas établi dans tous les pays.
3. Les partenaires mondiaux comme l'USAID et le PAM utilisent les rapports de l'IPC et des cartes dans une certaine mesure. D'autres partenaires mondiaux ne utilisent l'IPC pas souvent mais seulement à une échelle limitée.
4. Les partenaires sont actifs à des degrés divers par rapport aux activités de l'IPC, mais dans la plupart des cas il n'y a pas de véritable appropriation et la plupart des partenaires n'est pas disposée ou en mesure de contribuer financièrement.
5. La plupart des intervenants estiment que le projet a réussi à cibler les gouvernements comme les dépositaires actuels du processus de l'IPC.

Recommandations

1. Il y a un fort besoin pour les partenaires internationaux à renforcer leur contribution au processus de l'IPC au niveau des pays, y compris offrir plus d'information sur les stratégies spécifiques en place qui articulent leur engagement à l'IPC et la portée géographique.
2. La coopération avec les instituts régionaux comme la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est, l'AIGD et le CEDEAO peut ajouter à la durabilité et l'impact de l'IPC. Plus de sensibilisation est nécessaire à cet égard au niveau régional et mondial.
3. Les établissements d'enseignement supérieur peuvent participer en tant que partenaires pour contribuer à l'assistance technique et de formation, mais aussi pour intégrer les méthodes / outils FSIS et les compétences techniques dans leurs programmes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluation team would like to thank the staff of the FAO Regional Emergency Office for Central and Eastern Africa and relevant FAO colleagues at the country representations for offering their opinions and viewpoints on the implementation of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification - phase I and II in the volatile humanitarian context of the Central and Eastern African Region. We appreciate the frank discussions with ECHO staff in Nairobi that provided guidance to what was expected of the mission. We also want to thank all of the stakeholders interviewed in the 5 countries visited that were engaged in the implementation of this programme. Through our discussions we had a better appreciation of the opportunities and challenges that have faced the project over a 3 year period.

On the basis of this interaction with key stakeholders, we hope that this external end-of-project evaluation captures the major findings, lessons learned, and recommendations that will help guide future work carried out in implementing the IPC tool and associated processes at the country and regional levels.

René Verduijn and Herma Majoor

January 2011

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE REGIONAL IPC PROGRAM

In 2004 the IPC tool was introduced in Somalia to improve and standardize food security information and communication to enable intra and inter-agency information sharing and corroboration. Since its inception, the IPC has evolved into a standardized classification system based on the principle that common analysis among agencies will promote transparency, clarity, and understanding of food security analyses.

In 2007, a number of food security-oriented agencies formed an initial global partnership for the further development and roll-out of the IPC, including: FAO, WFP, USAID-funded FEWS NET, Oxfam GB, CARE, SCF-UK/US and the Joint Research Centre of the European Union.

IPC activities are supported along three main levels:

- The global level, mandated with the global coordination, supports fund-raising efforts, allocation and management of global resources, provides technical support to the implementation of activities, and ensures internal and external institutionalization.
- At regional level, with the regional IPC project for Central and Eastern Africa¹ being the most prominent promoter of IPC. This FAO- implemented project has coordinated activities in 7 countries (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda; with relatively recent introduction of activities in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Ethiopia. The FAO Regional Emergency Office for Eastern and Central Africa (REOA) has managed and provided technical support to the countries listed. FAO REOA also acts as the secretariat for the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG), which disseminates the latest IPC maps and information and helps regional decision makers prioritise their activities. Under the FSNWG sits the IPC Regional Steering Committee, which provides the necessary technical support and guidance to introduce and institutionalize the IPC within each country.
- At national level, IPC national technical working groups network with the relevant national stakeholders from ministries and other governmental units, UN, international and local NGOs. They ensure the development of a common situation analysis and implementation of the IPC at national level.

The first phase of the regional project took place from June 2007 to November 2008, and was funded by ECHO, CIDA and DFID and focused on the introduction of IPC in Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

An independent mid-term review was undertaken in August-September 2008 to monitor progress made towards the achievement of expected outputs and outcomes of the project at national and regional levels, as well as generate recommendations and lessons learned to inform potential further IPC development and food security analysis, assessment and response.

¹ Henceforth referred to as “the Project”

A second phase was fully funded by ECHO with a budget of USD 2,317,095 for an 18 months timeframe, from 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2010. The grant has been managed by the FAO REOA. A no-cost extension was requested for this project and granted by ECHO until December 2010 in order to finalize activities and line up with the time frame of the Global project.

1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE END-OF-PROJECT EVALUATION

The independent final evaluation assessed the overall results and impact of the programme from inception to date and provided an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the IPC tool in various countries in Eastern and Central Africa. The evaluation determined the extent to which the programme has delivered activities and outputs in a timely manner, as well as provided adequate and appropriate technical and institutional support.²

The scope of the evaluation included IPC activities implemented at regional and country level from inception to today. The team focused on the 5 core countries (Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) where sufficient time has passed to see results at outcome level. All 5 core countries have been visited. The project has also provided technical support to CAR and Ethiopia but the IPC implementation process is still in its infancy. While some progress has been made in CAR with buy-in from key partners, the process in Ethiopia is very much at a stand-still as the government has not yet come to accept the IPC.

The evaluation has been asked to (i) capture recent experiences in the set up and implementation of the IPC approach and (ii) assess the extent to which IPC associated processes and products are used by decision-makers. A three year period, covering Phase I and II, should provide a sufficiently long time-line to expect some tangible results.

Specific recommendations have been made in order to strengthen the IPC approach for adoption at country level. In this way, the evaluation should not be viewed exclusively as a terminal evaluation, but a formative and forward-looking document that seeks to enhance the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of future IPC activities in other contexts.

This evaluation examined the progress as a result of the consolidation of IPC in Central and Eastern Africa. More specifically, the objectives of the independent evaluation were to:

- Determine the **relevance** of project objectives and the IPC framework and approach for the five countries in which it is being applied.
- Evaluate project **efficiency**, assessing the process adopted during the project implementation at sub-national, national and regional level.
- Evaluate project **effectiveness**, assessing the degree to which planned outputs and outcomes have been achieved at the time of the evaluation.
- Identify any **impacts** or likely impacts (positive or negative) of the project.

² Please see annexes for more details about the team's terms of reference

- Assess the likelihood of **sustainability** of the project, i.e. what the enduring results are likely to be after the termination of the project.
- Identify lessons learned and formulate recommendations for any possible follow-up phase.

The review achieved the above objectives by focusing on the following five key questions:

1. What is the current status of the implementation process?
2. Are coordination and partnership mechanisms appropriate?
3. What is the level of ownership and control of national stakeholders over the IPC process?
4. What is the actual and potential impact of the IPC on the process of decision making?
5. Is the process of IPC roll-out and/or consolidation at the country level demonstrating, as foreseen in the project concept, that the IPC is relevant to different contexts? And what are the main adaptation measures required?

The targeted audience and potential users of the evaluation were:

- FAO project management, project staff at regional and country levels and staff at the IPC Global Support Unit in Rome
- All IPC partners involved in the region, at regional (FSNWG) and at country level (e.g. WFP, FEWS NET, UNICEF, ACF, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, ICRC/IFRC, etc.
- ECHO at head quarters (HQ), regional and country levels
- Governmental authorities of all recipient countries

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The Evaluation consisted of the following phases:

1. A desk review of key documents;
2. An overview of the IPC programme, including major achievements and constraints;
3. Collation of relevant policy documents, strategic plans, project documents, analytical tools and reports as well as previous evaluations, reviews and studies of relevance to this evaluation;
4. Stakeholder interviews carried out in Nairobi, and through field visits to the five countries (Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). These include interviews with key stakeholders in government, the donor community, UN and other international agencies, and NGOs. Both actual and potential users of IPC information products were interviewed, including decision makers, as well as suppliers of information to the IPC, and owners of possible complementary or competing systems;

5. Questionnaires were administered to a range of stakeholders to obtain feedback on the programme activities, results and outcomes. These questionnaires are included in Annex 10 to 15. The questionnaires were analyzed and the results incorporated into the final report. The response has been generally poor. The timing of the evaluation November/December may have had an impact on the response frequency. Another explanation could be that many people who were interviewed may have felt that completing the questionnaire had become superfluous, although the team had taken care to prevent a simple duplication of questions in the design of the questionnaires and the outline for the interviews. Finally, some of the blame may fall on the team for not keeping the questionnaires short enough. It is a lesson that shall be taken on board for future occasions;
6. An Aide-Memoire was written, which synthesized the preliminary outcomes of all the above components, in accordance with agreed formats described in the inception report;
7. A presentation was conducted with the IPC Steering Committee and Coordination Unit in Nairobi showing the preliminary findings of the Evaluation Team;
8. A Report was drafted for the purpose of review, verification and clarifications based on agreed outline described in the inception report;
9. Draft of Final Report was developed including conclusions and recommendations finalised by the Team Leader.

The data collection strategy has used a number of tools to gain a deeper understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and overall results and outcomes of the regional project, including:

- Stakeholder interviews (by telephone, email and in personal meetings)
- Questionnaire surveys of various stakeholders
- Desk review of background documents specific to the project

1.4 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

The report has been organized through 9 main chapters plus annexes. Introduction (Chapter 1) explains the background, purpose and objectives and methodology of the evaluation. Chapter 2 evaluates the regional project according to its first evaluation criteria of relevance. Chapter 3, by far the largest of the report evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of the project mainly through its four results areas of (1) analytical capacity; (2) analytical products available and integrated in regional/global analysis; (3) the IPC tool integrated into food security analytical systems; and (4) best practices and lessons learned recorded and disseminated. Other areas reviewed in this chapter include project design, project management and coordination, communication and allocation and use of funds. Chapter 4 provides more insight in the country support that the project has provided over the 3 year period. The next chapter (chapter 5) deals with potential technical shortcomings of the tool, and the perceptions by IPC TWGs and the Evaluation Team. Chapter 6 discusses the different roles of the different partnerships in the implementation of this project. The partnerships cover global, regional and national levels. Chapter 7 is an important chapter that lists and discusses the perceived impact of the project while chapter 8 evaluates the project against the evaluation criteria of sustainability. Finally, chapter 9 lists the main conclusions and recommendations of the

evaluation using well-established themes from project as headings. Detailed country reports have been produced for all the 5 core countries visited. They can be found in annex 1-5.

2. RELEVANCE

2.1 RELEVANCE OF THE IPC TOOL, PRODUCTS AND PROCESS

The mission has found the IPC meta-analysis tool, its products (severity classifications and maps) and process to be relevant in all the countries visited. Generally, stakeholders from government, UN agencies, NGOs as well as donors interviewed all see the relevance and benefits of the IPC tool, in particular as it has helped them

- (i) classify the severity of food insecurity outcomes using evidence-based and internationally accepted standards/ thresholds;
- (ii) compare more objectively between different areas within a country and between countries;
- (iii) provide clear guidelines as to what constitutes the different IPC phase classifications;
- (iv) provide rules of engagement for stakeholders, which lead to transparency of the process;
- (v) create technical consensus among the different experts; and
- (vi) identify key shortcomings in the national food security and nutrition information system (FSNIS) – regarding available data and its quality, and the respective capacities of stakeholders to participate in the process.

The IPC and situation analysis have been found relevant in the context of the disaster management cycle, with much of the emphasis on transitory food insecurity by geographic areas classified above phase 2. This holds true for Burundi, DR Congo and CAR with significant portions of the population in IPC phases 2 and 3, as well as for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania where the vast majority of its population is classified as food secure (phase 1 a/b) and/or borderline food insecure (phase 2).

The IPC tool, process and products have been found relevant in all countries to differing degrees, all within the context of the disaster management cycle.

The team has not observed evidence that the information from the IPC situation analysis tool has led directly to measures addressing chronic or underlying problems at country-level, despite the fact recommendations with regard to measures to address problems of chronic nature have been included in some of the IPC reports. The tool is evidently most relevant in a crisis situation, when significant increases in transitory food insecurity

are to be expected, and when sufficient resources (UN and INGOs) are available to generate bi-annual updates of the key reference (or proxy) indicators.

It is worth noting that IPC was found to be relevant in contexts with a more established national FSNIS (Kenya and Tanzania) as well as in the context of less comprehensive and networked FSNIS (Burundi, CAR, DR Congo and Uganda). The IPC tool has been adopted into

well-established seasonal assessment mechanisms in Kenya and Tanzania, whereas for the latter countries, IPC has been able to play a higher profile, creating positive externalities of networking stakeholders and building awareness for the need of a strong FSNIS.

The tool has proven to be popular among many user groups, primarily for creating a common, evidence-based classification system that all stakeholders adhere to. Users generally participated under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Food Security Cluster (UN, INGOs and government) co-chaired by FAO and WFP or through networks with a stronger government-signature such as in Kenya and Tanzania.³ IPC has proven relevant for users in both contexts. They like the clarity of the analysis, the technical consensus, universal classification and thresholds and subsequent maps. Most users are generally not so concerned with the quality of the data supporting the analysis. They are content with a clearly improved output.

The UN Humanitarian Food Security Clusters, co-chaired by FAO and WFP play an important role as umbrella structures for national IPC TWGs in (post-) conflict countries with a relatively weak operational national FSNIS.

While technical experts are (logically) more concerned about the underlying statistics supporting the IPC meta-analysis, they have iterated with the team on several occasions that the internal peer review is generally thorough and the technical consensus created provides the best possible output. The recorded improvements in quality of outputs over time somehow seem to support this point that in principal, there should be no restraint around the application of IPC in challenging data environments.

IPC has made a positive contribution by bringing data gaps to the fore, and by addressing some of those, mainly through changes in data collection tools. Despite this achievement, the team feels that the weaknesses in underlying data (available data for the time period of analysis - population figures to start with) are not always given enough emphasis by the national teams. Ratings of 1 star – representing low confidence level of analysis - are rarely seen on maps. Some countries like Tanzania do not provide insight into the underlying quality of the data. Familiarity with the IPC process and appreciation for the tool and its products by producers and users should not risk of becoming neglectful of its weaknesses. This could post a potential threat to the relevance of the tool for some of the key stakeholders involved (WFP and FEWS NET) if left unattended

It is important that IPC - the meta-analysis tool - clearly distinguishes itself from the FSNIS as a “system,” to remain relevant and keep its focus. The team still found confusion about the workings of IPC among some of the interviewees or respondents to the questionnaires. Respondents confused IPC with data collection and/or the designation of the entire system. This is disappointing given all of the project’s training efforts. It reiterates the findings in the IPC Joint Monitoring Mission report of June 2010⁴ as well as the 2009 IPC Global Partnership

³ It is not clear exactly why the IPC has not been deemed relevant by the Government of Ethiopia, a country with a strong governmental role in the National FSNIS.

⁴ ECHO/FAO Joint Monitoring Mission Report on IPC, June 2010.

Evaluation⁵ that it is key to be clear about the core function of IPC as a meta-analysis tool. This does not include any of the key components of the FSNIS, e.g. baseline assessments, emergency needs assessment nor early warning, at least in the current version of IPC.

The Team has observed tendencies with users to employ the maps (produced twice a year) as a forecasting tool while the predictive value from the map is limited. In fact, it is not a tool that captures dynamic aspects of a crisis. Early warning tools, once strongly pushed by international partners (UN and donors) in the realm of national governments have been run down over the past 10-15 years in Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, FEWS NET is the almost sole provider of up-to-date monthly early warning bulletins and public forecasts at country and regional level. FEWS NET is perhaps better focused but IPC provides the broader analysis, the buy-in from different stakeholders, starting with national (and local) governments. FEWS NET representatives often mentioned in discussions that they had gained valuable access to data sets by participating in the IPC process. Both are in the main complementary to each other.

The IPC tool, its promotion among stakeholders at regional and (sub-) national level is coherent with the mandates of ECHO, FAO and other IPC Global Partners and initiatives that aim to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid as well as accountability of the donors and other actors operating in this field.

It was observed that availability of livelihood descriptions and profiles enhance the relevance of the situation analysis and have an advantage over other countries where the analysis is conducted by administrative borders only (Tanzania). Although time consuming, using livelihood descriptions and profiles has helped interpret the reference indicators in their rightful context and subsequently identify both acute problems as well as underlying causes.

At regional level, the consolidated map for the region – Central and Eastern Africa are perceived relevant to most user groups, in particular donors, UN agencies and INGOs. The maps have strategic value and are relevant together with the use of other sources of information (e.g. FEWS NET country and Regional Outlook). The regional exercise to compare food insecurity across borders contributes significantly to monitoring the situation in the region, and particularly the Greater Horn of Africa, a geo-political hotspot. This responds to a clear demand from donors such as ECHO, the principal donor of the IPC initiative.

While the donor community and the regional economic community such as IGAD may be considered prime users, the national governments also are keen to monitor problems close to their borders, due to a risk of future spillover effects.

2.2 COHERENCE WITH PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS' MANDATES

The IPC tool and its promotion among stakeholders at regional and (sub-)national level are certainly coherent with ECHO's mandate to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. The enhanced

⁵ Frankenberger and Verduijn. Final Evaluation Report of the Global IPC Partnership, August 2009.
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evidence-base and technical consensus created clearly helps in allocating funds to those most in distress. In very similar ways it helps FAO to lead international efforts to defeat hunger. As the lead UN agency in agriculture, FAO provides technical advice and coordination for agricultural interventions undertaken by all development partners, national governments but also other UN agencies and NGOs, thereby optimizing their impact.

The IPC seems well aligned with a number of initiatives that aim to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid as well as accountability of the donors and other actors operating in this field. They include the Stockholm Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (2003); the Paris Declaration (OECD) on the effectiveness of aid; the Hyogo Framework for Action in the area of disaster risk reduction; and the WFS Action Plan and the Millennium Project.

3. EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

3.1 PROJECT DESIGN

The team has identified a few weaknesses in the logic and internal coherence of the project design as reviewed through its logical framework. First of all, the project design of phase I and II has been quite ambitious.⁶ It assumes full assimilation of a meta-analysis tool - that prescribes its own reference indicators and use of analytical templates by all stakeholders - based on USD200-400,000 investment per country over a period of 2.5 years⁷, with the technical support from a small technical team in the region and a national consultant for each of the project countries. This must be seen against a history of FSNIS support projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, also under FAO's management, that have had longer time spans and still did not show a clean track record, especially in regard to the evaluation criteria of sustainability.

At the same time, the Team realizes that positive externalities have been built into the project from engagement with other stakeholders and other FAO projects. The existing capacity of organizations participating in the IPC Global Partnership (FEWS NET, WFP, JRC, OXFAM, SCF-UK/US, CARE), and the Global Support Unit (GSU) in Rome, stand out as potential support vehicles at country and regional level. FAO's Emergency and Rehabilitations Operations Division (FAO-TCE) – that manages the project - has also provided new impetus and funds into FAO country programmes and national representations. In short, these externalities have been key to the selection of FAO as the lead implementing agency for the project.

A number of weaknesses were found in the internal coherence of the project design, as reviewed through its logical framework.

The project activities clearly support the attainment of the main results areas (phase II): (1) enhanced analytical capacity; (2) FS analytical products generated; (3) embedding of the tool in the FSNIS; and (4) established loop of self-learning to improve process, products, etc.

Inputs are in line with the technical nature of the project: heavy on personnel (both international and national); contracts (for implementing partners); travel and DSA (to backstop countries from the region, to organize national/ regional training events and regional workshops); technical support services from FAO-HQ; and General Operating Expenses (regional and national).

There is an inconsistency between the specific project objective and the 4 main result areas. The objective states under intervention logic:

“Standardized classification of food security is used for advocacy, planning, and response in food security and nutrition interventions at national and regional levels.” (Source: Project document, p.16)

⁶ For a detailed discussion of Phase I project design review, read Poulsen and Majid, 2008

⁷ It is not clear what criteria have been used to decide on country budget allocations.

This is supported by the Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) listed: (1) Number of organizations trained in use of IPC tool for response planning and implementation; (2) Number of organizations adopting the IPC tool; and (3) Incorporation of IPC products in policy and planning papers. These OVIs provide evidence of the overall project's success. They should be measured not just by the high-quality products generated but clearly by evidence that products have influenced users to take action (interventions or change of policies, strategies, etc.). Changed organizational behavior could easily have been added to this list of OVIs.

The project results, on the other hand, clearly focus on the analytical process, including the need for institutional housing of the tool. They stop short of covering the promotion, communication and/or advocacy of the products with the end-user. The budget allocation of USD10,000 for communication underlines this neglect. This discrepancy on paper has clearly translated itself to the field, although country experiences vary considerably. Most time and efforts have been focused on attaining the main results: capacity, the meta-analysis and the maps.

The main risk associated with the project (Phase II) has been identified as lack of buy-in from other users due to budgetary constraints and/or political pressures. The listed assumption states that all FSNIS stakeholders should be committed to collaborate to improve the evidence-base for decision-making. The contingency measures described under chapter 8 against this risk put both implementing agency (FAO) and donor (ECHO) to task "increasing awareness-raising among decision-makers." This seems to represent a narrow focus of what risks, assumptions and contingency measures should constitute of.

While the assumption referred to above borders on the tautological, other assumptions come to mind that c/should have been added that despite raised awareness, it is assumed that (1) stakeholders have indeed a strong interest in a tool that provides a generic national situation analysis twice a year; (2) stakeholders are content to assign personnel to work under FAO's sectoral lead; and (3) there is access to sufficient data to make the meta-analysis tool a useful exercise – a key assumption, recognized early on, as the operational data management system run by the FSNAU in Somalia explains an important part of the original success of IPC in Somalia;

Perhaps the most important weakness of the project design is the inherent assumption that problems can be solved through technical transfer of knowledge and experiences alone. Past experiences in FSNIS support to Sub-Saharan Africa at country and regional level have shown that this model has often failed. Increased technical capabilities do not lead automatically to changed behavior, institutionalization and/or decision-making more responsive to the FS sector's needs. And to continue this line of thought, training of a large number of individuals does not lead inevitably to organizational change or development.

The project design pays insufficient attention to the fact that decision-making is complex and information is just one input, among other socio-economic, cultural and political considerations. This again emphasizes the gap between the project specific objective and the 4 main result areas.

The selection of countries Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – with extension of CAR and Ethiopia, certainly brought together a heterogeneous number of countries as in respect to history, language, humanitarian and developmental context and sheer

geographical size. This has had undoubtedly consequences for a broader range of inputs that was needed although experiences with IPC may be said to be more diverse.

3.2 COHERENCE WITH PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS' MANDATES

Overall, the mission feels that the project has accomplished the results listed in the logframe at output level. In barely 3 years, it has been able to raise considerable awareness on the tool as well as on broader FS, contribute significantly to the collaboration between stakeholders in the sector, accomplished to change common data collection tools to fit the IPC meta-analysis, and produce new well-designed products (maps).⁸

The project has generally accomplished the results listed in the logframe at output level.

The IPC has received strong backing from the user community, especially national governments despite the weaknesses in its design. The new “common language” as some respondents refer to it, has allowed a common understanding of what constitutes a humanitarian disaster or a livelihood crisis. This is very much appreciated. The team received evidence (at outcome level) from senior government officials that the IPC analysis has been included into broader analysis and its key recommendations have been submitted for action to the highest relevant forums– in particular disaster management platforms such as TANDREC in Tanzania, KFSSG in Kenya and the Humanitarian FS Cluster and the OPM in Uganda. The team has been shown Cabinet Memo’s where the IPC analysis and its map have been presented.

At the regional level, the FSNWG has been quite effective in distribution of the information products from the countries and regional consolidation exercises. Members have said to use it predominantly for strategic purposes and to monitor their own country programmes.

It is worth noting that the project’s marketing mix has altered over time, with an initial push for a high-quality tool, similar to experiences in Somalia where strong data supports the analysis, to a more pragmatic and inclusive approach, with a focus on governance and inclusiveness of various data sources. The latter approach has been largely successful in the institutionalization of the process under a strong government lead among the 5+1 countries, where technical improvements are aimed for more gradually. This has had consequences for a number of areas that will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

3.2.1 STRENGTHEN CAPACITY IN FOOD SECURITY ANALYSIS

One of the areas that has received the largest attention, and has been key to galvanizing the collaboration and spearheading the main project outputs has been the capacity development. The following main activities have been covered: (1) awareness raising on food security and FSNIS⁹; (2) IPC training, provided at regional, national and sub-national

⁸ For a full list and overview of project activities per country, please see Annex... The JMM report also provides many details under this result area (p6)

⁹ based to a large extent on the e-learning courses produced under the FAO/EC Food Security Information for Action Programme with key inputs from WFP, FEWS NET and INGOs. Click on the External End-of-Project Evaluation Final Report

level –developed by the regional team; (3) IPC Training-of-Trainers (ToT); (4) training in GIS protocols for IPC maps; and (5) lessons learning, a feedback loop to learn from past experiences – success and failures. The OVI for this result area – 15 technical experts trained in each of the countries has been achieved. While many more individuals have been trained a core group of 10-20 people conversant with IPC was generally present. This has proven to be more difficult for the Team to ascertain at the regional level.

Perhaps much more could have been done if the project would have hired staff according to the posts allocated in the original project design. The project, FAO, has not been able to recruit two food security analysts and a regional training expert despite efforts. It may be that the conditions of the contracts offered by FAO (short-term consultancy contracts) have had a negative impact on their chances to recruit experienced bi-lingual food security analysts in a globally competitive market. The JMM in June 2010 asked for redressing this shortage in staff. A solution was found by the use of the CARE IPC technical advisor, recruited by GSU and seconded to join the REOA team in Nairobi and take over the technical backstopping duties to Uganda and Tanzania. His inputs have been greatly appreciated by the countries but his attention has been divided among different priorities. Subsequently, this should not be seen as a substitution for a full-time staff member. The absence of specifically designated staff has surely reduced the impact of a project with a large focus on capacity development.

This is clearly an issue where the GSU or FAO-ESA, responsible for technical backstopping should have intervened to ensure such a critical project would be fully staffed. The 2009 Global IPC evaluation points to the general lack of IPC and food security experts, and it seems the problem has not yet been taken seriously enough, perhaps due to a shortage of resources or because the roles and responsibilities are not sufficiently stipulated in this regard.

For 2.5 years, the core project team consisted of a project manager or regional food security advisor and an international food security analyst. They should be commended on their commitment to, and results achieved by supporting 7 countries.

The anticipated formal capacity reviews at the start of the project that should have guided the project activities in this area have generally not been undertaken, with exception from Tanzania. Here, a review was conducted to inform the new design of a national Livelihood based Food security and Nutrition Information System (LFSNS) under the GoT/UN Joint Programme.

The training activities have been discussed with the teams, and it is felt the appropriate individuals have been selected. During interviews, IPC TWG members have stated they have been part of single or multiple training sessions. A number have been exposed to the regional meetings. Although the team received a few complaints about the lack of a follow-up plan to the ToT courses, it is worth noting that many have indeed been involved in training themselves, often at district levels, in preparation for a bi-annual assessment feeding into the IPC meta-analysis (examples of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania).

following link for direct access: <http://www.foodsec.org/DL/elcpages/food-security-learning-center.asp?pgLanguage=en&leftItemSelected=food-security-learning-center>

The project has targeted most of the capacity development activities on individuals rather than providing wider support to some of the key organizations, which is a weakness. It could be argued that broader support to key institutions would be beyond the scope and means of the project, although a few targeted activities (engagement with senior management on capacity needs, review of TORs, etc.) could easily have been added. This is perhaps also a consequence of the expanded scope of serving 7 countries rather than the core 5, and the scarce human resources the project had access to.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the project document has not listed changes in personal and organizational behavior among its success indicators. But also here, the mission has met several partners, including senior government officials, who made a strong case for changes in behavior and using of the added knowledge and skills on a daily basis. To give one example, the IPC reference table seems to have emphasized the importance of the different FS components, with a much better and broader appreciation for the roles of water, nutrition and health. These changes in perception can have significant positive effects, for instance at the district level – where multi-stakeholder teams operate and jointly discuss opportunities for most appropriate interventions. Improved awareness could lead to more effective allocation of scarce resources to the neediest areas.

The project needs to be commended in the flexible way it has followed the lead of governments who have been insistent that large emphasis was given to train a number of district staff.

The User Guide, finalized by the project team during phase I, has also been found to be an excellent reference document for country teams, much more so than the IPC manual. Responses from interviewees have been very positive. It is believed the wide distribution of the User Guide among IPC practitioners has come to the rescue of the project, especially in cases where the limited regional HR were unable to provide technical backstopping to the national teams on demand.

The capacity development has been affected by availability of documents in English only. Francophone countries have had less and/or late access to IPC documentation. Support from GSU in this respect has been viewed insufficient. Other local languages (like Swahili) could also be worth translating (for Kenya and Tanzania). It comes as a surprise that the project has not used its budget line for contracts to outsource the translation of key documentation. Burundi, DR Congo and CAR have suffered due to the language barrier and have missed out on opportunities to learn from early adaptors such as Somalia and Kenya. Support to the Francophone countries has depended heavily on the individual contribution by project staff, and to some extent by the national IPC consultant in Burundi who has visited and provided backstopping to the other 2 countries on occasions. The support to DR Congo, a vast undertaking due to the sheer size and complexity of the situation in-country has been guided by a strong FAO presence in-country.

Although some individuals from Universities participate in the national IPC TWGs¹⁰, it is understood so far, no national institute of higher learning has been identified and targeted

¹⁰ Sokoine University of Agriculture in Tanzania; Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture & Technology in Kenya; and University of Kinshasa, DR Congo

for support to mature into a (regional) hub for relevant training and/or coaching. Perhaps the contributions from the University of Kinshasa in DRC come closest to such a role. Even though in Tanzania a number of students have been trained on IPC basics, in the other countries the involvement of education institutes has not gotten beyond the planning stage. The team feels this is a missed opportunity to enhance efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the IPC tool and the broader need for FSNIS experts in the future. It is recommended that this will be a priority for any future capacity development activities in this area.

3.2.2 ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS AVAILABLE AND INTEGRATED INTO REGIONAL/GLOBAL ANALYSES

The project countries have delivered the outputs as expected. An open process guided by the IPC tool (mainly a table of reference indicators and three analytical templates) has led to the production of (in-)complete templates, a consolidated situation analysis and a map summarizing the key points. The products show the technical consensus created during the process. Over the past 3 or 4 years, countries have gone through a number of cycles, which have consolidated the learnings for applying the tool.

At regional level, the FSNWG has provided its clientele with monthly updates, with particular emphasis on countries that just released their latest products. The regional workshops have provided a big opportunity for learning, and have contributed largely to what the project calls “cross-fertilization” between the countries. The team did not find any evidence of inclusion of the IPC reports in global analysis.

The strong ownership of government of the IPC process in the region has perhaps had a negative effect on the swift distribution of results among stakeholders. Too often, especially in Tanzania and Kenya, IPC teams have had to wait till the results had been presented to a high-level meeting of government officials before they could release it to a wider audience. The observed underinvestment in communication and advocacy clearly plays an important role in this respect. It seems that after all the investment in the situation analysis also other spin-off products should be considered with specific audiences and timelines in mind. During the country visits, opportunities were discussed about enlarging audiences. For instance, the detailed district IPC exercises conducted in Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania would be highly relevant to inform district planning processes, while the bi-annual situation analysis - national report and maps would constitute a welcome addition to ongoing poverty analysis. The team did not observe any efforts of engagements with National Poverty Monitoring Units in this matter.

3.2.3 IPC TOOL INTEGRATED INTO EXISTING FOOD SECURITY ANALYTICAL SYSTEMS

The project has been largely successful with incorporating the tool into existing food security analytical systems, with the exception of Ethiopia. It has achieved this possibly with a minimum of resources, as these mechanisms or systems are operational (and well-established) in Kenya and Tanzania, less so in Uganda, Burundi and DR Congo. If anything, the reception from the countries with the stronger institutional set-up has been skeptical to IPC, which has delayed the introduction of the tool in those countries. But once these teams

had been convinced about the benefits of the tool, after going through 1 or 2 cycles, the classifying tool – and not necessary the entire process associated with it - has been eagerly incorporated into the existing system of assessments and analysis.

The IPC tool, process and products have helped to strengthen the system of assessment and analysis in the other 3 core countries to a much larger extent as there is no alternative system available (Burundi, DR Congo and CAR). While the tool, process and products are popular with stakeholders, the post-crisis situation has prevented the establishment of an operational broader FSNIS with buy-in from government and partners. Weak government services have put severe limitations on the chances to sustain IPC after the project comes to an end. Perhaps, this would justify continued donor support for IPC operations in these countries, particularly as an alternative to IPC is absent in these particular countries.

The project has been urged by the JMM to develop a funding strategy for global, regional and country levels, and within the institutionalization efforts, ensure long-term funding for IPC country activities. In fact, the JMM recommended recruiting a Resource Mobilization Advisor.

The GSU was able to recruit one as late as November 2010. Fund raising guidelines are said to be distributed among country and regional teams. While the mission has noted some fund raising efforts by FAO-REAO at the regional level for both region and countries, few efforts have been made to support national IPC TWG in the last six months of the project life span. During the country visits, the Team encountered some national IPC consultants that were blissfully ignorant of how IPC activities would be sustained after the project came to an end. No proposals were observed to circulate among donors to continue activities at a minimum. FAO Kenya has been the only team that had secured funds for another year of IPC activities (SIDA) by the end of 2010.

FAO-REAO management suggested that perhaps half of the national IPC consultants (2-3) would be assimilated into the national FAO Representations. Facilitation of the IPC process would therefore be saved for some time.

Best practices and lessons learning exercises have generally been consistently held at country level.

3.2.4 BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED RECORDED AND DISSEMINATED

Best practices and lessons learning exercises have generally been consistently held at country level. Interviews with respondents have shown that changes have been made to the tool and process (inclusion of additional stakeholders), and in data collection tools on the basis of these exercises.

The JMM had recommended the recruitment of a regional consultant to take the lead in consolidating the lessons learning exercises in the region. A consultant has been hired for two and a half month; she has visited the Anglophone countries and has provided a more structured template for the exercises at country and regional level. Much of this work has accumulated in the November 2010 Regional Workshop, where country presentations have led to thematic discussions and consolidation of lessons learned and best practices. This

workshop report that would include these lessons was not yet available at the time of the evaluation mission.

The Team has noted that the GSU has issued a detailed case-study of Uganda's experiences with IPC, which has been tasked to the CARE IPC technical advisor. The team would actually recommend that the regional project team – assisted by national IPC consultants – to write such descriptions for all 5 core countries – containing details as to the context, institutional framework, progress made over time with the tool, assessment/ analysis, and use of the products. In the end these descriptions should record the successes and failures of the project in a way that allows an audience from within and outside the region to optimize their learnings. Lessons learning exercises are often found weak as they focus too much on the individual elements. These do not always provide the inexperienced reader with a gratifying read. It is understood that these reports are still foreseen to be written by the regional project team during the remaining month of the project, January 2011.

A funding strategy for global, regional and country levels, as proposed through the JMM in June 2010 and in particular within the institutionalization efforts, to ensure long-term funding for IPC country activities has not materialized.

3.3 PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

The coordination structure put in place to support the adoption of IPC at regional as well as national level has worked reasonably well. A core group of technical experts have been associated with the IPC through so-called technical working groups. A larger audience of mainly users is sought for the distribution of IPC products, predominantly through the humanitarian food security clusters and national sectoral working groups.

FAO REOA has been largely responsible for secretarial services to the regional FSNWG. This serves as a forum for exchange of information. It also reports to the UN Regional Humanitarian Partners Team (RHPT) chaired by OCHA and co-chaired by an NGO representative from the Inter-Agency Working Group in Nairobi.

The national coordination was conducted by full-time national IPC consultants who generally resided within the national FAO Representations. They have been a clear asset to the project. Some of the national IPC consultants have been able to harness externalities within their offices. A good example is Uganda, where the FAO Representation (FAO-TCE M&E Officer) has lend a hand with vital mapping services.

Regarding financial management of the project, the team was surprised to see the complex financial management structure in place, with a budget holder at FAO HQ, whereas it would be more efficient assigning the project manager as the budget holder. This would have provided more flexibility to the project manager and would be clear about end responsibility for the successful implementation of the project.

The link with the GSU and the support received from FAO HQ has been limited. It is understood that the GSU has had staffing problems as well. The GSU has provided welcome support to the region through the secondment of Justus Liku, IPC technical advisor for the GSU. This CARE IPC technical advisor based in Nairobi has taken on the responsibility of

backstopping Uganda and Tanzania in June 2010. His role was to provide direct technical backstopping on behalf of the GSU directly in the region and to ensure the link between the region and the global level. Two other analysts from Oxfam and Save the Children have recently found refuge in the REOA offices in Nairobi. These focal points are institutionalization focal points for their respective agencies and they report to their own agency. Their primary role is to increase awareness, ownership and participation within the agency. The GSU made these recruitments possible through signing a number of Letters of Agreement with global IPC partners. The input and support of GSU are listed in a table under Annex 7. Promotion of IPC among NGOs in the region, including their own, is among their top priorities. Their contracts will run out by end of December 2010, when the ECHO-funded IPC Global project comes to an end.

GSU staff provided operational and technical support in some instances like support to regional workshops and to the DRC and Uganda analysis. Desk and operational support was provided more regularly, as a result of the support of a dedicated Country Support officer for the region within the GSU (June 2010).

The HR situation has certainly led to a reduced engagement with senior management of UN agencies and governments at the country level in 2010. Whereas earlier the project manager entertained this vital strain of communication, it has been mostly absent after June 2010. National coordinators have stated to the team, they lacked management support from the region in supporting their efforts to fund raise in order to sustain operations into 2011. As a consequence, the mission feels that many countries have not developed optimal exit strategies (if at all) and have not started early enough with fund raising to allow a continuation of core IPC activities such as training and key analytical workshops.

3.4 COMMUNICATION

At country level, the communication of IPC products has been largely dependent on the initiatives employed by the national IPC consultants and the national IPC TWG. Some of them, Burundi and Uganda for example, have admirably invested in dissemination of products and the production of spin-off products like newsletters and briefs. Others, such as Tanzania have refrained from any additional dissemination activities. One activity that has been particularly successful in almost all countries, has been the use of so-called high-level meetings with senior decision-makers, mainly from government. Relevant senior officials within and outside government would be invited to listen to the results of the latest situation analysis. In DRC these meetings are organized on the last day of the 5 day national analytical workshop, whilst in the other countries it is usually 1-3 weeks after the technical validation of the results.

At regional level, the project has received technical support from the communication/report officer at FAO REOA. She has mostly assisted with the development of FSNWG newsletters. Despite these inputs, the reviewers have found the communication/dissemination of IPC products to be a weakness. The project could have profited from a dedicated communication person at the regional level or budget allocations for part-time assistance at country level.

The IPC website, managed from Rome by GSU, has included a bulletin board for an exchange of views by an expanding IPC user group. This has been largely operational, except towards the end of 2010 when it was migrating to another platform. The IPC regional map of 2008 has only been uploaded at a very late stage. Also, use of the IPC website by national IPC teams for downloading documents seems to have been fairly low. Lack or limited quality of internet access may have hampered participation from some of the countries in any case. The bulletin board has not been used as an important communication tool between country teams. The language barrier has played a limiting factor all by its own.

Communication has not received enough attention by the project, especially at country level, in part due to a weakness in the project design itself.

3.5 ALLOCATION AND USE OF FUNDS

The expenditures by countries are broadly in line with their original allocations – about 50 per cent of the total budget. The expenditures at the regional level have increased. In part, savings under expenditure account of personnel have been used for the project extension with 6 months till end of 2010. The original allocation of 10 per cent to HQ seems to have been used on direct support costs, visibility, technical support services, and operations.

The Team has found the financial management for a regional project of this size unnecessarily complicated. It would have expected the regional project manager to be budget holder and overall responsible, supported by an administration/financial officer. Instead, the team has found a project where the main budget holder and admin support is housed at HQ in Rome. Straightforward transactions between the region and FAO National representations have become entrenched in an additional layer of administration. FAO's REOA does have a financial/ administration officer but she only acts as an in-between. In addition, FAO procedures stipulate that all international contracts, including contracts such as LOAs of any significance are processed through HQ.

It is difficult to ascertain details of all major project expenditures, including the large accounts on contracts, duty travel, and in-service training. A verification according to the established procedure between UN and EC may provide more details, but this is clearly beyond the mandate of this evaluation mission.

4. COUNTRY SUPPORT

4.1 TECHNICAL BACKSTOPPING FROM REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVEL

The regional support to the countries has focused on the explanation and adoption of the IPC tool, mainly in the areas of analytical capacity development, development of products, institutionalization of the tool and finally recording best practices and lessons learning. Whereas at the onset of the project several FAO staff members were involved in technical backstopping, only the international Food Security Specialist has provided support throughout the project period.

From FAO-REOA, towards the end of the project there were insufficient staff members to provide technical and management support to the countries. Project posts have been left vacant.

From June 2010, an IPC technical advisor from CARE has been appointed for support to NGO (training) events and to contribute to country support, in particular in Kenya, together with the Deputy Food Security Specialist from REOA. An advisor from Oxfam was designated to support the IPC implementation as well. The Francophone countries remained covered by the international FAO specialist, who still needed to guide the activities in CAR as well. The technical advisors have mostly focused on providing technical inputs around training events and national IPC analytical workshops. The advisors are housed by FAO REOA in Nairobi. Day-to-day backstopping has been less frequent. All these advisors have been recruited by the IPC GSU through Letters of Agreement and have supported the region.

Otherwise, the mission has found the interaction between global-region and global-country levels, including day-to-day communication, to have been limited. Apart from the line of support towards the countries, it is also important that the GSU, the Global Partnership and Steering Committee get exposure to the experiences from the field. The team has not heard of very few occasions where representatives from national IPC TWGs have been invited to global (SC) meetings. In the past few years, a number of experts from regional and 9 experts from national level have been invited to major global events, including ones for the development of the new technical manual version 2.0. The details on these exchanges may be found in the table under Annex 7. Even though recommendations from lessons learned workshops have been incorporated, the fairly limited participation from regional and especially national level risks producing a new version that is bereft of important lessons from the region with the largest exposure to IPC outside of Somalia. A reform is to be approved at the next SC meeting (Feb 2011), for invitation of representatives of the IPC at regional level to the Steering Committee meetings.

The project manager and food security analyst have attended numerous trainings and provided hands-on training and developed documentation/ training materials. The seconded analysts from the global partners have also attended and supported a number of trainings.

The Francophone countries have faced problems with regard to training documents and reports, which have not always been available in French and if they have become available, it has taken a very long time to translate the needed-documents, even though an

improvement was seen in 2010. At regional level, there were also insufficient people speaking French, putting a high pressure on those who do to support the countries under consideration (Burundi, DR Congo and CAR). This clearly affected management support in 2010.

Staff members from regional level and also the seconded analysts at a later stage have attended analytical workshops and facilitated the peer review to ensure quality of outputs. The regional office has regularly participated in the analysis workshop to offer support and guidance in this regard and has reviewed all maps and reports before they were issued. FAO-REAO has also supported country teams with finding solutions to specific technical problems like the absence of population numbers and cross-border issues.

Interaction between global-region and global-country levels has been very limited.

In the first phase of the project, National IPC Technical Working Groups (TWG) were successfully established. They are often lead by one of the Ministries. The TWGs have coordinated IPC activities until the end of the project in December 2010.

Due to staff changes in the project, the project management support within REAO and towards the countries has been lacking. The absence of a fund raising strategy towards the end of the project, despite the JMM's recommendations, is seen as one of the evident results.

Both the project manager and the food security analyst have traveled extensively to raise further awareness on IPC and its relation to food security.

Most countries received regional support in various IPC related areas, except in Kenya, where the government has already a good grasp of the IPC process. The government shared that it does not really need extensive support from regional level. The regional support was therefore mainly focused at participation and technical guidance in training and lessons learned workshops.

With regard to collecting and disseminating lessons learned, FAO-REOA has hired a lessons learned consultant who has supported the project and partners in the last 6 months of the project's duration.

The support of the regional office has been highly appreciated by many stakeholders and was anticipated to continue in 2011. The regional office should continue providing support to the FSNWG and plays an important role for technical backstopping of countries in the region. Some donors (like ECHO and OCHA) found the support of the regional office a prerequisite for future funding of the IPC. Many stakeholders shared the view to be incapable to continue without financial and technical support from the regional level. A common view was that it would be unfair to stop the IPC now for lack of external funding, whereas an exit strategy (including a fund raising strategy) might have helped to continue implementation after 2010 as well as raise funding, possibly at country level.

4.2 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED ASSISTANCE

Even though awareness raising has been part of the capacity development and has been implemented by the stakeholders and supported by FAO-REOA, it was found that much more awareness on food security and the IPC is still needed. The direct partners of IPC are often aware of IPC and its use and merits, but outside this core group actors have often never heard of IPC. Especially in DR Congo and Burundi, only a very small group of people knew about IPC and from the questionnaires it appeared that the knowledge of partners sometimes was only partial.

Support from the project manager and international food security analyst has been strong with regard to training, analysis workshops and technical issues.

With regard to training, from all countries, people have regularly participated in IPC training and ToT events at regional and national level and the responses have been mostly positive. The acquired knowledge and skills have been used for imparting training at national level and in the larger countries also at provincial and district level.

In the log frame, a total of 15 trainers trained per country was the required result under the FS capacity building section. In DR Congo, the total of 15 trainers (including those trained during the first phase of the project) appeared far too few, even to only cover each province at a minimum level. As far as possible, local stakeholders have been trained by these trained trainers but the knowledge is not yet sufficiently integrated. Furthermore, as a result of the size of the provinces, a team of experts would be needed to have the capacity to cover all territories within a province, not only because the territories are far apart in distance, but they have very different characteristics as well. Therefore, there is a need to train more local stakeholders.

In Kenya, project technical support has been limited to training of government staff and ToT, with members of the KFSSG, representatives from government, NGOs, and UN agencies being the main beneficiaries. The IPC training fits in within the general capacity development plan of the KFSSG.

In general, among the participants of trainings and workshops, roughly 10% were from national NGOs, 20% from international NGOs, 30% from UN organisations and 40% from the government. About 75% of the trainees use their acquired knowledge and skills. The trained trainers often came from different backgrounds (government, UN or NGO), which may also have helped to reach a broader target group for awareness raising.

In most cases, training has been focused on an individual level up to now and institutionalization has not yet sufficiently been achieved. The mission has not seen examples of incorporation of IPC related skills into task descriptions or TORs. Selection of trainees was not always clearly focused on people who were focal points with regard to food security in their organisation on a long term basis. But positive result in the field of institutional capacity building has been achieved as well. One of the key staff members of the SNSA within the MINAGRI in DR Congo has been trained. He not only coordinates and supports IPC activities in DR Congo, but also advocates for and shares information on the IPC outside the country in international meetings with SADC and others. He has also been responsible for technical backstopping of CAR for the duration of one year. The SNSA is a

stable institute which may remain active in the same composition even if the government changes, which adds to the institutionalization of IPC.

Even though significant numbers of people have been trained at central and decentralized level, most stakeholders felt that there was still a need to train many more for a sustained impact. Still, government staff at district and sub-national level acquired an enhanced understanding of food security and increased their sense of participating in an analysis that produces clear outputs, a fact that was especially appreciated in Uganda. The TCE M&E officer in FAO-Uganda has provided technical assistance in putting together the maps whereas the communication expert has reviewed reports as a technical editor.

A review of institutional mandates and capacities of relevant institutions was not conducted by the project, although the work plan for phase 2 was produced at country level taking into account needs for skills and capabilities. It was again readjusted by country representatives according to the ToT organized in Nairobi in November 2009. To some extent, this has mitigated the risk of focusing solely on individuals. As in the countries under consideration the staff turn-over has been high, focusing on individuals has in the past often led to reduced impact, or even a lack of noticeable impact. The activities for which skills and capabilities are strengthened should get incorporated into existing terms of reference and included in organizational work plans, which has not always been the case, even though improvement was seen.

Training has been too often at an individual level and no examples were found of incorporation of IPC related skills into task descriptions or TORs.

In most cases, the training courses were discussed before implementation and targeted to specific audiences with the full acceptance of the different stakeholders. The governments have played a major role in identifying government staff at the district level as a large beneficiary group. The project has shown flexibility in addressing these substantial needs. Furthermore, the project has recognized at an early stage the need for basic courses that introduced food security concepts. This is not a specified part of IPC, but as knowledge and skills in this regard amongst the different stakeholders were limited, the courses were an absolutely necessity for making significant gains from the actual IPC trainings.

Unfortunately, in most of the countries, except for Tanzania, no capacity assessment or review of skills and needs has been conducted before the onset of the training. Still, a number of efforts were made to ensure the contents and approach of the training would match the existing capacity and skills. In Kenya the project was able to provide additional training at district level upon request of the KFSSG, which was conducted in a highly interactive way. In Burundi and DR Congo, training activities were planned with input of the TWG Group based on their knowledge of the group capacity and needs. The training curriculum was crafted based on a rapid needs/current capacity appreciation of the target group. Training evaluation in general showed positive feedback by participants and in the ToT courses, 80% of the participants were able to reproduce their learning.

Lessons learned workshops have been conducted on a regular basis and specific details are found in Annex 6. The sharing of lessons learned was found very useful by participants and often, recommendations from these workshops were followed up, as in the case of Burundi

where the secretariat of IPC is in the process to be moved to MINAGRIE. As per recommendation of JMM¹¹, a Lessons Learned Facilitator has been recruited for 2 1/2 months who has facilitated country-level lessons learned and consolidated regional LL for the project period. As recommendation 3 on fully implementing IPC cross-fertilization has only been answered in a limited way, the full benefit of these lessons learned has not yet been achieved.

4.3 DOCUMENTATION

Many reports, manuals and guidelines have been produced under the IPC project and most of them have been found useful by the stakeholders, especially the IPC manual, User Guide, and the training package.

A training tool package and Training Manual were published and disseminated, and the feedback of all of the stakeholders was very positive in this regard. The IPC Technical Manual and IPC User Guide are also found very useful and valuable.

Even though the situation has improved in the second half of 2010, the Francophone countries face problems with regard to training documents and reports.

Country teams are looking forward to the appearance of IPC Technical Manual version 2.0, but are at the same time very reluctant about the consequences of the new IPC on their work. They are afraid that the past efforts building capacity among partners have been in vain and new efforts may require a considerable investment in time and financial and human resources to train all relevant people involved. This may discourage some from continued buy-in in the process.

The regional report on IPC lessons learned and best practices is expected to be published in January 2011. The IPC website is a useful tool, which is accessible to all and where one can find most of the disseminated reports and maps. It is difficult to distinguish though from the website, what is the role of the regional office, as it focuses at global and subsequently at country level. A page with maps at regional level is available, but for non-IPC experts it is difficult to understand the added value of the regional level. In Annex 6 the tables of IPC products per country may be found, completed by each of the country offices. The products have been produced as per planning and reports are available of all workshops and trainings. The only limitation was the fact that translation into French took quite a lot of time.

4.4 LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learning has been conducted in the form of LL workshops and LL have been well documented at national, and often at sub-national level. At regional level, lessons learned have also been collected and documented in 2009 and 2010. Towards the end of the project, a consultant was hired for 2.5 months to facilitate the lessons learning process at national and regional level. The consolidated lessons learning process from national and regional level culminated at the last regional workshop in November 2010. The results from the LL

¹¹ JMM, page 7 Recommendations 2 and 3

still need to be consolidated in one report, as recommended by the JMM in June. Absence of such a consolidated report makes it difficult to review if the process, tools used and final product have been of sufficient quality. The countries have reacted positively to the last LL exercise. The lessons learning exercises have been generally successful at the country-level.

There has also been considerable feedback from lessons learned. During the IPC cycles with events organized and supported by the regional team, many positive lessons and examples have been used as part of capacity development. Experiences from other countries have generally been among the most popular items at workshops. A community of IPC practitioners has been formed in the region – with a clear divide between Francophone and Anglophone countries.

It may be appropriate to develop detailed country reports that document the history of IPC and development of process and products with particular emphasis on the institutional and political context. This task is still scheduled to be generated by the project, early in 2011. The countries should provide the documentation of the lessons learned in their respective country contexts. The information will be useful for the IPC community in other parts of the world and particularly for the global partners. A global LL report is in preparation for January 2011, where lessons learned are collected and made available to all interested parties. .

Under the heading of “cross-fertilization,” some exchanges have taken place between national IPC consultants. More could have been done, in particular promoting the exchange between the different levels - country, regional and global level. For instance, a representative from the national IPC TWGs could have been invited to an IPC Global Steering Committee, to show and illustrate progress made in the country under consideration. Exchanges between countries has been complicated because of the existing language barrier. Separate meetings have been organized, mostly in 2010, to learn from regional and country experiences in the process of developing the new IPC vision and manual version 2.0. For example, a two week technical retreat was held in Ispra, Italy (July 2010) where all relevant regional project staff attended.

5. TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT

5.1 STRATEGIC FOCUS

While the evaluation team has been asked to refrain from an in-depth technical review of the tool, it has proven useful to review the experiences – technical strengths and weaknesses - at both country and regional level. It is thought that these experiences should help to inform improvements to the tool, such as the development of a version 2.0, as well as inform plans that would introduce these revisions among the core 5 countries plus CAR (5+1) in the near future.

It is important to state once again that there is a broad consensus among stakeholders in the 5+1 countries that the core elements of the IPC tool are the multi-stakeholder approach, the meta-analysis and universal severity classifiers of transitory food insecurity. While not all templates (1+2+3) are fully completed by all national teams during the analytical cycles, the validity of these templates is not under discussion. Time constraints are given as reasons for not completing templates 2 and 3. Most IPC TWGs find the templates relevant in identifying underlying causes and summarizing potential interventions in the short, immediate and longer-term. And, even as their weaknesses are known and noted, the templates are well-appreciated. They have been very useful in raising awareness how to conduct food security analysis.

The project has made positive contributions to the development of the tool. It has been successful in testing and incorporating innovations, in particular as to redefining the IPC phase classifications 1 a/b, 2 and 3.

Given the many interviews conducted at regional and national level, it may be appropriate for the Team to caution any introduction of a revised IPC in this region, mainly since the current tool is well-appreciated, operational and churns out products of acceptable quality. One should be careful with introducing major revisions as they may be received to be top-down. If not well conceived, any imposed upgrades may well introduce new challenges that local teams are not able or willing to overcome. Moreover, if introduction of these changes would be considered in the region, they should surely come with sufficient resources to make the shift quickly and relatively painless. Given the perceived lack of interest from relevant stakeholders to invest in IPC – with exception from SIDA in Kenya, no donor has come forward to sponsor the initiative – it goes without saying that any proposed change should be demand-driven and tailored to the specific conditions and needs of the countries.

5.2 COMPARABILITY VERSUS ADAPTIBILITY

The strong ownership of IPC in the 5+1 countries can be partly explained by the flexibility the project team (and country teams) has shown allowing adaptations to the tool at (sub-) national level. The technical consensus created through the use of proxy-indicators has worked well at country-level but may have impacted the comparability of results across borders. Although this is perhaps of secondary concern to a majority of national

stakeholders involved, and in particular to national governments – the IPC champions in many respects - the goal of comparing key indicators across borders is the main aim for a donor like ECHO. In general, all stakeholders whose operations fall within a regional or global scope, including inter-governmental organizations such as EAC or IGAD, would profit from a strong adherence by country teams to a set of key reference indicators.

The Team has found that soft evidence in this respect points to reasonable success by the project in keeping a balance between comparability and adaptability. The open process and validation that takes place through cross-border analysis at the annual regional workshops has been quite successful. It has been able to produce regional maps, and its results have not been contested, with a few exceptions. In the current situation, the Team feels that technical considerations should be prioritized to safeguard a basic level of comparability and credibility of the analysis.

Quality control through internal peer review mechanisms have functioned well during the current project phase, while external peer reviews from the region or GSU has been too limited.

5.3 TECHNICAL ISSUES

One of the areas where the project has been successful is in making positive contributions to the development of the tool outside the Somalia context. This has been absolutely critical for the development and awareness raising and coalition building around the tool at global level. It has been successful in testing and incorporating innovations in the design of the tool, in particular as to redefining the IPC phase classifications 1 a/b, 2 and 3. Experimentation with both quantitative and qualitative information in different contexts has been helpful in understanding the effectiveness of the tool in different contexts.

Access to livelihood baselines (descriptions and profiles) has proven to be greatly beneficial to understand as the context against the predominantly quantitative reference indicators.

A number of technical weaknesses have been identified through lessons learning exercises and have been reiterated during discussions in the field. The most important points, although certainly not an exhaustive list, have been summarized below. Many of them may be addressed in the new manual.

- The IPC initiative has not yet developed an analytical framework that should help explain the causal relationships of the elements and indicators in use (component of the new manual version 2.0);
- The availability of up-to-date outcome indicators from the reference table is a concern. They include data on nutrition and mortality rates. Population figures are not among the indicators, which is an additional weakness. Hence, efforts to prompt improvements to data collection tools should be encouraged.
- There has been insufficient guidance to countries as to the use of proxy indicators.
- The incorporation of different elements in the analysis and subsequent products – such as severity scale and early warning (risk of worsening phase), have lead to difficulties in interpretation and comparability.

- The demand for early warning or forecasting tools are high. The outcome indicators used by the tool have severe limitations as to any predictive value that the product offers.
- The integration of chronic food insecurity in the analysis requires further attention. Chronic food insecurity relates to a temporal dimension (duration), which is challenging to capture through a single phase classification (1 a/b).
- The IPC's strategic response framework for potential responses has been found useful, although it has been accepted that it provides a narrow view coming from analysts with little programming experiences.
- Internal peer review mechanisms are used to validate the IPC results with good results. External quality control, currently undertaken by the project, should likely be improved at regional level to ensure open process and continued drive towards a stronger evidence-base for analysis (component of new manual version 2.0).

6. PARTNERSHIPS

6.1 IPC GLOBAL PARTNERS

The most important IPC global partners active in Central and Eastern Africa are WFP and FEWS NET. Relations are generally good. Other IPC global partners such as Save the Children, CARE and OXFAM do participate at national as well as regional level although their participation varies considerably.

CARE, SAVE and OXFAM have seconded or hired a food security analyst in the region with financial support from the IPC GSU. They are accommodated by FAO-REOA and generally engage with NGOs in the region trying to gain support for the IPC. The IPC technical advisor from CARE has been assigned the responsibility to technically support Uganda and Tanzania.

Even though the global partners are active in most of the countries, the level of participation is not always equal or consistent and global partners do not offer large financial contributions, although contributions from WFP and FEWS NET in Uganda, and CARE in Burundi are noted. Oxfam in particular appears generally absent from national IPC TWG. In view of the end of the IPC project, the global partners could be requested to step up their role at country (and regional) level with regard to technical assistance and funding.

In Burundi, Save the Children does not have an office and Oxfam is only active in a very limited way and has only established its presence in 2 provinces; CARE is very active. WFP avails technical support to IPC and has been an important technical and strategic partner; one of the WFP staff members is known as a key IPC expert in the country. For 2010/11 an agreement between FEWS NET and FAO is in the making (not yet formalized or documented) to consolidate cooperation in data supply, with FAO providing a number of food security and harvest related data and FEWS NET the satellite agro-met data.

In DR Congo, WFP is not a strong partner of IPC in DR Congo. FEWS NET has not been established yet; its set up is constrained by the same issues as faced by IPC, namely lack of harvest data and limited quality of infrastructure.

Under the KFSSG structure in Kenya, almost all global partners are active, including WFP, FEWS NET, Oxfam, CARE and SCF. In Tanzania, the MUCHALI members are fewer. They include FEWS NET, but the roles of WFP and the NGOs are much smaller. FAO plays a prominent role with the establishment of the LFSNIS or MUCHALI under the overall leadership of the GoT.

Global partners may need to develop more specific strategies to articulate better their commitment to IPC and detail their level of engagement as well as the countries in which they are willing and capable to contribute to IPC implementation and awareness raising.

It needs to be noted that the global partners may play a supportive role to the region and nations, but their influence is limited as the diversity of players in the countries do not let themselves easily be represented through any forum, including the IPC Global Partnership. For instance, in the Francophone countries, a large number of NGOs are active in IPC, but they are not represented at regional or global level. Apart from the big 2 (WFP and FEWS NET) no other Global partner has universal presence and the associated mandate to participate in FSNIS forums. Perhaps, more specific strategies should be developed how the

partners will support the regional and country activities. Such a strategy has not been observed anywhere and may be the obvious way forward if the Global Partnership wants to further develop and operationalize its commitments to IPC.

6.2 IPC REGIONAL PARTNERS

FAO has established a Regional Emergency Office for Eastern and Central Africa (REAO) a few years ago in Nairobi, Kenya. FAO-REAO has hosted the IPC project for the past 3 years. The Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) is also based in Nairobi and provides a significant potential source of technical expertise for the application of IPC in Kenya. WFP, UNOCHA and FEWS NET function as regional as well as national partners and they all have a regional office based in Nairobi. NGOs that play important roles in the region are ACF, World Vision, and the Red Cross.

UNOCHA leads the United Nations Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team, of which most UN agencies are a member. The FSNWG, under which the IPC steering committee resorts, is a sub group of the RHPT

The Inter Agency Working Group (IAWG), is a forum for exchange of information and regional coordination of activities in Central Africa on emergency response largely for thirty NGOs. The chair of the IAWG co-chairs the RHPT to improve communication between its members.

It was suggested by various stakeholders that cooperation with regional institutes like East Africa Community, IGAD and COMESA may add to the sustainability and impact of IPC, and that more advocacy is needed in that regard at regional and global level.

6.2.1 FSNWG

The IPC Regional Steering Committee (SC) is placed under the umbrella of the FSNWG and consists of the following membership: FEWS NET, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, SCF-UK and SCF-US, CARE, Action Against Hunger (AAH) and Oxfam. The SC has provided mainly technical guidance to the project team in their country support activities. FSNWG has disseminated the maps and conducted limited comparative regional analysis. The FSNWG Secretariat, FAO-REAO has produced regular monthly newsletters, containing recently produced country maps and reports, which are then disseminated further. The evaluation team found that not all possibilities of dissemination had been explored and used, and that an increase of target groups and occasions may also add to the awareness and visibility of IPC. The strengthening of the FSNWG at regional level has to be commended for drawing stakeholders into the importance of food security in the region. Furthermore, not all participants of the FSNWG show the same level of commitment to promote IPC at country level. It would be good to establish clear guidelines to clarify respective roles and responsibilities so the input and focus of all participants can be aligned.

6.3 IPC PARTNERS AT NATIONAL LEVEL

The participation of NGOs is larger in the Francophone countries than in the Anglophone countries; especially local NGOs are active at country level. NGOs do not seem to be represented very well at the regional and global level. NGOs invest mainly at the level of

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human resources; hardly any of them has invested financially or is willing to do so in the near future.

All stakeholders at country level were very satisfied with the coordination among the IPC partners, the frequency and quality of communication and the regularity of the meetings.

Some stakeholders suggested that the homogeneity of the group might compromise the transparency, because these stakeholders may be more inclined to depict the situation gloomier than the reality. Inclusion of other stakeholders in food security, like production associations and nationally elected people (and national NGOs in the Anglophone countries) could improve the quality of the process.

In Burundi, among the non-government partners WFP, UNICEF and OCHA should be mentioned. There is a large group of NGOs, among which most regularly participating ones are AAA, COPED, LVIA, CISV, CRS, Oxfam, FH Global, HCB, PACT, WVI, Solidarité, BADEC, ODDBU, CARE and Caritas.

The role of government in Kenya and Tanzania is particularly strong, whereas the role and capacity of governments in (post) conflict countries like Burundi and DR Congo are still weak. There may be a need to transfer more responsibilities to these governments whilst at the same time continue direct support.

The main IPC partners in DR Congo among international organisations and international NGOs are FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, WHO, OCHA, Caritas, World Vision, ACF, Oxfam, COOPI, FHI, ACTED, CARE, NRC, Solidarité, IFES, GTZ, Tear Fund and CESVI, as well as national NGOs (APROBES, ALDI) and the University of Kinshasa. Most of the NGOs are involved in humanitarian support. Even though WFP is officially a partner, the relationship is not optimal. WFP seems to see IPC as competitive and does not use the results; recently, WFP had to be asked by ECHO? to add IPC information to their proposal.

Apart from Tanzania and Kenya, where academics are involved as partners, DR Congo is the only country where the educational sector played a prominent role. Not only were staff from university involved in the technical aspects of the analysis, the information regarding IPC was also incorporated into food security related courses and a couple of students even performed a thesis on the subject of IPC.

FAO is still fully in control of the IPC in DR Congo, with the secretariat of IPC housed in its office and the responsibilities for training, analysis and production of maps and reports. It looks as if it is reluctant to give up this role. Some stakeholders have criticized the strong leadership role of FAO as they see it as hampering the involvement of others, leading to insufficient awareness raising on IPC.

In Kenya, the IPC program is almost fully institutionalized in the government. There is a multi-sectoral approach to food security, led by the Cabinet of Ministers and coordinated by the Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM) and implemented through the Kenya Food Security Steering Group. Apart from the government, partnership comes from FAO, UNICEF, WHO, UNOCHA, UNDP, EU, FEWS NET and NGOs like Oxfam, CARE, SC, World Vision, Kenya Red

Cross, Concern, Islamic Relief, Mercy Corps, Samaritan Purse, FFH and Catholic Relief Services.

The key partners for IPC in Tanzania are former FSIT members (under the MUCHALI framework), among which apart from government are FEWS NET, Sokoine University of Agriculture, FAO, UNICEF and WFP, CARE and World Vision.

The main IPC partners in Uganda are USAID-FEWS NET, UNOCHA, WFP and UNICEF. The relationship with FEWS NET is perceived to be mutually beneficial as the improved networking generally improves the availability and quality of data. From the (I)NGOs SAVE Children, OXFAM, Uganda National Red Cross Society, World Vision, ACF-USA, Feed the Children Uganda, Pastoral Environmental Network for the Horn of Africa (PENHA) are among the most active partners. While SAVE and Oxfam do participate in the IPC their participation is probably more as users than as strong contributors.

Most stakeholders feel that the project has successfully targeted the governments as the real custodians of the IPC process.

In Uganda until mid 2010, the actors from the humanitarian community have played the leading role in IPC. Most coordination and exchange of information between partners has been conducted under the umbrella of a Humanitarian Food Security Cluster, chaired by both FAO and WFP and the IPC TWG has been established under this structure. According to many interviewees, it has been one of the most active and successful clusters in the country. The IPC process, joint situation analysis plus classification of outcomes, has played a key role in the success of this cluster. In December, the Cluster has been dissolved. The IPC is expected to continue under a new Agricultural Sector Working Group, chaired by MAAIF. Fears have been raised that the change will alter the constitution of stakeholders involved, with many of the humanitarian partners dropping out.

6.4 GOVERNMENTS

It is clear from the country visits that governments have been targeted as the real custodians of the process. This was reemphasized by the vision that was adopted by participants at the IPC regional workshop in October 2010. The selection of one of the UN specialized agencies to implement the project has clearly resulted in the promotion of a government-led process with associated capacity development efforts. Many respondents (one of them ECHO) have questioned the possible bias from governments in reporting and taking action on food insecurity. The technical consensus seeking between government, UN and NGOs does take away some of these concerns, but concerns continue to exist. It is quite plausible that at times the interests of all stakeholders, including donors are biased towards emergency responses and it cannot be excluded that IPC products are used to sustain that bias.

There is a clear distinction between the role and input of government in (post) conflict countries like DR Congo and Burundi and the more stable countries. The governments in (post) conflict countries are still young and have a lot of priorities on their plate, security being one of demanding problems. They often do not have the financial nor human capacity and resources to take the lead role in IPC, as there are many demands on their scarce

funding sources. In such countries, the role of FAO and other international organizations automatically becomes larger, and a strong external facilitation role makes the process fast and easily adaptable but also less sustainable.

In Burundi, from government level, there is MINAGRIE (central and provincial level) in the lead role, and furthermore the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning (Ministère du Plan, MINIPLAN), the Geographical Institute (IGEBU) and ISTEERU (Bureau of Statistics). FAO has started up the IPC process but from 2009, MINAGRIE has taken up the administrative side and FAO offers technical support.

In all countries under consideration, most stakeholders admitted that there is no single alternative to the IPC tool.

In DR Congo, MINAGRI is supposed to take over the secretariat of IPC within a short period. The Service Nationale de Statistiques Agricoles (SNSA) is their most knowledgeable and active local Service. Other parties from government are Ministère du Plan, Ministère des Actions Humanitaires, Programme Nationale de Nutrition (ProNanut) of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Internal Affairs all are partners in IPC. The government has only a very small budget for food and agriculture and even though MINAGRI has a large group of staff members, their capacity is low, especially at national level.

In Kenya, the government is not merely a partner but it has taken up the role of lead partner; the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation and the Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands are the most active Ministries in this regard. Furthermore the Ministry of Medical Services, the Ministry of Livestock Development and the Kenya Meteorological Department are involved. Most of the IPC related activities have been implemented under the Arid Lands Resource Management Programme, an umbrella programme initially placed under the Office of the President. The implementing network is the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) that reports to senior management at the Kenya Food Security Meeting. From here recommendations for action are channeled through to the combined PSs and the Cabinet. More details may be found in Annex 3.

In Tanzania, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) has the core mandate of food security policy formulation, project implementation and analysis. A group of government and non-government stakeholders have collaborated as the Food Security Information Team (FSIT) from 2000. From 2008, they have implemented IPC when it was incorporated into the Joint Programme 1 (JP1) —“Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment,” one of the integrated joint programmes between the Government of Tanzania and the UN “Delivering as One.”.

The key partners from government in Tanzania are the Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries (MAFC), Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Health, Technical Food and Nutrition Centre, Tanzania Meteorological Agency and regional and local government authorities.

In Uganda, from the government there is participation from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Water and Environment, the Meteorological Department (MAAIF), the Ministry of Health and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS).

6.5 DONORS

During the field visits, it was felt that donors may need to be better informed about the possibilities of use of IPC reports and maps as well as the broader benefits involved with the IPC process. Unfortunately, there was not enough time to meet with many donors at country level. Apart from the global UN partners UNICEF and WFP, multilateral donors are not involved in the data collection and analysis but are mainly involved as end users. ECHO in Kenya uses IPC products almost on a daily basis. OCHA in DR Congo uses the products in their planning and coordination of humanitarian activities. EC requires addition of IPC maps to proposals submitted by NGOs under their Calls for Proposals for Burundi.

It is therefore unfortunate, that donors have not stepped in to co-finance the IPC products, to prolong the implementation until it will be totally institutionalized in all countries under consideration, especially since most of them admitted the absence of alternatives. It may therefore be worthwhile to put more effort into approaching donors at country level.

7. IMPACT

7.1 ROLE OF IPC IN DECISION-MAKING AT REGIONAL LEVEL

The role of the consolidated regional maps is similar to its use at national level. The IPC maps provide foremost strategic information that also gets translated into advice for national counterparts in the region and helps them monitoring the relevance of their country programmes given the current food security situation. FAO REOA has used the information in the formulation of regional project. Others state that it helps among a number of other information sources to triangulate the state of food insecurity in the region and advocate for needs in the field. They may even serve as ex-post justifications for ongoing interventions.

The mission has found several examples of interventions based on the IPC analysis, particularly by national governments. This is proof that the IPC has successfully been incorporated in the respective national disaster management structures.

FAO REOA has used among others IPC information to help put together a multi-agency USD 15 million proposal for Climate Change adaptation and mitigation for communities in dryland regions (Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia).

Many stakeholders raised the issue of “the rush to the red area”, which may be a weakness in its cartographic protocol, or just a reflection of a crowded humanitarian arena. Apparently, the red areas on the map, depicting the highest food insecure areas (humanitarian emergency and humanitarian catastrophe), attract all attention and human and financial resources as a result. Therefore, stakeholders tend to ignore the other areas, where problems are not as severe, but perhaps many more people are affected. It may emphasize the lack of organization and coordination in the sector. It was suggested that in future the IPC maps could be combined with more extensive information on presence of stakeholders on the ground and ongoing interventions. This would ultimately allow a solid review to be undertaken showing the reliability of the analysis and the actions taken to mitigate crises.

7.2 ROLE OF IPC IN DECISION-MAKING AT NATIONAL LEVEL

In all countries visited there is evidence that the IPC phase classifications and resulting maps have been used regularly. Even though not all stakeholders may always have considered IPC results in their decision making, IPC has certainly played a major role with regard to raising awareness on the food security situation, ways to measure it, its causes and how to address it at (sub-)national level. UN agencies and NGOs have used the information for adaptations in their programmes and projects as well as for illustration of needs in project proposals. Donors have used the information as an additional information source, and may have been influenced to refocus some of the funding to areas with high IPC phase classifications. In countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, national governments have been the most

important users of IPC products. In conflict or post-conflict countries governments have played a less prominent role in using the IPC products for decision making. The mission has found several examples of interventions based on the IPC analysis by governments. This suggests that the IPC has successfully been incorporated in the respective national disaster management structures and the relevant reporting structures to the highest level in government in a number of countries are indeed operational.

In general, the NGOs are constrained by the specific donor demands in their use of IPC products. Calls for proposals are often already very particular with regard to subject and geographical area, so the NGOs do not always have the opportunity to use priority areas developed through IPC. Some of the NGOs use IPC products in regional meetings to advocate with the government. They use also IPC for project formulation, advocacy and reporting writing when appropriate. NGOs have also consulted IPC maps and reports to help decide whether or not to conduct emergency

UN agencies and NGOs have used the information for adaptations in their programmes and projects, illustration of needs in project proposals, justification of geographical targeting and advocacy with government.

interventions. NGOs also use the information for small adaptations in their programmes and projects as well as for illustration of needs of project proposals, but It appeared that sometimes they are still unsure how to interpret the maps and tables. Donors use the information for short term planning but are mostly not involved in the analysis.

IPC is effective in communicating the food security situation to the decision makers. Decision makers find it easier to use IPC in allocating resources¹².

In DR Congo, before the introduction of IPC, availability of data has been an issue. Therefore, the first maps were produced with blind spots, the number of which decreased along the years. The existing data gaps were identified and addressed by the IPC partners. In this case IPC did not only play a consensus forming role, but also improved relevant data collection tools. In the last map of 2010, only two small white areas had remained, which are supposed to be covered by data collection in the next analysis round.

The national ministries have not been using the IPC products in all countries in decision-making, and especially in the Francophone countries the awareness among ministries and prime ministers is low.

The situation analysis, templates, map and classifications are used by many stakeholders in reporting on status within their own organization. IPC is used to advocate for humanitarian interventions in specific geographical areas with IPC classification 3 or higher.

¹² Kenya LL workshop report 2010

7.2.1 EXAMPLES

In Kenya, almost all stakeholders confirmed to use the Short and Long-Rain Assessments (including IPC maps) and its main use was to advocate for humanitarian interventions, from phase III areas. World Vision also used the map to include into project proposals to certify a more justified geographical targeting. The government has used the IPC map and related information on various occasions when the need was deemed high.

In Burundi, UNICEF has used IPC in the development of the “National Plan of Action for Nutrition and Food Security for Burundi 2010-2014” as well as in their Community Based Nutrition Programme (PNAC). Caritas has used IPC for geographical selection in their “Cash for Work” project and HCB in their “Food for Work” project.

In Burundi, even though FSNIS existed before the introduction of IPC, it was hard to get a clear picture of the food security situation and Burundi was often referred to as suffering from famine, which appeared not the case. IPC provided the needed clear picture for decision making and contributed to consensus forming, which had hitherto been impossible.

In DR Congo, ACF has used the IPC products for deciding the geographic location of their interventions, but always together with the outcomes of their own data collection systems.

In Burundi and DR Congo, OCHA has made regular use of the IPC products. The IPC maps are widely used in the yearly Humanitarian Action Plan, coordinated and developed by OCHA. OCHA uses IPC for monitoring the same plan and in discussions in monthly meetings.

In Kenya in August 2009, there had been a failure of the long rains and 11 districts were in need of financial support. There were 3.8 million people in crisis, and some in acute livelihood crisis. The resources for water, food and livestock were allocated using the IPC map. The Government of Kenya is presently using the IPC to allocate emergency funds.

Also in 2009, the submission of the RVA report through TANDREC led to an intervention to support the Arusha pastoralists with insemination to restock their herds. This was a novel intervention.

In 2008, the IPC map convinced the GoU to take action in the north and Karamoja. An intervention (quick maturing seeds and free ploughing for its farmers) was implemented to mitigate the impact of drought conditions.

7.3 REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

One of the donors in Uganda reported that even though IPC plays a role in networking, the 6-monthly map and reports do not bring any new insights and are probably more useful at regional level.

In many cases, it was mentioned that IPC steers funds towards the emergency sector, thus bypassing the more chronic needs. Many stakeholders feel that the IPC has missed out on an important role in the development sector. Still, expansion towards implementing IPC in a more developmental context is already ongoing, even though consensus has to be found on necessary adaptation of indicators, extent and possibilities for using the IPC products and the need to produce separate maps. Tanzania was selected to test the application of IPC in a

situation of chronic poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition but currently, the use of IPC is only relevant as part of the disaster management cycle, similar to applications run by other countries in the region.

The mission has not seen any evidence of IPC leading to addressing chronic problems, although the IPC is said to have raised awareness on the importance of quality of food, rather than quantity per se. In Tanzania for instance, high levels of malnutrition and the importance of water for human consumption, preparation of food and sanitation, have been recognized by stakeholders as key limiting factors to food security in certain areas. This has lead to an initial realization that standard emergency responses could be different in nature from standard food handouts and seeds distribution. One of the positive spin-offs has been the establishment of a “Nutrition in Emergencies Working Group.”

8. SUSTAINABILITY

8.1 PROJECT APPROACH

It has been stated earlier that sustainability of IPC is not guaranteed for a number of core countries, in particular DR Congo, Burundi, and Uganda. IPC activities are still at an early stage of adoption in for instance CAR and Ethiopia, so they would surely need sustained additional resources. Most stakeholders interviewed expected that without external funding the project would come to a standstill within a limited time frame. Even though the costs of continuing IPC may be limited and there has already been quite some training conducted, the governments still don't have the financial and human resources and capacity to lead and continue the entire process. A number of costs stand out. They include (refresher) training events and the national 1-week analytical workshop, where key stakeholders converge and create the technical consensus on the situation analysis. Furthermore, more extended and higher level training would be needed to ensure institutionalization of the IPC, and in a large country like DR Congo, focal points or even entire teams need to be operational, for which funding is needed.

Even though the countries are in various stages of institutionalizations, sustainability of IPC is by no means guaranteed. Without external funding, IPC is expected to come to a standstill in Burundi, CAR and DR Congo.

Although many respondents positively reviewed the training efforts by the project, a considerable number of them shared with the Team that there is still a large outstanding need to train more people for a sustained impact, an activity which may also not be continued without external funding.

It is difficult to provide a unique statement on sustainability for all countries under consideration. In Kenya and Tanzania sustainability is more likely as the FSNIS and seasonal assessments and the larger FSNIS are well established. In Kenya, the main food security and nutrition information system that is operational has been built up with the contributions from government, UN and donors. The IPC tool has been fully incorporated into the seasonal assessments; adjustments have been made to data collection tools to absorb relevant IPC indicators, so benefits from IPC will continue. In Tanzania the IPC tool has been properly embedded in the national LFSNIS or MUCHALI, operated by GoT and partners. In Tanzania, IPC has been incorporated into a FSNIS which has been in existence for a decade and which is government led and supported by various non-government stakeholders. But even though expected sustainability in Tanzania looks more positive, all stakeholders found that facilitation by the FAO would be sorely missed.

In Uganda, DR Congo and Burundi (and CAR) sustainability IPC will certainly not continue without external funding. The keeping on board of the national IPC coordinator as a food security analyst supporting both emergency/rehab and core development of the agricultural sector by the FAO Representation would add positively to the future outlook.

All in all, it is clear that IPC is still in need of funding, even though it is not clear for how long and in what modality the funding should be organized. A funding strategy, which should outline the possible answers to these questions, had unfortunately not been developed. Up to now, the approach of IPC in this region has remained very project based. As a result, IPC is suddenly facing absence of funds and risks to have to (at least temporary) stop activities, when continuing the same activities is a precondition to a successful implementation of IPC.

To increase sustainability, and avoid such situation, funding may have to be differently organized. Governments may need to contribute their share, possibly supported by donors through targeted financial support or basket funding. Multiple donors may be addressed, especially those who use IPC on a regular basis. Global partners may have a financial responsibility and last but not least, FAO may be the most important financial engine for the coming years to prevent IPC from dying an untimely death.

8.2 BUY-IN FROM PARTNERS

Given the expansion of FAO's Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) in the past years, it is not surprising that FAO-TCE has bought into the IPC although the operational capacity is still limited. A relative shortage of technical expertise is further emphasized by FAO's reduced field capacity in support officers to FSNIS activities under the regular programme. FAO should therefore buy into the IPC wholeheartedly and mainstream information management activities into project budgets. A beginning has been observed in some of the countries visited (such as Kenya). This may go some way in addressing concerns of accountability of the expanding emergency and rehabilitation programme.

Other partners are active to various degrees in analysis workshops, lessons learned workshops and training and they often use the IPC maps and reports, but in most cases one cannot speak of true ownership. Many partners admit to the value, uniqueness and need of IPC and the absence of alternatives, but do not feel responsible for its survival. If the IPC is truly without alternative, all partners need to live up to their responsibility and contribute financially and technically as well as help raise awareness among a larger target group. It would help if IPC were to be used as the standard tool in the Humanitarian Food Security Clusters.

The government, mentioned by most as the ultimate guardian of the tool, is in most of the cases not yet fully capacitated to have the major ownership. In Kenya, the collaboration between stakeholders is based upon an institutional structure that links the technical experts with the executive authority in the country as well as the implementing powers at the decentralized levels. Only here, the government, together with partners has been found to be almost completely carrying as well as using the IPC. The KFSSG has no official status yet, but this is expected to change in 2011. Its assessment, analysis and classification should then become part of the government system when it will formally adopt the new drought management policy, expected to be discussed and adopted by Parliament by end of 2011.

In Uganda, the government has mentioned to include IPC in its sectoral plans but as the national coordination structure has recently been changed and IPC has been carried by actors from the humanitarian sector up to now, it remains to be seen how successful this inclusion will be in the long run.

In Burundi, CAR and DR Congo, some of the data systems are implemented and managed by the government, but the process of collection and analysis and the use of IPC products mainly reside with non-government humanitarian actors like UN organisations and NGOs, with FAO in the lead role. In DR Congo the lead role is even further concentrated with FAO, and even though the subject is discussed, it seems too early to move this role to the government. Allocation of financial resources may be a problem. There is a risk that money made available to the government will not be fully spent on IPC as many issues need funding.

FAO and WFP may take it upon themselves to promote IPC as a standard tool in the Humanitarian Food Security Clusters with core funding from the??o.

In the lessons learned workshop of August 2010, it was suggested that the secretariat of IPC should be housed in the MINAGRIE in Burundi. This recommendation was approved and an MOU will be signed soon, where the MINAGRIE will take on much more responsibility for the implementation of IPC. Among others, organisation of trainings and analysis workshops will originate from the MINAGRIE. They already coordinate the administrative side of the project. Still, the Ministry will need funds and technical assistance, probably in the form of a FAO staff member permanently stationed within the Ministry, to be able to carry out such a task.

In DR Congo, the government is motivated but their capacity is very low and so are their financial resources: the budget for agriculture is currently 0.7%, far from the targeted 10%. As a large part of the country is still in an emergency situation, NGOs working here are often multi-disciplinary without specific or in-depth knowledge or experience on food security and without guaranteed long-term presence. This hampers the sustainability of IPC. Information protection by humanitarian actors aggravates the problem. DR Congo faces an extra challenge with regard to funding as a result of its size. The country is so large, that up to now the total, which was only slightly more than in other countries, was insufficient. Fortunately, DR Congo was able to raise money by themselves which also contributes to the explanation of the size of their share in the regional funding. In future, in order to be able to manage IPC, focal points and trainings are needed at provincial level because it is impossible to manage the program at central level and therefore, even more funding and support is needed than for the other countries.

Institutionalization may take more time in post crisis countries like Burundi,

DR Congo and CAR than was expected. When IPC was introduced in 2007, the implementation was carried by the structure of humanitarian coordination and it was only in 2008 that the government also started to participate. The government has no functional platform yet and may need technical and financial support for (at least) the first 5 years.

Especially in (post) crisis countries, the burden of IPC is still too heavy for the governments to carry by themselves. Donors may be reminded of their responsibility to financially

contribute to bridging that gap, until these governments are ready to undertake the full ownership, which they are willing but clearly still not capable to undertake.

8.3 FUNDING

Even though many stakeholders with different backgrounds are involved in the data collection and analysis process and use the IPC products for various purposes, hardly any of them has been found able and willing to provide a hard promise for funding after 2010. Thus, IPC is still a product which is acquired free of charge whereas its value justifies the payment of a certain price.

Still, in interviews IPC TWG members appeared committed and showed an interest and willingness to support IPC in the next few years, either in kind or with cash. Perhaps project proposals displaying the minimum support necessary could keep the IPC alive. This would include the organization of the IPC national analytical workshops and a training component. Part-funding may be suggested for the national IPC coordinator. The estimated budget for IPC activities per country would be estimated to be between USD 150,000-300,000 for one year. This amount may be financed per country or as part of a regional proposal.

The mission has not been able to meet with many donors at both regional and national level. Even though USAID may be found interested to fund IPC at GSU level, it has expressed a general lack of interest in IPC at country and regional level, due to their easy access to FEWS NET data. It is interesting to note that FEWS NET representatives at country-level state their part-dependency on data sources derived from participating in the IPC exercise. As donors are considered an important user group – of both national and regional maps - donors should be requested to take their responsibility to fund initiatives such as this. Sustainability should not be used to press national governments only, but clearly should address all users that depend on it one way or another.

ECHO has expressed hesitancy towards additional funding of IPC in the region after funding of 2 phases of the regional project and 2 phases of the global project. It has been noted that ECHO in Kenya has been using the reports and maps almost on a daily basis, even though ECHO at national level, for instance in Burundi and Uganda, hardly uses the products at all. As no other donor has been identified with an interest in continued funding it may be difficult to maintain the current funding mode. The mission feels that in certain cases continued direct support (notably to countries such as CAR, DR Congo and Burundi) is justified. DR Congo, Burundi and CAR represent countries where needs are urgent and alternatives to the IPC analysis do not exist. Continued support for national coordinators and key events (training and analysis) would preserve progress made to date and provide a continued flow of information to users.

CARE is a very active partner in Burundi, financially as well as operationally. CARE has a regional project, “Local And Global Action for Food Security in Africa”, which has a budget line for Food Security under which they have financially supported the IPC project and it is hoped, that they will do so for the next year.

For DR Congo, the budget provided by regional office was small but luckily FAO in DR Congo had raised funds from the OCHA managed Pooled Fund and use a certain percentage of other project funds to cover for the deficit. DR Congo is still in need of funding to be able to

continue IPC. Decentralization is a costly process and more focal points need to be trained at province level and training needs to be intensified in general. Furthermore, awareness on IPC is very small and money will be needed for visibility and publicity.

FAO Kenya has successfully lobbied funds with SIDA in support of IPC activities for the next year. SIDA had shown a special interest in this component. Unfortunately the mission has not been able to hear the reasoning underlying the choice. NGOs like World Vision and Oxfam have shared in the cost of assessment and training.

Kenya, as highlighted before, is one of the countries where a further continuation of IPC is likely. The IPC process is ongoing and unlikely to come to a standstill if no donor funding is found. Still, even here additional funds are needed to ensure that the national analytical workshops take place and participants from the district, regional and national level get a chance to interact and indeed reach a technical consensus. Training needs to be further intensified and expanded as well, since the turnover of trained government staff remains high. It was suggested that for training only partial funding is needed. Also, funding may be needed to introduce and adapt to new elements, like the implementation of the IPC manual version 2.0.

With diminishing roles for WFP and FEWS NET in Tanzania, contributions from partners to sustain the FSNA may become an issue in the near future. FAO is expected to further (financially) support the establishment of MUCHALI (IPC included) through a new phase of the GoT/UN Joint Programme I in 2011.

In Uganda, as a result of the described change in national coordination structure by the GoU, it is not yet clear if MAAIF senior management is fully on-board and willing to allocate resources to the process. MAAIF mentioned that a budget line for food security has been included in the new Agricultural Sector Investment Plan. Funds may become available by mid-2011 from which the IPC process can be supported. Apart from this, in Uganda in general no donor interest has been shown so far and the project management has not provided sufficient support to identify suitable donor interest and raise funds.

8.4 REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

From the evaluation, it has become clear that IPC is not strong enough yet to survive without external support in all countries, even though a lot of progress has been made. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to point out to the multilateral donors the fact that they use the IPC products on a regular basis, which may require a contribution, but also to remind the global partners of their responsibility to help the IPC move beyond the first constraints towards a more sustainable phase. Most country coordinators shared that the amounts needed to continue IPC for another three years are relatively small, and after a number years some of the countries might be able to continue IPC with less or even without external financial support.

Interestingly, a number of interviewees used the same subjects in their metaphors to illustrate their view on this topic. They said that “the baby is created and should not be left now”, “the baby should be taught how to walk” and even “the baby should not be strangled at this point in time”.

Apparently, IPC is seen as a very valuable tool but still in need of support and guidance. In that regard, one might contemplate to move more responsibilities to the government in a gradual process, and channel part of the funds directly through the government (which may be particularly interesting for the EU), whilst part of the funds may be used for direct technical support and guidance. Country contexts should be taken into consideration. There is the existing level of ownership, as in Kenya the government already owns the IPC process, whilst in DR Congo a lot of work still needs to be done to prepare the government to even take on such a task, with the other countries being at various levels of capacity. Also, the quality of data availability, collection and analysis is varying between countries, and thus, more funding may be needed in countries where this quality is still lacking, like DR Congo. Finally, one should assess whether IPC is still used entirely in a humanitarian context or if use in development context is possible.

It may be justified for ECHO and other donors to continue financial support to IPC in countries such as Burundi, CAR, and DR Congo on the principal of “user pays.”

From regional level, more support may be requested to promote visibility and awareness on IPC and its possibilities to address the food security situation. At the same time, more advocacy is needed, not only with donors to provide funding, but also with governments to allocate a budget line for IPC. In countries like Burundi and Congo, the agricultural budget line is still small, but the countries have committed themselves to raise the budget line to 10 %; in that process, securing a space for IPC may add considerably to its sustainability.

High staff turnover was mentioned as a limiting factor for sustainability in all of the countries. Mostly this concerned government staff, which was sent to different designations by their government at regular intervals, or started working for NGOs or in the UN system. Even though the staff turnover may be seen as a complicating factor with regard to the need for more training, it does not only exert negative influence. Especially if government staff moves onwards to higher ranks within the government, the acquired knowledge may be very valuable and even contribute to an increase in use of IPC in decision making. Even governments staff in different positions may use their acquired knowledge if they remain involved in IPC. In Uganda, staff turnover among the partnering NGOs was also perceived as a major factor preventing sustained support.

The fact that there was an almost continuous staff shortage for IPC at the FAO-REOA also threatened the sustainability, as this may have contributed to the insufficiency of efforts with regard to issues like awareness raising and support to developing and implementing a funding strategy.

Capacity development is currently channeled in part through ToT activities at the regional and national level. Even though this has been quite successful, it remains to be seen if this modus is sustainable if dedicated project funds are not available anymore. It may be considered by some to identify local training institutions or institutions of higher learning institutes to incorporate a number of the key elements of the relevant courses into a (training and/or academic) curriculum.

The EC/FAO distance learning courses on FSNIS are a great resource in this respect. They have been used extensively in the IPC training packages. These courses can be used for self-learning and can be easily adapted to a face-to-face training environment. The courses have been put together with key inputs from other organizations - FEWS NET, UNICEF and WFP for instance. They cover thematic areas such as: basics of food security, availability assessments and analysis, vulnerability assessment and analysis, markets assessment and analysis, nutritional status assessment and analysis, collaboration and advocacy techniques, and reporting of food security information.¹³ In DR Congo, IPC is already integrated in curricula at university level.

Publication of outputs of IPC does not always coincide with the planning cycle of partners and government. In Tanzania for instance there was little evidence of publications that are timed and focused on a particular audience outside the TANDREC framework.

The evaluation team has been asked to review possible alternatives to the current IPC modus. Almost all of the interviewees denied knowing of any alternative to IPC with comparative quality and did not see any emerging option in the near future. Some stakeholders have suggested that a structure similar to FEWS NET may be useful. Such a structure would certainly have important benefits, timely reporting among them. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether all the government-owned data sets would be available for introduction into such a system. The technical consensus approach has also made a real difference in publishing agreed upon figures on food security related status and needs. It is unlikely that an alternative would achieve the same positive externalities, accomplished by current modality. In many countries IPC has given direction to the existing FSNIS. IPC also responds very well to modalities set out under global programmes such as the Good (Humanitarian) Donorship Initiative.

¹³ Please check <http://www.foodsec.org/DL/elcpages/food-security-courses.asp?pgLanguage=en&leftItemSelected=food-security-courses> for more details

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions and recommendations have been generated and reflect the most important findings and observations of the evaluation mission. The structure follows mostly well established themes from the project management cycle and main thematic areas of the project.

A. Relevance of IPC tool

Conclusions

1. The IPC tool, process and products have been found relevant in all countries to differing degrees, all within the context of the disaster management cycle.
2. The IPC tool, its promotion among stakeholders at regional and (sub-) national level is coherent with the mandates of ECHO, FAO and other IPC Global Partners and initiatives that aim to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid as well as accountability of the donors and other actors operating in this field.

Recommendations

1. Continue focus of IPC classifying severity of transitory food insecurity as part of the disaster management cycle (proven demand and relevance). If relevant, countries should be allowed to experiment with classifying chronic food security in their respective countries.
2. It is recommended that IPC remains a meta-analysis tool for a situation analysis and is not confused with other FSIS functions such as baseline assessments, emergency needs assessment, M&E and early warning.

B. Project results

Conclusions

1. The project has generally accomplished the results listed in the logical framework at output level:
 - a. Analytical products have been produced at country level as scheduled and incorporated into regional analysis. The FSNWG has provided its regional clientele with monthly updates.
 - b. The project has been largely successful in incorporating the tool into existing seasonal assessments or food security analytical systems.
 - c. The project has also accomplished clear evidence of effective use of the information generated through the tool, in particular with national governments (Disaster Management Teams).
 - d. Best practices and lessons learning exercises have generally been consistently held at country level.
2. Expenditures have been found more or less in line with their original allocations, although it is difficult to ascertain details of large project expenditures.

3. The mission has found several examples of interventions based on the IPC analysis, particularly by national governments. This is proof that the IPC has successfully been incorporated in the respective national disaster management structures.
4. UN agencies and NGOs have used the information for adaptations in their programmes and projects, illustration of needs in project proposals, justification of geographical targeting and advocacy with government.
5. The use by governments of IPC varies: In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda governments are frequent users but in DR Congo and Burundi, the governments are not always participating as strongly, in part due to a lack of capacity and awareness.
6. The team has not observed evidence that the information from the IPC tool has led directly to measures addressing chronic food insecurity at country-level.

Recommendations

1. The mission would recommend that the regional project team completes detailed histories for all 5 core countries – containing details as to the context, institutional framework, progress made over time with the tool, assessment/ analysis, and use of the products to compliment the LL exercise.

C. Project management/coordination/HR

Conclusions

1. The coordination structure of TWGs put in place to support the adoption of IPC at regional as well as national level has worked reasonably well.
2. The full-time national IPC consultants residing within the national FAO Representations have been a clear asset to the project.
3. The project could have performed better if FAO had recruited according to the posts allocated in the original project document.
4. A funding strategy for global, regional and country levels, as proposed through the JMM in June 2010 and in particular within the institutionalization efforts, to ensure long-term funding for IPC country activities has not materialized.
5. High staff turnover, among all partners including project staff, was mentioned by many as a limiting factor for sustainability in all of the countries.

Recommendations

1. Support to IPC in Central and Eastern Africa needs continued support from FAO-REOA, a fact that was confirmed by all stakeholders, including donors.
2. The mission feels there is a special obligation for FAO-TCE to sponsor IPC activities as it misses any dedicated information service to inform their significant and growing country programmes. In contrast, WFP programming is at least informed by their VAM- unit. Therefore, FAO is encouraged to keep national IPC/FSIS consultants in place, and incorporate them into the FAO country programmes.

E. Funding Issues

Conclusions

1. Even though the countries are in various stages of institutionalizations of IPC, sustainability is by no means guaranteed. Without external funding, IPC will come to a standstill in some of the countries (Burundi, CAR and DR Congo).
2. Funding up to now has been mostly project-based and from one donor only (ECHO), which has resulted in a situation where there is no direct funding available and no clear outlook for the coming years.

Recommendations

1. Funding proposals for Burundi, CAR, DRC, Tanzania and Uganda should be developed as a matter of priority to prevent the breakdown of capacity built up over the past 2-4 years.
2. All partners, at global, regional as well as country level, need to be reminded of their responsibility, if possible, to contribute in financial and technical terms. Pooling of resources by all stakeholders would be preferred.
3. It may be justified for ECHO and other donors to continue financial support to IPC in countries such as Burundi, CAR, and DR Congo on the “user pays” principal.
4. FAO and WFP may take it upon themselves to promote IPC as a standard tool in the Humanitarian Food Security Clusters with core funding from the two agencies.

F. Communication/awareness raising

Conclusions

1. IPC has played a major role with regard to raising awareness on the food security situation, including measures for analyzing severity of food insecurity, root causes and initial responses at (sub-)national level; although publication of outputs has not always coincided with the planning cycle of partners and government.
2. Communication has not received enough attention by the project, especially at country level, in part due to a weakness in the project design (lack of budget) itself.

Recommendations

1. Communication and advocacy are integral part of information management and need to be appropriately budgeted for in future. The mission feels that appropriate internal and external advocacy would go a long way into the successful application and use of the tool and products with global partners and active partners at the (sub-)national level.

G. Capacity Development / Lessons learning

Conclusions

1. The project's capacity development efforts in food security analysis have been key to galvanizing the collaboration and spearheading the main project outputs. These include the introductory or FSIS foundation courses (based on EC/FAO E-learning

courses) that addressed general weaknesses in understanding of FSIS among IPC stakeholders.

2. IPC training material, including User Guide, has been found to be of satisfactory quality but translation into French took a lot of time, and this has impacted negatively on operations in Burundi, DR CONGO and CAR.
3. The project has targeted most of the capacity activities on individuals rather than at an organizational level.
4. There is a general lack of FSIS experts within the region and available to FAO.

Recommendations

1. To address a shortage of IPC practitioners and trainers like it has been faced in the past years, a capacity development strategy should be developed for concerned parties.
2. The large need for FSIS expertise and training should be addressed collectively by all stakeholders in the FS sector, including governments, UN, NGOs, and institutions of higher learning. Separate capacity development programmes (outside IPC) would be appropriate and very much needed.
3. Capacity development of IPC experts, and in particular providing technical backstopping to country teams and generation of normative guidance, should become a priority for FAO itself if it is serious about the promotion of IPC and its use. It is felt that the capacity within FAO (ESA in particular) has decreased significantly over the past 10-15 years, while TCE has not yet built up this function sufficiently.

H. Technical Development

Conclusions

1. The project has made positive contributions to the development of the tool. It has been successful in testing and incorporating innovations, in particular as to redefining the IPC phase classifications 1 a/b, 2 and 3.
2. An overall IPC analytical framework has not yet been developed.
3. Guidance on the appropriateness and limitations in the use of proxy-indicators has been limited.
4. Access to livelihood baselines (descriptions and profiles) has proven to be beneficial to the interpretation of reference indicators as it provides an improved context.
5. Quality control through internal peer review mechanisms have functioned well during the current project phase, while external peer reviews from the region or GSU has been too limited.
6. The mission has not been able to find a possible alternative for IPC with the same quality and possibilities as IPC, a fact that was confirmed by almost all stakeholders.

Recommendations

The IPC initiative should:

1. Develop a clear analytical framework to show the cohesion, weighting between elements and causal relationships between the different elements and indicators.
2. Develop guidelines on the appropriateness and limitations in use of various proxy indicators by sector.
3. Develop standards or minimum requirements for an IPC analysis to allow for comparability across borders.
4. Improve quality control and peer review mechanisms of processes and products, in part through the development of guidelines.
5. Promote livelihood baselines (descriptions and profiles) to support the interpretation of reference indicators through an improved context.
6. Address the underlying weaknesses in data together with all stakeholders in the sector (technical partners, government, donors and academic institutions) towards improved access to agreed key reference indicators that would improve the relevance and quality of output of the meta-analysis tool.

I. Partnerships

Conclusions

1. The involvement of global partners at country level varies considerably and especially the input of Oxfam is quite weak.
2. Cooperation between IPC and FEWS NET is generally good, even though FEWS NET is not established in all countries.
3. Global partners like USAID and WFP use IPC reports and maps to some extent. Other global partners use IPC often only at a limited scale.
4. Partners are active to various degrees in IPC activities but in most cases one cannot speak of true ownership and most of them are not willing or capable to contribute financially.
5. Most stakeholders feel that the project has successfully targeted the governments as the real custodians of the IPC process.

Recommendations

1. There is a strong need for global partners to step up their contribution to the IPC process at country-level, including better reporting on specific strategies in place that articulate their commitment and engagement to IPC with a geographic scope.
2. Cooperation with regional institutes like East Africa Community, IGAD and COMESA may add to the sustainability and impact of IPC, and more advocacy is needed in that regard at regional and global level.
3. There is scope for the involvement of institutions of higher learning as full partners to contribute to technical assistance and training, but also to incorporate FSIS methodologies/tools and technical skills into their curricula.

ANNEX 1A COUNTRY REPORT BURUNDI

A. COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Current FS and Nutrition Status: a short description

When IPC started in Burundi in 2006, this was done in a humanitarian response context. The food security situation is still highly insecure, even though the majority of areas have shifted to chronic food insecurity with a very small resistance to shocks. Whereas acute malnutrition is moderate, stunting for instance on average reaches a level of more than 60%. As the war has only just finished, one would better speak of protracted crisis. According to the most recent IPC map, the major part of the country is in phase II, with some of the areas on the north and west borders in phase III. Furthermore, the map shows a number of red dots in the south-east and south. These dots depict the “integrated rural villages”, established by the government for that part population, which has been repatriated from abroad, mainly from Tanzania. Two groups are concerned: one moved to Tanzania in 1972 and one in 1991. Upon return, they have found that their land and homes have been taken by others and they are left without livelihood. In the villages, they lack access to drinking water, land, income and social securities.

The reasons underlying the current situation are natural as well as man made. With regard to natural causes, part of the country has suffered from a shortage of rain for five consecutive seasons. The issue of La Nina raises worries that the situation may not improve in the near future. The quality of the soil is low and deteriorates even further as a result of too intensive use and lack of crop rotation. Access to seeds and fertilizer is limited. The manioc harvest is threatened constantly by the mosaic disease, even though the situation is slowly improving by the use of resistant varieties. As the country is very densely populated (340 people per km², with over 400 per km² in more than one fourth of the country) and more than 94% is depending on agriculture and often living in the rural areas, this aggravates the problem. The population is still growing rapidly. There is not only insufficient food supply but also insufficient income. In the plains, the situation is often worse than in the hills, since access and quality of water are also compromised.

On the other hand, the civil war, which officially had a duration from 1993-2005 with a cease fire with the RLA in 2006 but of which the effects effectively lingered on until 2008, has left its traces. The security situation is still highly fragile and the country has far from recovered from the damage caused by the war. The political situation is not very stable either, as the two most important parties do not seem to be able to form an agreement.

Operational FSN information systems in the country

In Burundi, a number of data collection systems are operational, which measure food security related data. There is UNHCR implemented PARES, the BINUB-Sec system implemented by OCHA, data collection by the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage, MINAGRIE), the SAP/SSA system implemented by FAO, the data

collection system of WFP, the data collected by government institutes ISTEEBU and IGEBU-Méteo, the LMTC-SSN system of UNICEF the data of the Ministry of Health (Ministre de la Santé, MINISANTE) on nutrition and health. All data feed into the IPC, and even though most of the systems produce analyses of their own, in general there is no competition. FEWS NET, which was introduced into the country in 2009, also feeds its data analysis into the IPC system. As FAO coordinates the FEWS NET data collection and map distribution, there is no position of competition here, either.

At the onset of the implementation of IPC in the country, there was resistance from WFP, who saw IPC analysis as possible competition to theirs. This seems to have resulted from a lack of communication and understanding, and currently there is good cooperation with a WFP staff member being one of the most knowledgeable IPC experts in the country.

Description of IPC key partners in the country and their capacity

FAO still remains the leading partner with a capacity and knowledge considerably higher than was found with most of the partners. The other partners come from the government, international organisations and NGOs. From government level, there is MINAGRIE (central and provincial level), Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning (Ministère du Plan, MINIPLAN), the Geographical Institute (IGEBU) and ISTEEBU (Bureau of Statistics). With regard to international organisations, WFP, UNICEF and OCHA should be mentioned. There is a large group of NGOs, among which most regularly participating are AAA, COPED, LVIA, CISV, CRS, Oxfam, FH Global, HCB, PACT, WVI, Solidarité, BADEC, ODDBU, CARE and Caritas.

B. RELEVANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE IPC PROJECT

1. Since the country is very small, the IPC system is not decentralised like in some of the neighbouring countries. From the start of the project in the second half of 2007, six cycles have been completed.
2. IPC has responded to the demand for a standard in food security analysis; this demand existed before starting the project. People were aware that problems existed with regard to food security, but the extent and geographical dimensions were completely unclear. In effect, the situation was often called “a famine”, but after introduction IPC reports pointed out that this was not the case. Before the IPC was introduced, consensus forming was almost impossible and stakeholders did not get together on a regular basis. There were no tools for common use.
3. Before 2007, it was difficult to retrieve the data for the organisations that had a need for them and as all systems were independent, they just provided insight in a small area with regard to food security, which has improved considerably with the implementation of IPC.
4. IPC takes all local problems into account. Data are collected on food availability (agricultural production per population per area), access (meals per day, coping strategies), access to water (the time it takes to arrive at a water source, the price of drinking water), health (prevalence of diseases), nutrition (malnutrition rates like acute and chronic malnutrition) and mortality rates. The combination of these data and other analysis produces a credible overview of the food security situation.

5. From time to time, data on various subjects have not been available and it has been difficult to estimate population numbers facing crises, which was tackled by the assistance of a regional technical backstopping consultant in the second half of 2010. In the lessons learned workshop of 6-8 July 2010, a basic calculation methodology of population numbers was proposed for use in Burundi. In general, the technical problems were not so large as to prevent a useful analysis.
6. The quality of the data has not always been sufficient and data was sometimes available only at a late stage. Some reports, which serve as input for IPC, did not appear regularly. Some of the stakeholders questioned the objectivity of the data and the fear was raised that data and results might be pictured too negatively in order to facilitate fundraising or advocacy.
7. Before 2007, there was very limited knowledge and awareness on the issue of food insecurity and possible ways to address it. There was cooperation of partners on improving livelihood, but not on other food security related issues, whereas now there is coordination on food security in general. The project has improved the analysis capacity of local stakeholders and their level of understanding with regard to food security considerably, but knowledge and capacity remain sub-optimal.

C. IS THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?

8. The activities with regard to food security and nutrition are coordinated by the Groupe Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle (GSAN), which meets once a month. The group resorts under the Groupe Sectoriel Agriculture, Développement Rural et Environnement (GSADRE) Member organisations of the GSAN are the same as the mentioned stakeholders of IPC, but the participants usually reside at a high level in their organisation. Within the GSAN, there is a Groupe Technique IPC, which ensures the vertical and horizontal programming of IPC activities. The GSAN poses and responds to technical questions and validates the outcomes of the IPC analysis. After validation, the GSAN will approve the distribution of the IPC products.
9. The distribution of the IPC products as well as visibility and awareness raising are strongly supported by FAO Burundi.
10. The FAO manages the project mainly from the Bujumbura office, where approximately 25 staff members are working. The IPC secretariat is housed here and FAO oversees the budget, activities, collection of data, FAO maintains the contact with several forums, countries and the regional office. In the secretariat the data are stored and analysis workshops and IPC analyses are organised from here. Thus, FAO is still clearly the lead party of IPC.
11. The collection of data and reports is done on a regular basis. Data collected are pre-analyzed and used at the national analysis workshop, which lasts 4-5 working days. Subsequently, after 2 weeks of preparation, the output of the analysis is presented to the GSAN, which takes one week to validate the data and approve dissemination, provided it does not meet any major problems.

12. Institutionalization appears to take more time in a post crisis country like Burundi than was expected or hoped for. The government has only just been installed after a period of war and is therefore still young. They have no functional platform yet and may need technical and financial support for the first 5 years. Many priorities, among which national security, are fighting for attention.
13. CARE has a regional project, "Local And Global Action for Food Security in Africa (LAGAFA)", which has a budget line for Food Security under which they have financially supported the IPC project and it is hoped, that they will do so for the next year. The government may also be willing to contribute financially. As labour and living costs are relatively cheap in Burundi, a funding of USD100,000 per year might be sufficient.
14. Even though FAO Burundi is in general content with support from global level, it faces problems with regard to documents, which are not systematically available in French and if they become available, take a very long time to be translated. Especially the upcoming IPC Technical Manual version 2.0 is mentioned in this regard.
15. From the regional level, there has been financial support, regional workshops as well as technical support in national trainings and workshops, and the added knowledge and expertise is still badly needed.
16. The Burundi office will find it very hard to survive without regional support; probably the activities and even trainings would still take place, but at a much lower level. Future support may be needed with regard to implementation of the to-be-released revised manual version 2.0. Also, according to FAO Burundi, more could be done to link the IPC in Burundi to other countries by sharing and exchange knowledge and experiences with experts from the various countries.
17. Of the global partners, Save the Children does not have an office in Burundi, CARE is very active and Oxfam is only active in a very limited way and has only established its presence in 2 provinces. WFP avails technical support to IPC and between FEWS NET and FAO there is a (not yet formalized) cooperation where FAO contributes the FS data and FEWS NET the satellite data.
18. The planned exchanges between countries have been limited, there has been a visit with training and follow up capacity building to the Central-African Republic in March 2010 and a visit with support to cross border analysis to DR Congo in October 2010 but no experts from other countries have visited Burundi. (The language barrier between the countries in the region under consideration complicates the problem.

D. WHAT IS THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE PROJECT IN-COUNTRY?

19. The main beneficiaries, as in most other Central African countries, are government, UN agencies, international NGOs and national NGOs. The diversity of participants is large enough to enable neutrality of data collection and analysis.

20. No capacity or needs assessment has been undertaken before or during implementation of IPC, but training activities were planned with input of the TWG Group based on their knowledge of the group about capacity and needs. The training curriculum was crafted based on a rapid needs/current capacity appreciation of the target group. There was already capacity to implement food security measuring systems at organisation level but no capacity or knowledge especially geared towards IPC.
21. Capacity has been increased by implementing training. Four trainers have been trained: one from FAO, one from WFP, one from the MINAGRIE and one from the NGO coalition RESO. These trainers conduct trainings in the capital where people from national level as well as province level are invited to attend. There is a first level training (basic principles of food security) for those who are involved in data collection and analysis, and a second level training (all dimensions of food security and livelihood) for roughly two thirds of the trainees. The trainees have to perform an entrance test as well as a final test, for which they may receive certification if their score is sufficient. The results are then compared. In total, roughly 80 people have been trained and 60 are still active in the field of IPC.
22. The trainings take place for members from each of the 17 provinces. The trainings are usually conducted two weeks before the analysis workshop, so the knowledge is still fresh when it is to be used. Unfortunately, there is a high government staff turnover, and therefore an almost continuous repetition of training for certain target groups is needed. The turnover will be inherent to the situation in a developing country like Burundi for the coming years, so it will be difficult to solve this problem.
23. The IPC is not owned by the government and other local partners to the extent that one would have wished for after three years of implementation. Even though the capacity of government and NGOs has increased considerably, there is still room to do more. The leading role of FAO is strong and without it, the system would not be sure to survive.
24. Even though MINAGRIE has a large number of staff members (for example, 1,308 agronomists at district level), it still has no means to support the IPC structure.
25. Among the participants of trainings and workshops, roughly 10% were from national NGOs, 19% from international NGOs, 33% from UN organisations and 40% from the government. The workshops for distribution of the map are only organised once every year, the other distribution date is used for raising awareness on the use of the maps within the group.
26. There has been limited exchange from other countries. Since the national coordinator is one of the main experts, he went to other countries to avail of his technical knowledge and expertise.

E. WAS THE INFORMATION GENERATED USED BY DECISION MAKERS?

27. In general, NGOs are involved in the data collection and analysis and they use the information for small adaptations in their programmes and projects as well as for

illustration of needs in project proposals. Some (like Caritas) do not contribute data but do participate in the analysis. Still, it appeared that sometimes NGOs are unsure how to interpret the maps and tables. Donors use the information for short term planning but are not involved in the analysis.

28. UNICEF has used IPC in the development of the “National Plan of Action for Nutrition and Food Security for Burundi 2010-2014” as well as in their Community Based Nutrition Programme.
29. Caritas has used IPC for geographical selection in their “Cash for Work” project and HCB in their “Food for Work” project.
30. When IPC was introduced in 2007, the implementation was carried by the structure of humanitarian coordination and it was only in 2008 that the government also started to participate. Even though government has gained in the meantime as much capacity as other partners with regard to data collection and analysis, their use of IPC products is less intensive than that of other stakeholders. There are government focal points at province level but at central level, after validation not much use is made of the maps or analyses. Still, the government has started to make use of IPC products and is slowly picking up steam.
31. In general, the use of IPC has enabled organisations to request donors for more and focused support. Before, the general idea was that with the ending of the war the problems with regard to food insecurity were over, and countries in conflict situation seemed worse off. IPC analysis proved that this was not the case at all, but that people were suffering throughout the country and resilience was low. Based upon this information, it became clear that the country was direly in need of support.

F. SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT (2007-10)

32. In the lessons learned workshop of August 2010, it was suggested that the secretariat should be housed in the MINAGRIE and that the Groupe Technique IPC should be responsible for editing the IPC reports. There should then also be a budget line for the MINAGRIE.
33. An MOU is planned to be signed soon, where the MINAGRIE will take on much more responsibility for the implementation of IPC. Among others, organisation of trainings and analysis workshops will originate from the MINAGRIE. Still, the Ministry will need funds and technical assistance, probably in the form of a FAO staff member permanently stationed within the Ministry, to be able to carry out such a task.
34. Looking at the food security situation in Burundi and the development of the capacity with regard to the IPC system and use of the IPC products, IPC is most certainly valuable for the country and its implementation should be continued. The lack of exit strategy in the regional project should not cause the IPC to be stopped.
35. Even though IPC slowly starts to be integrated into the national data collecting system and all parties appear to really appreciate the system, without technical and financial support it will not be able to survive.

36. Some stakeholders report, that the process of IPC analysis and dissemination takes too long which limits the information value of the maps and reports.
37. Stakeholders may need to advocate stronger with the government for follow up to and decision making based upon IPC products and to avail their support if and when possible.
38. CARE has financed part of the IPC implementation until now, and they shared that there is a budget line for IPC in their regular budget so it will be probably possible for them to provide at least part of the necessary funding. No other partners or stakeholders appear to be willing or able to provide financial support.

SWOC OF IPC IN BURUNDI

Strengths <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The size of the country makes the IPC system relatively easy to manage at central level • IPC has covered an existing gap in coordination and cooperation in food security as well as knowledge and awareness • A large group of partners with diverse backgrounds participate in IPC 	Opportunities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An MOU is being prepared to house the secretariat of IPC in the MINAGRIE • CARE has supported IPC in Burundi until now and as IPC is in their regular budget lines, they may continue to do so • The non-government partners may advocate more strongly with government based upon IPC maps and reports
Weaknesses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability, quality and timeliness of data on various subjects are sometimes compromised • The financial and technical capacity of the government is still insufficient to transfer the leadership from FAO • High staff turnover in government creates the need for continuous training • Awareness is high among participants but low among other important parties in Burundi 	Constraints <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population growth/density is a factor which constantly returns in the recommendation, but it cannot be addressed by food security related interventions • Institutionalization in a post war country like Burundi is a lengthy process • Support and documentation in French language is not always timely available

A. RESUME

Sécurité alimentaire actuel: une brève description

Lorsque l'IPC a commencé au Burundi en 2006, c'était dans un contexte d'intervention humanitaire. La situation alimentaire reste très précaire, même si la majorité des zones ont changé à l'insécurité alimentaire chronique avec une résistance très faible aux chocs. Considérant que la malnutrition aiguë est modérée, retard de croissance, par exemple, atteint souvent un niveau de plus de 60%. Alors que la guerre vient à peine finie, on pourrait parler de crise prolongée. Selon la carte la plus récente de l'IPC, la plupart du pays est en phase II, avec quelques-uns des domaines sur les frontières nord et ouest dans la phase III. En outre, la carte montre un certain nombre de points rouges dans le sud-est et au sud. Ces points représentent les "villages ruraux intégrés", établis par le gouvernement pour la population, qui a été rapatriée de l'étranger, principalement de Tanzanie. Deux groupes sont concernés: l'un installé en Tanzanie en 1972 et l'autre en 1991. Lorsque ils sont retournés, ils ont découvert que leurs terres et leurs maisons ont été prises par d'autres et ils se retrouvent sans moyens de subsistance. Dans les villages intégrés, ils n'ont pas accès à l'eau potable, la terre, du revenu et des titres sociaux.

Les raisons sous-jacentes de la situation actuelle sont naturelles ainsi que fait par l'homme. En ce qui concerne les causes naturelles, une partie du pays a souffert d'un manque de pluie pendant cinq saisons consécutives. La question de La Nina suscite inquiétudes que la situation ne peut s'améliorer dans un proche avenir. La qualité du sol est faible et se détériore encore davantage en raison de l'utilisation intensive et de l'absence de rotation des cultures. L'accès aux semences et d'engrais est limitée. La récolte de manioc est sans cesse menacé par la maladie de la mosaïque, même si la situation s'améliore peu à peu par l'utilisation de variétés résistantes. Comme le pays est très densément peuplé (340 habitants au km², avec plus de 400 km² dans un quart du pays) et plus de 94% est dépendant de l'agriculture, vivant souvent dans les zones rurales, le problème est encore plus grave. La population continue de croître rapidement. L'approvisionnement alimentaire est insuffisant, mais aussi le revenu est trop faible. Dans les plaines, la situation est souvent pire que dans les collines, puisque l'accès et la qualité de l'eau sont également compromis.

D'autre part, la guerre civile, qui a officiellement eu une période allant de 1993-2005, mais dont les effets ont efficacement attardé jusqu'en 2008, a laissé des traces. La situation sécuritaire est encore très fragile et le pays est loin d'avoir récupéré des dommages causés par la guerre. La situation politique n'est pas très stable non plus, et les deux parties les plus importantes ne semblent pas être en mesure de former un accord.

Les systèmes des informations sur la sécurité alimentaire dans le pays

Au Burundi, un certain nombre de systèmes de collecte de données sont opérationnelles, qui mesure les données liés à la sécurité alimentaire. Il y a le PARES (HCR), le système BINUB-Sec mis en œuvre par OCHA, la collecte de données par le ministère de l'Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, MINAGRIE), le système SAP / SSA mis en œuvre par la FAO, le système de collecte des données du PAM, les données recueillies par le gouvernement et les instituts de STEEBU et IGEPU-Météo, le système LMTC-SSN de l'UNICEF, les données du External End-of-Project Evaluation Final Report

ministère de la Santé (Ministre de la Santé, MINISANTE) sur la nutrition et la santé. Tous les flux de données entrent dans l'IPC, et même si les systèmes produisent leur propre analyse, en général, il n'y a pas de concurrence. FEWS NET, qui a été introduit dans le pays en 2009, nourrit aussi ses données dans le système de l'IPC. La FAO coordonne le FEWS NET par rapport à la collecte de données et de la distribution de carte.

Au début de la mise en œuvre de l'IPC dans le pays, il y a eu résistance de la part du PAM, qui a vu l'analyse IPC comme une concurrence possible. Cette situation a été créée par conséquence d'un manque de communication et de compréhension, et il actuellement il y a une coopération optimale avec un membre du personnel du PAM, qui est un des experts les plus compétents de l'IPC.

Description des partenaires de l'IPC dans le pays et leur capacité

FAO reste le premier partenaire, dont la capacité est beaucoup plus élevée que celle de la plupart des partenaires. Les autres partenaires viennent du gouvernement, les organisations internationales et les ONG. À partir du niveau du gouvernement, il y a MINAGRIE (niveau central et provincial), Ministère de l'Environnement, Ministère de la Santé, Ministère de la Planification (Ministère du Plan, MINIPLAN), l'Institut géographique (IGEBU) et ISTEEDU (Bureau de Statistiques). En ce qui concerne les organisations internationales, le PAM, l'UNICEF et OCHA devrait être mentionnés. Il y a un groupe important d'ONGs, parmi lesquelles les participants plus réguliers sont AAA, COPED, LVIA, CISV, CRS, Oxfam, Global FH, HCB, PACT, WVI, Solidarité, BADEC, ODDBU, CARE et Caritas.

B. PERTINENCE ET RESULTATS DU PROJET IPC

39. Depuis que le pays est très petit, le système de l'IPC n'est pas décentralisé comme dans certains des pays voisins. Dès le début du projet dans la seconde moitié de 2007, six cycles ont été accomplis.
40. L'IPC a répondu à la demande d'un standard dans l'analyse de la sécurité alimentaire; cette demande existait avant le début du projet. Les gens étaient conscients que les problèmes existent en ce qui concerne la sécurité alimentaire, mais l'ampleur et les dimensions géographiques n'ont pas été complètement claires. En effet, la situation est souvent appelée "la famine", mais après l'introduction de l'IPC, les rapports ont prouvé que ce n'était pas le cas. Avant l'IPC a été introduit, former un consensus a été presque impossible et les intervenants ne se sont pas réunis sur une base régulière. Il n'y avait pas d'outils pour l'usage commun.
41. Avant 2007, il était difficile de récupérer les données pour les organisations qui ont besoin et tous les systèmes étaient indépendants. Les systèmes de données ont juste donné un aperçu dans une petite partie de la sécurité alimentaire, qui s'est considérablement améliorée avec la mise en œuvre de l'IPC.
42. IPC prend en compte tous les problèmes locaux. Les données sont recueillies sur les disponibilités alimentaires (production agricole par habitant par région), d'accès (repas par jour, les stratégies d'adaptation), l'accès à l'eau (le temps qu'il faut pour arriver à une source d'eau et l'évolution des prix de l'eau potable), de la santé (prévalence des maladies), les taux de nutrition (les taux de malnutrition comme la

malnutrition aiguë et chronique) et la mortalité. La combinaison de ces données et l'analyse d'autres produit un aperçu crédible de la situation de sécurité alimentaire.

43. De temps en temps, des données sur divers sujets n'ont pas été disponibles et il a été difficile d'estimer la population face à des crises. Ce problème a été abordé par l'assistance l'appui technique d'un consultant régionale dans la seconde moitié de 2010. Dans l'atelier des leçons apprises de 6-8 Juillet 2010, une méthode de calcul de base du nombre d'habitants a été proposée pour une utilisation au Burundi. En général, les problèmes techniques ne sont pas suffisamment importants pour empêcher une analyse utile.
44. La qualité des données n'a pas toujours été suffisante et des données sont parfois disponibles seulement à un stade tardif. Certains rapports, qui sont nécessaires pour l'IPC, ne paraissent pas régulièrement. Quelques intervenants ont douté l'objectivité des données et la crainte a été exprimée que des données et les résultats pourraient être reflétés trop négativement, afin de faciliter la collecte de fonds ou de plaider.
45. Avant 2007, il y avait très peu de connaissance et de sensibilisation sur la question de l'insécurité alimentaire et les moyens possibles pour y remédier. Les partenaires ont coopéré sur l'amélioration des moyens d'existence, mais pas sur d'autres questions concernant la sécurité alimentaire. Maintenant, il y a une coordination sur la sécurité alimentaire en général. Le projet a amélioré considérablement la capacité d'analyse des acteurs locaux et leur niveau de compréhension à l'égard de la sécurité alimentaire, Pourtant, les connaissances et les capacités ne sont pas encore optimales.

C. LE STRUCTURE ET MISE EN OEUVRE DU PROJET SONT-ILS EFFICACES? AND EFFECTIVE?

46. Les activités en matière de sécurité alimentaire et de la nutrition sont coordonnées par le Groupe Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle (GSAN), qui se réunit une fois par mois. Le groupe fait partie du cadre du Groupe Sectoriel Agriculture, Développement Rural et Environnement (GSADRE). Les organisations membres de GSAN sont les mêmes que les parties prenantes de l'IPC, mais les participants résident habituellement à un niveau élevé dans leur organisation. Dans le GSAN, il y a un Groupe Technique de l'IPC, qui assure la programmation verticale et horizontale des activités de l'IPC. Le GSAN pose des questions techniques et y répond et de valide les résultats de l'analyse de l'IPC. Après validation, le GSAN approuve la distribution des produits de l'IPC.
47. La distribution des produits de l'IPC ainsi que la visibilité et de sensibilisation sont fortement soutenues par la FAO au Burundi.
48. La FAO gère le projet, principalement à partir du bureau de Bujumbura, où environ 25 membres du personnel travaillent. Le secrétariat de l'IPC est logé ici et la FAO gère le budget, les activités et la collecte des données. La FAO maintient le contact avec plusieurs forums, les pays et le bureau régional. Dans le secrétariat, les données sont stockées et des ateliers d'analyse de l'IPC sont organisées à partir d'ici. Ainsi, la FAO est toujours clairement la partie principale de l'IPC.

49. La collecte des données et le développement des rapports se fait sur une base régulière. Les données recueillies sont pré analysées et utilisées dans l'atelier national d'analyse, qui dure 4-5 jours ouvrables. Par la suite, après 2 semaines de préparation, la sortie de l'analyse est présentée à la GSAN, qui prend une semaine pour valider les données et approuver la diffusion, à condition qu'il n'y a pas de problèmes majeurs.
50. Il semble que l'institutionnalisation prenne plus de temps dans un pays post-crise comme le Burundi que prévu ou espéré. Le gouvernement vient juste d'être installé après une période de guerre et est donc encore jeune. Il n'y a pas de plate-forme fonctionnelle et le gouvernement a encore besoin d'un soutien technique et financier pour les premières 5 années. Il y a des nombreuses priorités, parmi lesquelles la sécurité nationale, dont le gouvernement doit se soucier.
51. CARE a un projet régional, « Collectivités locales et d'action mondial pour la sécurité alimentaire en Afrique », dans lequel il y a une ligne budgétaire pour la sécurité alimentaire. Sous cette ligne, ils ont soutenu financièrement le projet de l'IPC et il est à espérer, qu'ils le feront pour la l'année prochaine. Le gouvernement peut aussi être prêts à contribuer financièrement. La main-d'œuvre et coût de la vie sont relativement bon marché au Burundi, un financement de 100 000 dollars par an pourrait être suffisant.
52. Même si la FAO Burundi est en général satisfait avec le soutien de niveau mondial, il y a des problèmes en ce qui concerne les documents, qui ne sont pas systématiquement disponibles en français et si elles sont disponibles, le temps nécessaire à traduire est trop long. Surtout la prochaine IPC manuel technique version 2.0 est mentionnée à cet égard.
53. A partir du niveau régional, il y a eu un soutien financier, des ateliers régionaux ainsi que du soutien technique à des formations et des ateliers nationaux, et les connaissances et l'expertise ajoutée sont toujours nécessaires.
54. La FAO Burundi trouve qu'il sera très difficile de survivre sans un soutien régional; sans doute les activités et même des formations auront encore lieu, mais à un niveau beaucoup plus bas. Le futur soutien sera nécessaire en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre de la version révisée du manuel IPC 2.0. En outre, selon la FAO au Burundi, on pourrait faire davantage pour relier l'IPC au Burundi à d'autres pays par le partage et l'échange de connaissances et d'expériences avec les experts des différents pays.
55. Parmi les partenaires mondiaux, Save the Children n'a pas un bureau au Burundi, CARE est très actif et Oxfam est actif seulement dans une manière très limitée et a seulement établi sa présence dans deux provinces. PAM saisit un appui technique à l'IPC et entre la FAO et FEWS NET il y a une coopération (pas encore officialisé) où la FAO contribue les données de la sécurité alimentaire et FEWS NET les données satellite.
56. Les échanges prévus entre les pays ont été limités, il y a eu une visite avec formation suivi du renforcement des capacités dans la République centre africaine en Mars 2010 et une visite avec appui technique à la République démocratique du Congo en

Octobre 2010, mais les experts d'autres pays n'ont pas visité le Burundi. La barrière de la langue entre les pays de la région à l'étude complique le problème.

D. QUELLE EST LA STRATEGIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA CAPACITE DANS LE PAYS?

57. Les principaux bénéficiaires, comme dans la plupart des autres pays d'Afrique centrale, sont le gouvernement, les agences onusiennes, les ONG internationales et nationales. La diversité des participants est assez grande pour assurer la neutralité de la collecte de données et d'analyse.
58. Aucune évaluation de la capacité ou des besoins a été réalisée avant ou pendant la mise en œuvre de l'IPC, mais les activités de formation ont été planifiées avec la participation du Groupe TWG en fonction de leur connaissance concernant la capacité et les besoins. Le programme de formation a été conçu basé sur une appréciation rapide des besoins et des capacités actuelles du groupe cible. Il y avait déjà des capacités à mettre en œuvre des systèmes de mesure concernant la sécurité alimentaire au niveau de l'organisation mais pas de capacités ou connaissances axées sur l'IPC.
59. La capacité a augmenté par la mise en œuvre de la formation. Quatre formateurs ont été formés: l'un de la FAO, l'un par le PAM, l'un de l'MINAGRIE et l'autre de la coalition d'ONG « RESO ». Ces formateurs organisent des formations dans la capitale où les gens de niveau national comme au niveau province sont invités à y assister. Il existe une formation de premier niveau (principes de base de la sécurité alimentaire) pour ceux qui sont impliqués dans la collecte de données et d'analyse, et une formation de deuxième niveau (toutes les dimensions de la sécurité alimentaire et de subsistance) pour environ deux tiers des stagiaires. Les stagiaires ont à effectuer un test d'entrée ainsi que d'un test final, pour lequel ils peuvent recevoir la certification si leur score est suffisant. Les résultats sont ensuite comparés. Au total, environ 80 personnes ont été formées et 60 sont toujours actifs dans le domaine de l'IPC.
60. Les entraînements avaient été accessibles pour les membres de chacune des 17 provinces. Les formations se déroulent habituellement deux semaines avant l'atelier d'analyse, de sorte que la connaissance est encore fraîche quand il est utilisé. Malheureusement, il y a un roulement élevé du personnel du gouvernement, et donc une répétition quasi continue de la formation pour certains groupes cibles est nécessaire. Ce problème est inhérent à la situation dans un pays en développement comme le Burundi, alors résoudre le problème dans les années à venir sera difficile.
61. L'IPC n'est pas appropriée suffisamment par le gouvernement et par les autres partenaires locaux après trois ans de mise en œuvre. Même si la capacité du gouvernement et des ONG a considérablement augmenté, il est encore possible de faire plus. Le rôle de la FAO est fort et sans elle, le système ne serait pas sûr de survivre.
62. Même si MINAGRIE a un grand nombre de membres du personnel (par exemple, 1.308 agronomes au niveau du district), il n'y a toujours pas les moyens de soutenir la structure de l'IPC.

63. Parmi les participants aux formations et ateliers, soit environ 10% étaient des ONG nationales, 19% des ONG internationales, 33% des organisations des Nations Unies et 40% la part du gouvernement. Les ateliers pour la distribution de la carte sont organisés une fois par an, l'autre date est utilisée pour la sensibilisation sur l'utilisation des cartes au sein du groupe.
64. L'échange avec les autres pays a été limité. Depuis le coordinateur national est l'un des principaux experts, il est allé à d'autres pays pour qu'ils profitent de ses connaissances techniques et d'expertise.

E. L'INFORMATION GENERE, A-T-ELLE ETE UTILISEE PAR LES DECIDEURS?

65. En général, les ONG sont impliquées dans la collecte de données et d'analyse et ils utilisent l'information pour les adaptations dans leurs programmes et projets ainsi que pour l'illustration des besoins dans les propositions de projet. Certains (comme Caritas) ne contribuent pas de données mais ne participent à l'analyse. Pourtant, les ONG parfois ne savent pas comment interpréter les cartes et les tableaux. Les bailleurs de fonds utilisent les informations pour la planification à court terme mais ne sont pas impliqués dans l'analyse.
66. L'UNICEF a utilisé l'IPC dans l'élaboration du «Plan national d'action pour la nutrition et la sécurité alimentaire au Burundi 2010-2014» ainsi que dans leur Programme de Nutrition du base communautaire.
67. Caritas a utilisé l'IPC pour la sélection géographique dans leur projet «Cash for Work» et «Food for Work».
68. Lorsque l'IPC a été introduit en 2007, la mise en œuvre a été réalisée par la structure de coordination humanitaire et ce n'est qu'en 2008 que le gouvernement a également commencé à participer. Même si le gouvernement a acquis autant de capacité que d'autres partenaires en ce qui concerne la collecte de données et d'analyse, leur utilisation de produits de l'IPC est moins intense que celle des autres parties prenantes. Il y a des points focaux du gouvernement au niveau provincial, mais au niveau central, le gouvernement n'utilise pas souvent les cartes ou les analyses après validation. Pourtant, l'utilisation des produits IPC par le gouvernement est en train d'accélérer lentement.
69. L'utilisation de l'IPC a permis aux organisations de formuler leur demande aux donateurs plus précisément. Avant, l'idée générale était que, avec la fin de la guerre, les problèmes en ce qui concerne l'insécurité alimentaire avaient fini, et que la situation dans des pays en situation de conflit était pire. L'analyse IPC a montré que ce n'était pas le cas, mais que les gens souffraient dans tout le pays et la résistance était faible. Basé sur cette information, il est devenu clair que le pays a encore besoin de soutien.

F. AVANTAGES DURABLES DU PROJET (2007-10)

70. Dans l'atelier des leçons apprises du mois d'août 2010, il a été suggéré que le secrétariat devrait être logé dans le MINAGRIE et que le Groupe Technique de l'IPC devrait être responsable pour l'édition des rapports de l'IPC. Une ligne budgétaire pour la MINAGRIE serait donc aussi nécessaire.

71. Un protocole d'entente devrait être signé prochainement, où le MINAGRIE va prendre beaucoup plus de responsabilités pour la mise en œuvre de l'IPC. Entre autres, l'organisation de formations et d'ateliers d'analyse est déjà organisée par le MINAGRIE. Pourtant, pour être en mesure d'effectuer une telle tâche, le ministère aura besoin de fonds et l'assistance technique, probablement sous la forme d'un membre du personnel de la FAO stationné en permanence au sein du ministère,.
72. En examinant la situation de sécurité alimentaire au Burundi et le développement de la capacité à l'égard du système de l'IPC ainsi que l'utilisation des produits de l'IPC, l'IPC est certainement utile pour le pays et sa mise en œuvre doit être poursuivie. L'absence de stratégie de sortie dans le projet régional ne devrait pas causer l'IPC à être terminé.
73. Même si l'IPC a commencé lentement à être intégrées dans les systèmes de collecte des données nationales et toutes les parties semblent vraiment apprécier le système, sans le soutien technique et financier, il ne sera pas en mesure de survivre.
74. Certains intervenants ont rapporté, que le processus d'analyse de l'IPC et la diffusion prend trop de temps ce qui limite la valeur de l'information des cartes et des rapports.
75. Les parties prenantes doivent plaider plus fortement avec le gouvernement pour la prise de décision fondée sur les produits de l'IPC et peuvent offrir leur soutien si et lorsque cela est possible.
76. CARE a financé une partie de la mise en œuvre de l'IPC jusqu'à présent, et ils ont partagé qu'il existe une ligne budgétaire pour l'IPC dans leurs budget ordinaire de sorte qu'il sera probablement possible de fournir au moins une partie du financement nécessaire. Pas d'autres partenaires ou intervenants semblent être disposés ou en mesure de fournir un soutien financier.

SWOC DE L'IPC AU BURUNDI

Points forts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La taille du pays rend le système IPC relativement facile à gérer au niveau central • IPC a couvert une lacune dans la coordination et la coopération en matière de sécurité alimentaire ainsi que les connaissances et la sensibilisation • Un vaste groupe de partenaires d'origines diverses participent à l'IPC 	Possibilités <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Un protocole d'entente est en préparation pour mettre en place le secrétariat de l'IPC dans le MINAGRIE • CARE a soutenu IPC au Burundi jusqu'à présent et comme l'IPC est dans ses lignes du budget, ils peuvent peut-être continuer à le soutenir • Les partenaires non gouvernementaux peuvent plaider plus vigoureusement avec le gouvernement sur la base des cartes IPC et les rapports
Faiblesses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disponibilité, qualité et actualité des données sur divers sujets sont parfois compromis • La capacité financière et technique du gouvernement est encore insuffisante pour le transfert de la direction de la FAO • Le roulement du personnel dans le gouvernement est élevé ce qui crée le besoin de formation continue La sensibilisation est élevée parmi les participants, mais faible chez les autres parties importantes au Burundi 	Contraintes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La croissance démographique et la densité sont des facteurs qui reviennent constamment dans les recommandations, mais qui ne peuvent pas être résolues par des interventions de sécurité alimentaire • L'institutionnalisation dans un pays d'après-guerre comme le Burundi est un long processus • Le soutien et la documentation en langue française ne sont pas toujours en disponibles immédiatement

A. COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Current FS and Nutrition Status: a short description

Congo is often called a continent and its vast size justifies this name. The country has around 69 million inhabitants; about 30 % of the population lives in the cities out of which 10 million in Kinshasa. It is divided into 11 provinces and 145 territories, of which currently 40 are in Phase III (Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis) . Most of the country is in Phase II (Moderate/Borderline Food Insecure) and III, with a few small areas in the South-West and South-East area of the country in Phase I (Generally Food Secure). Even though from September 2010 a slight improvement is seen in a few provinces, there is no structural improvement yet. According to the last IPC analysis of October 2010, 4.5 million people were in an acute food security crisis. There is chronic food insecurity throughout the country as a result of declining agricultural productivity and rising prices. The mosaic disease, which threatens manioc, is not yet under control and a bacterial disease which threatens banana plants is quickly spreading.

As a result of the ongoing armed conflicts, parts of the country face a superposition of acute malnutrition on top of the existing chronic problems. There is a high rate of poverty throughout the country with almost no access to basic social security.

Operational FSN information systems in the country

Data from Kinshasa are not collected yet, but that may change after the new technical IPC manual version 2.0 has been introduced. To take the high percentage of urban people properly into account, urban assessments need to be properly introduced.

Recently (March 2010) a Multiple Index Cluster Survey (MICS) has been conducted and the data was used for the IPC. Unfortunately, MICS is only carried out once every five years and the data cannot therefore serve as regular input. Furthermore, data of FAO, WFP and UNICEF are entered into the templates, as well as data from government through the nutrition, water and sanitation, health and food security clusters. Finally, data from NGOs like Oxfam, WorldVision, MSF, ACF, and a number of others are used.

Description of IPC key partners in the country and their capacity

The main IPC partners are from government (Ministère du Plan, Ministère des Actions Humanitaires, Service Nationale de Statistiques Agricoles (SNSA) of the Ministère de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage (MINAGRI), Programme Nationale de Nutrition (ProNanut) of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Internal Affairs), international organisations (FAO, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNFPA, WHO, OCHA), international NGOs (Caritas, WorldVision, ACF, Oxfam, COOPI, FHI, ACTED, CARE, NRC, Solidarité, IFES, GTZ, Tear Fund and CESVI), national NGOs (APROBES, ALDI) and the University of Kinshasa. Most of the NGOs are involved in humanitarian support.

The ministries provide data and participate in the analysis workshops. The same can be said about the NGOs, even though Oxfam did not have an important program on food security since the beginning of 2010.

B. RELEVANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE IPC PROJECT

1. IPC responds to a real demand in the country. Even though there are a number of data collection systems, they collect data in a stand-alone way. Before the introduction of IPC, in a large number of territories there were hardly any data available and for that reason, the first IPC map showed a large number of blind spots. In the course of three years, IPC has helped to identify these gaps and has provided solutions by advocating and supporting better quality data collections, expansion of data collection by partners to neighboring territories as well as initiating rapid evaluation in certain areas. Currently, in the map there are only two white territories left, which are expected to be covered under the next analysis round.
2. IPC combines all food security related systems into a coherent report and map. Before there was no other coherent exhaustive system and currently there is still no alternative.
3. One of the problems the IPC is facing with regard to the data collection is the fact that there is a high tax on food products which differs per district and even per part of the city, and the same can be said about the exchange rate of dollar/Congolese franc. These data also change very quickly over time and it is therefore difficult to ensure the collection of the most recent data.
4. There is no overall availability and consistent quality of data. At the onset in 2007, the problems were even bigger but even though the availability has improved considerably, the quality of the data remains sometimes questionable. The quality of the analysis is sub-optimal, too.
5. The method of collection is sometimes doubtful and triangulation of data is not conducted. Data collected from different sources on the same subject are not necessarily equal or comparable. From time to time it was found that data collectors completed questionnaires “creatively” and the data had to be discarded.
6. Data are collected on different points in time and are thus not always compatible. IPC signals all data collection and quality related problems and tries to correct them.
7. The government is motivated but their capacity is very low and so are their financial resources: the budget for agriculture is currently 0.7%, far from the targeted 10%. As a large part of the country is still in an emergency situation, NGOs working here are often multi-disciplinary without specific or in-depth knowledge on food security and without guaranteed long-term presence.
8. Some organizations would rather not share their information but prefer keeping it to themselves. Stronger advocacy is needed to convince them of the advantage they themselves would have from sharing that information.
9. The project has increased the capacity of the local stakeholders but there is still a lot to be wished for. Some local stakeholders have been trained but the knowledge is not really integrated. Furthermore, as a result of the fact that the provinces are so big, a team of people is needed to cover all territories within a province, also because they are not only far apart in distance, but have very different characteristics as well. Therefore, there is a need to train more local stakeholders.
10. Even though knowledge and awareness have increased among participants of the system, there is still need for publicity since the IPC is relatively unknown to others.

C. IS THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?

11. IPC was introduced in DR Congo in 2007. The size of the country was the first constraint that had to be overcome in creating a feasible IPC structure. There are 11 provinces, and the IPC is fully decentralized with 11 Technical working Groups, one in each province. In each province, an analysis workshop is organized, and in two provinces two workshops are organized. In 2007, 2008 and 2009, 15 trainers have been trained in a TOT at regional level (Kenya). At provincial level, 75 trainers have been trained. In turn, they train other participants at any level. Before each analysis workshop, the trainers conduct training for the participants.
12. FAO is still solely in the leading role. The secretariat of IPC is housed in FAO Kinshasa office, and FAO has offices in 11 provinces that support the process. FAO organizes all IPC related workshops including trainings and production of the maps.
13. Even though decentralization poses problems with regard to high cost and low quality infrastructure, it also has advantages. The data collection and analysis may be done at local level which increases credibility; furthermore, high level technical local officials participate, which might not have been the case at national level as the availability of priorities there is much higher.
14. Data are collected by UN institutes, government and NGOs. A marketing and research bureau is also involved in collecting price data. Analysis workshops are carried out at provincial level. Subsequently, the data are validated by the technical groups (GTIs) of the Comité Provinciale Inter Agences (CPIAs). Subsequently, they are presented to the GTI at national level, where they are revalidated by the clusters of the Humanitarian Advocacy Group (HAG), where each cluster validates the relevant data. The GTI at national level consists of government institutes, civil society and international organizations in the role of observatory.
15. The size of the country and infrastructure make data collection difficult. As there is no collection of harvest data, regularity is difficult to ensure. The capacity of the partners and the tools they have to collect data are sometimes doubted.
16. In 2010, the population tables with estimated numbers have been introduced into the map. There is no separate distribution workshop, but data are distributed through existing inter-agency meetings.
17. Not all partner organisations have yet designated a staff member to be responsible for the IPC activities within the organisations, which makes the communication sometimes difficult.
18. The process between the data collection and analysis takes quite some time. When the data are collected in October/November, the data and analysis have to pass through the above mentioned stages and the final result may only be available after 4 or 5 months, in March.
19. The capacity of government is low. The MINAGRI is supposed to be in the lead role. They may have the technical capacity, but good governance and financial resources still need to be improved. It is expected that without further technical and financial support, the project will come to a standstill. Also, lack of security and stability still take up much of the attention.

20. Availability of financial resources is a problem. There may be a risk that money made available to the government will not be fully spent on IPC, with many other priorities in need of funding.
21. The partners are working on the idea of establishing a secretariat at the level of the MINAGRI instead of at FAO level. The Ministry indicates this is a good idea, as this would give them the justification and structure they need to start to truly lead the implementation of IPC.
22. There is a plan at national level to divide the country into 26 provinces, which would make the project management even more complex. A solution will have to be found to make data collection and analysis manageable if this happens.
23. From a financial point of view, the partners do not seem to be too eager to contribute to the current or future implementation of the project. This is unfortunate, since all partners interviewed have confirmed the importance and essence of the IPC programme in DR Congo and its lack of alternative. The Belgian government was mentioned often as possible donor.
24. The faculty of agronomy of the Kinshasa University is also involved as partner; it contributes knowledge in the data collection and analysis and has trained students on the subject of IPC.
25. Currently, only template 1 is completed. Template 2 and 3 are completed in a limited number of provinces but are not seen as a priority.
26. The planned exchanges between countries have been limited, there has been a visit from the Central-African Republic for the capacity building workshop in July 2009 and a visit from an expert from Burundi in October 2010 for the cross border FS analysis but there were no visits to other countries.

D. WHAT IS THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE PROJECT IN-COUNTRY?

27. The beneficiaries are government institutes, international institutes, local and international NGOs. The IPC trainings have increased the capacity and knowledge and the analysis workshops have increased consensus forming and cooperation.
28. There has not been any clear capacity assessment during the implementation of the project. Training activities were planned with input of the TWG based on their knowledge of the group capacity and needs. The training curriculum was crafted based on a rapid needs/current capacity appreciation of the target group. With hindsight, the capacity appeared very low in all respects, whereas now a small core group of people at national as well as province level have an acceptable FS analysis capacity.
29. Until now, the emphasis has been mainly on increasing technical capacity, and more effort should be put on raising awareness with regard to using the IPC products in the decision making process.
30. The main means of capacity development is training, mostly at an individual level. Institutionalization is still very difficult at this stage. The ministries shared that some of their technical staff members still needed considerable training, a fact which was confirmed by FAO and other stakeholders. The staff turnover is not as high as for instance in Burundi, which benefits the effect of the trainings.

31. On the other hand, one of the key staff members of the SNSA within the MINAGRI has been trained. He has been with the project from the start and seems to be involved in future as well. Not only does he coordinate and support IPC activities in DR Congo, he also advocates for and shares information on the IPC system outside the country in international meetings with SADC and others. He has even provided technical backstopping to CAR for one year. The SNSA is a stable institute which may remain active in the same composition even if the government changes, which adds to the institutionalization of IPC.
32. THE IPC is fully accepted by the government as a cheap system that cannot produce miracles but at least presents the situation of the country in a manner that may be basic but is constant.
33. Even though the TOT was very useful and the trainers use their knowledge to train participants of IPC, a total 15 trainers (including those trained during the first phase of the project) appeared far too little for a country with the size of Congo.
34. The budget provided by regional office was far too small and FAO Congo had to raise funds from the OCHA managed Pooled Fund and use a certain percentage of other project funds to cover for the deficit. The budget for DR Congo was USD285,000, compared to USD150,000 for Burundi, whereas for the sheer size of the country and its population, the infrastructure, the cost for security and the elevated cost of living the country would at least have needed ten times as much financial support as Burundi. On the other hand, the low budget was also a result of the fact that DR Congo had managed to already secure some funding at country level.
35. IPC in DR Congo is far from being institutionalized. Before that will be possible, a number of conditions must be met, with regard to capacity development, resources and quality of data and analysis.
36. Before the introduction of IPC hardly anything similar was being carried out, and the time has been too short to realize institutionalization. Some institutes do not exist yet, and if they do, they are still young and weak.

E. WAS THE INFORMATION GENERATED USED BY DECISION MAKERS?

37. Some NGOs like ACF use the IPC products for deciding the geographic location of their interventions, but always together with the outcomes of their own data collection systems as sometimes the results of IPC appear to give a different estimate.
38. The IPC maps are used in the yearly Humanitarian Action Plan, coordinated and developed by OCHA. OCHA also uses it for monitoring the same plan. Donors in general, which are focusing on humanitarian situations, use the IPC products to target their limited food security related funding. The proposals they receive are also sometimes illustrated by IPC maps.
39. Up to now, the ministries at national level have not been really using the IPC products, even though the Ministry of Health shared that it found IPC indispensable and said it planned to start using IPC in the near future. The prime minister was said to be unaware of the existence of IPC.
40. The marketing of the IPC has been insufficient. FAO was holding on to its position as a leader. Other IPC partners did not get or use the opportunity to raise awareness

and as a result, IPC s still unknown to many. Parties who are currently outside IPC but who may use IPC in their decision making should be addressed.

41. Even with the IPC information available, it is very difficult to make decisions because the size of the country impedes planning at a national level.

F. SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT (2007-10)

42. Even though in the North and East of the country the situation is still in emergency stage, the rest of the country is suffering from structural problems with regard to food security. IPC has helped unveil the causes. The resilience to shocks is low. To obtain a true picture of the structural problems, the introduction of different indicators is needed. Most of the stakeholders felt that structural problems were found throughout the country, whereas war induced urgencies were superposed on the structural situation.
43. For the areas in Phase II, the information reflected will be expanded in 2011 to reveal the causes of chronic food security.
44. There is a balanced participation of partners from all sectors of society. They seem to bring the knowledge and support needed to create a sustainable IPC program in the long run. There is sufficient diversity from all sectors to guarantee technical neutrality.
45. Without external financial support, it will not be possible to continue the project. Within the first 5 years, the government may not be able to support the IPC structure, financially or technically. There are plans to move the secretariat to the MINAGRI, but this can only be viable with additional financial and technical support. For long term continuation of IPC, having the Ministry in the lead role is preferable since it is not only involved in humanitarian situations.

G. ANY UNINTENDED EFFECTS – POSITIVE/NEGATIVE

46. WFP has not really used the IPC map up to now. They recently submitted a proposal to ECHO but had to be asked to add the IPC map to justify the geographical targeting. Even though they are a global IPC partner, the cooperation at national level is sub-optimal. They were not available for an interview.
47. The IPC has been introduced into the agronomic faculty of 4 universities. One professor is member of GTI, and he is involved in training at provincial level and in analysis workshops. Students are performing research on IPC. There are plans to expand to other universities, which may contribute to the sustainability.

SWOC OF IPC IN DR CONGO

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPC has been able to identify data gaps and contribute to finding solutions resulting in a progressing quality of the products • One of the key IPC experts resides within a stable institute inside the Ministry of Agriculture • Decentralisation allows a better control of the process and participation of high level provincial government 	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Several universities are involved at various levels of the IPC process
<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The technical and financial capacity of the government at national level remains low and good governance is not always ensured. • Quality, access and timeliness of data collection are not always ensured and rigor of the analysis is sometimes questionable • There has not been enough publicity and awareness raising and apart from among the participants of the IPC, there is little awareness. 	<p>Constraints</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As a result of the size of the country and quality of the infrastructure, quality control is difficult • Financial resources too limited because of a vast area, security cost, high cost in general and the need of a large group of participants • Decentralisation makes the implementation of IPC more money and time consuming

A. RESUME

Sécurité alimentaire actuel: une brève description

On dit souvent que DR Congo est un continent et sa vaste étendue justifie ce nom. Le pays compte environ 69 millions d'habitants, dont environs 30% vit dans les villes (10 millions à Kinshasa). Le pays est divisé en 11 provinces et 145 territoires, dont actuellement 40 sont en phase III (aiguë crise alimentaire et de subsistance). La plupart des pays est en Phase II (insécurité alimentaire modérée / limite) et III, avec quelques petites zones dans le Sud-Ouest et la région du Sud-est du pays dans la phase I (généralement en sécurité alimentaire). Même si de Septembre 2010 une légère amélioration est perçue dans quelques provinces, il n'y a pas encore d'amélioration structurelle. Selon la dernière analyse de l'IPC d'Octobre 2010, 4,5 millions de personnes se trouvaient dans une crise de sécurité alimentaire aiguë. Il y a une insécurité alimentaire chronique dans tout le pays en raison de la baisse de la productivité agricole et la hausse des prix. La maladie de la mosaïque, qui menace de manioc, n'est pas encore sous contrôle et une maladie bactérienne qui menace les bananiers se répand rapidement.

En raison de la persistance des conflits armés, une partie du pays souffre d'une superposition de la malnutrition aiguë au-dessus des problèmes chroniques existants. Il y a un taux élevé de pauvreté dans le pays, pratiquement sans accès à la sécurité sociale de base.

Les systèmes des informations sur la sécurité alimentaire dans le pays

Les données de Kinshasa ne sont pas encore perçues, mais cela pourrait changer après la nouvelle version manuel technique IPC 2.0 a été introduite. Pour prendre le fort pourcentage de la population urbaine correctement en compte, les évaluations en milieu urbain doivent être correctement mises en place.

Récemment (Mars 2010) un survey MICS a été effectué et les données ont été utilisées pour l'IPC. Malheureusement, MICS n'est effectué qu'une seule fois tous les cinq ans et les données ne peuvent donc servir d'entrée régulier. En outre, les données de la FAO, le PAM et l'UNICEF sont entrées dans les modèles, ainsi que les données du gouvernement à travers la nutrition, l'eau et l'assainissement, la santé et la sécurité alimentaire. Enfin, les données des ONG comme Oxfam, Vision mondiale, MSF, ACF, et un certain nombre d'autres sont utilisés.

Description des partenaires de l'IPC dans le pays et leur capacité

Les principaux partenaires de l'IPC sont le gouvernement (ministère du Plan, Ministère des Actions Humanitaires, le Service Nationale de Statistiques Agricoles (SNSA) du ministère de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage (MINAGRI), Programme Nationale de Nutrition (PRONANUT) du ministère de la Santé, Ministère de l'Environnement et le ministère de l'Intérieur), les organisations internationales (FAO, UNICEF, PAM, HCR, UNFPA, OMS, OCHA,), des ONG internationales (Caritas, Vision mondiale, ACF, Oxfam, COOPI, FHI, ACTED, CARE, le CNRC, Solidarité, IFES, GTZ, Tear Fund et CESVI), des ONG nationales (APROBES, ALDI) et l'Université de Kinshasa. La plupart des ONG sont impliquées dans l'aide humanitaire.

Les ministères fournissent des données et participent aux ateliers d'analyse. La situation est pareil pour les ONG, même si Oxfam n'a pas eu un important programme sur la sécurité alimentaire depuis le début de l'année 2010.

B. PERTINENCE ET RESULTATS DU PROJET IPC

1. IPC répond à une demande réelle dans le pays. Même si il y avait un certain nombre de systèmes de collecte de données, ils recueillaient les données d'une manière autonome. Avant l'introduction de l'IPC, dans un grand nombre de territoires, il y avait très peu de données disponibles et pour cette raison, la première carte de l'IPC a montré un grand nombre de territoires blancs. Au cours des trois années, l'IPC a permis d'identifier ces lacunes et a fourni des solutions en préconisant et en favorisant une meilleure qualité de collectes de données. IPC a facilité extension de la collecte des données par les partenaires pour les territoires voisins ainsi que le lancement d'évaluation rapide dans certains domaines. Actuellement, dans la carte il reste seulement deux territoires blancs, qui devraient être couverts en vertu de la ronde analyse suivante.
2. IPC combine tous les systèmes de sécurité alimentaire de manière cohérent dans un rapport et carte. Avant il n'y avait pas d'autres systèmes cohérents et exhaustives et actuellement il n'y a toujours pas d'alternative.
3. Un des problèmes que l'IPC a rencontrée en ce qui concerne la collecte des données est le fait qu'il y ait une taxe élevée sur les produits alimentaires qui se distingue par district et même par une partie de la ville, et au sujet du taux de change du dollar / franc congolais. Ces données changent très rapidement au fil du temps et il est donc difficile d'assurer la collecte des données les plus récentes.
4. Il n'y a pas de disponibilité globale et une qualité constante des données. Au début de 2007, les problèmes ont été encore plus grands, mais même si la disponibilité s'est considérablement améliorée, la qualité des données reste parfois discutable. La qualité de l'analyse est sous optimal, aussi.
5. La méthode de collecte est parfois douteuse et la triangulation des données n'est pas effectuée. Les données recueillies à partir de sources différentes sur le même sujet ne sont pas nécessairement égale ou comparable. De temps en temps, il a été constaté que les collecteurs de données ont rempli des questionnaires "de manière créative" et les données ont dû être abandonnées.
6. Les données sont recueillies sur les différents points dans le temps et ne sont donc pas toujours compatibles. L'IPC remarque tous les problèmes liés à la collecte de données et à la qualité de et tente de les corriger.
7. Le gouvernement est motivé, mais leur capacité est encore très faible comme leurs ressources financières: le budget de l'agriculture est actuellement de 0,7%, loin du but de 10%. Comme une grande partie du pays est encore dans une situation d'urgence, les ONG qui travaillent ici sont souvent multidisciplinaires sans connaissances spécifiques ou en profondeur sur la sécurité alimentaire et sans la présence à long terme garantie.
8. Certaines organisations préfèrent ne pas partager leurs informations, la veulent garder pour eux-mêmes. Il faut plaider plus fortement pour les convaincre de l'avantage qu'ils auraient eux-mêmes du partage de cette information.

9. Le projet a augmenté la capacité des acteurs locaux, mais il reste encore beaucoup à désirer. Certains acteurs locaux ont été formés, mais la connaissance n'est pas vraiment intégrée. En outre, les provinces sont si grandes, qu'une équipe de personnes serait nécessaire pour couvrir tous les territoires dans une province, aussi parce qu'ils sont non seulement loin en distance, mais aussi ont des caractéristiques très différentes. Par conséquent, il est nécessaire de former plus d'acteurs locaux.
10. Même si les connaissances et la sensibilisation ont augmenté chez les participants du système, il y a toujours besoin de publicité depuis l'IPC est relativement inconnu des autres.

C. LE STRUCTURE ET MISE EN OEUVRE DU PROJET SONT-ILS EFFICACES? AND EFFECTIVE?

11. L'IPC a été introduit en République démocratique du Congo en 2007. La taille du pays a été la première contrainte dans la création d'une structure possible de l'IPC. Il y a 11 provinces, et l'IPC est entièrement décentralisée avec des groupes techniques de travail, un dans chaque province. Dans chaque province, au moins un atelier d'analyse est organisé, et dans deux provinces deux ateliers sont organisés. En 2007, 2008 et 2009, 15 formateurs ont été formés dans un TOT au niveau régional (Kenya). Au niveau provincial, 75 formateurs ont été formés. À leur tour, ils forment les autres participants à tous les niveaux. Avant chaque atelier d'analyse, les formateurs forment les participants.
12. FAO est encore seul dans le rôle principal. Le secrétariat de l'IPC est abrité au sein de la FAO à Kinshasa, il y a des bureaux dans 11 provinces qui soutiennent le processus. La FAO organise tous les ateliers connexes, y compris des formations de l'IPC et la production des cartes.
13. Même si la décentralisation pose des problèmes en ce qui concerne leur coût élevé et des infrastructures de qualité faible, il a aussi des avantages. La collecte de données et d'analyse peut être fait au niveau local ce qui augmente la crédibilité; en outre, des techniciens de haut niveau participent, ce qui n'aurait pas été le cas au niveau national où de la disponibilité des priorités est beaucoup plus élevé.
14. Un bureau de marketing et de la recherche est également impliqué dans la collecte de données sur les prix. Après que les ateliers d'analyse ont été effectués au niveau provincial, les données sont validées par les groupes techniques (GTI) de la Commission Provinciale Inter Agences (CPIA). En suite, les données et l'analyse sont présentées à la GTI au niveau national, où ils sont validés par les pôles du Humanitarian Advocacy Group (HAG), où chaque groupe valide les données pertinentes. Le GTI au niveau national se compose d'instituts publics, société civile et les organisations internationales dans le rôle d'observatoire.
15. La taille du pays et l'infrastructure rendent la collecte de données difficile. Comme il n'y a pas de collecte de données sur la récolte, la régularité est difficile à assurer. La capacité des partenaires et les outils qu'ils ont à recueillir des données sont parfois mis en doute.
16. En 2010, les tableaux de la population avec des chiffres estimatifs ont été introduits dans la carte. Il n'y a pas d'atelier de distribution distincts, mais les données sont distribuées par des réunions inter agences existantes.

17. Il y a encore quelques organisations partenaires qui doivent désigner un membre du personnel qui sera responsable pour les activités de l'IPC au sein des organisations, ce qui rend la communication parfois difficile.
18. Le processus entre la collecte et l'analyse prend un certain temps. Lorsque les données sont collectées en Octobre / Novembre, les données et l'analyse doivent passer par les étapes mentionnées ci-dessus et le résultat final ne peut être disponible au bout de 4 ou 5 mois, en Mars.
19. La capacité du gouvernement est faible. Le MINAGRI est censé être dans le rôle principal. Ils peuvent avoir la capacité technique, mais la bonne gouvernance et les ressources financières doivent encore être améliorées. Il est prévu que sans appui technique et financier, le projet est au point mort. En outre, le manque de sécurité et la stabilité encore prennent beaucoup de l'attention.
20. Disponibilité des ressources financières est un problème. Il peut y avoir un risque que l'argent mis à la disposition du gouvernement ne sera pas entièrement consacré à l'IPC, avec de nombreuses autres priorités qui ont besoin de financement.
21. Les partenaires travaillent sur l'idée de création d'un secrétariat au niveau du MINAGRI au lieu d'au niveau de la FAO. Le ministère indique que c'est une bonne idée, car cela leur donne la justification et la structure dont ils ont besoin pour commencer à vraiment mener la mise en œuvre de l'IPC.
22. Il y a un plan au niveau national pour diviser le pays en 26 provinces, ce qui rendrait la gestion du projet encore plus complexe. Une solution devra être trouvée pour faire la collecte de données et l'analyse gérable si cela se produit.
23. D'un point de vue financier, les partenaires ne semblent pas être trop enthousiaste de contribuer à la mise en œuvre actuelle ou future du projet. C'est malheureux, car tous les partenaires interrogés ont confirmé l'importance et l'essence du programme de l'IPC en RD Congo et son manque d'alternative. Le gouvernement belge a été mentionné souvent comme bailleur de fonds possible.
24. La faculté d'agronomie de l'Université de Kinshasa est également impliqué en tant que partenaire ; il apporte des connaissances techniques dans la collecte de données et d'analyse et forme des étudiants sur le thème de l'IPC.
25. Actuellement, seulement modèle 1 est terminée. Modèle 2 et 3 se sont déroulées dans un nombre limité de provinces, mais ne sont pas considérés comme une priorité.
26. Les échanges prévus entre les pays ont été limités ; il y a eu une visite de la République centrafricaine pour l'atelier de renforcement des capacités en Juillet 2009 et la visite d'un expert du Burundi en Octobre 2010, mais il n'y avait pas de visites à d'autres pays.

D. QUELLE EST LA STRATEGIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA CAPACITE DANS LE PAYS?

27. Les bénéficiaires sont les instituts gouvernementaux, les instituts internationaux et ONG locales et internationales. Les formations de l'IPC ont augmenté la capacité et les connaissances et les ateliers d'analyse ont augmenté la formation de consensus et de coopération.
28. Il n'y a pas eu une claire évaluation de la capacité au cours de la mise en œuvre du projet. Les activités de formation ont été planifiées avec la participation du GTT sur la base de leur connaissance de la capacité du groupe et des besoins. Le programme de formation a été conçu basé sur une rapide appréciation des besoins et des capacités actuelles du groupe cible. La capacité est apparue très faible à tous les égards, alors que maintenant un petit groupe de personnes au niveau national comme au niveau province ont une capacité d'analyse acceptable de la sécurité alimentaire.
29. Jusqu'à présent, l'accent a été mis principalement sur l'augmentation des capacités techniques, et plus d'efforts devraient être mises sur la sensibilisation à l'égard de l'utilisation des produits de l'IPC dans le processus décisionnel.
30. Le principal moyen de développement des capacités est la formation, principalement au niveau individuel. L'institutionnalisation est encore très difficile à ce stade. Les ministères partagèrent que certains de leurs membres du personnel technique ont encore besoin d'une formation considérable, ce qui a été confirmé par la FAO et par d'autres intervenants. Le roulement de personnel n'est pas aussi élevé comme par exemple au Burundi, qui bénéficie de l'effet des formations.
31. D'autre part, l'un des membres clés du personnel de la SNSA dans le MINAGRI a été formé. Il a été avec le projet dès le départ et serait impliquée à l'avenir aussi. Non seulement il coordonne et soutient les activités de l'IPC en RD Congo, il plaide aussi et partage l'information sur le système de l'IPC en dehors du pays à des réunions internationales avec la SADC et d'autres. Il a même fourni un appui technique à la RCA pour un an. Le SNSA est un institut stable, qui peut rester actif dans la même composition, même si le gouvernement change, ce qui ajoute à l'institutionnalisation de l'IPC.
32. L'IPC est pleinement acceptée par le gouvernement comme un système bon marché qui ne peut pas produire des miracles, mais au moins présente la situation du pays d'une manière qui peut être simple, mais est constante.
33. Même si le TOT a été très utile et les formateurs utilisent leurs connaissances pour former les participants de l'IPC, un total de 15 formateurs (y compris ceux formés au cours de la première phase du projet) semble bien trop peu pour un pays avec la taille du Congo.
34. Le budget prévu par le bureau régional était beaucoup trop faible et la FAO Congo a reçu des fonds de l'OCHA et utilise un certain pourcentage des fonds du projet pour couvrir le déficit. Le budget pour la RD Congo a été USD285, 000, et le budget pour Burundi a été 150 000 dollars par comparaison. Pour la taille du pays et sa population, l'infrastructure, le coût pour la sécurité et le coût élevé de la vie quotidienne, DR Congo aurait au moins besoin de dix fois plus le Burundi. D'autre part, la faiblesse du budget a été aussi le résultat du fait que la RD Congo avait déjà réussi à obtenir des fonds au niveau du pays.

35. L'IPC en RD Congo est loin d'être institutionnalisé. Pour que cela soit possible, un certain nombre de conditions doivent être remplies, en ce qui concerne le développement des capacités, des ressources et la qualité des données et des analyses.
36. Avant l'introduction de l'IPC il n'y avait pas de système semblable, et le temps a été trop court pour réaliser l'institutionnalisation. Certains instituts n'existent pas encore, ou sont encore jeunes et faibles.

E. L'INFORMATION GENEREE, A-T-ELLE ETE UTILISEE PAR LES DECIDEURS?

37. Certaines ONG comme ACF utilisent les produits de l'IPC pour décider le ciblage géographique de leurs interventions, mais toujours en combinaison avec les résultats de leurs propres systèmes de collecte de données.
38. Les cartes de l'IPC sont utilisées chaque année dans le Plan d'action humanitaire, coordonnée et développée par OCHA. OCHA les utilise également pour le suivi du même plan. Les bailleurs de fonds en général, qui se concentrent sur les situations humanitaires, utilisent les produits de l'IPC à cibler leurs ressources limitées concernant la sécurité alimentaire. Les propositions qu'ils reçoivent sont aussi parfois illustrées par des cartes IPC.
39. Jusqu'à présent, les ministères au niveau national n'ont pas vraiment utilisé les produits de l'IPC, même si le ministère de la Santé a partagé qu'il a trouvé l'IPC indispensable et a indiqué qu'il envisageait de commencer à utiliser l'IPC dans un proche avenir. Le Premier ministre semble de ne pas être conscient de l'existence de l'IPC.
40. La commercialisation de l'IPC a été insuffisante. La FAO a été tenue à sa position de leader. Autres partenaires de l'IPC n'ont pas obtenu ou profité de l'occasion pour sensibiliser des autres et, par conséquent, l'IPC est encore relativement inconnu. Parties qui sont actuellement à l'extérieur de l'IPC mais qui peuvent utiliser l'IPC dans leurs prises de décision doivent être adressées.
41. Même avec informations de l'IPC disponibles, il est très difficile de prendre des décisions parce que la taille du pays empêche la planification à l'échelle nationale.

F. AVANTAGES DURABLES DU PROJET (2007-10)

42. Même si dans le Nord et l'Est du pays, la situation est encore en phase d'urgence, le reste du pays souffre de problèmes structurels par rapport à la sécurité alimentaire. L'IPC a aidé à découvrir les causes. La résistance aux chocs est faible. Pour obtenir une image sûre des problèmes structurels, l'introduction de différents indicateurs est nécessaire. La plupart des intervenants ont estimé que des problèmes structurels ont été trouvés à travers le pays, alors que les urgences causées par la guerre sont superposées sur la situation structurelle.
43. Pour les domaines de la phase II, les informations qui seront élargies en 2011 pour révéler les causes de l'insécurité alimentaire chronique.
44. Il y a une participation équilibrée des partenaires issus de tous les secteurs de la société. Ils semblent apporter les connaissances et le soutien nécessaires pour créer

un programme durable de l'IPC dans le long terme. Il y a une diversité suffisante de tous les secteurs afin de garantir la neutralité technique.

45. Sans aide financière extérieure, il ne sera pas possible de poursuivre le projet. Dans les 5 premières années, le gouvernement ne peut pas être en mesure de soutenir la structure de l'IPC, financièrement ou techniquement. Il est prévu de déplacer le secrétariat de la MINAGRI, mais cela ne peut pas être viable sans soutien financier et technique supplémentaire. Pour la suite à long terme de l'IPC, avoir le ministère dans le rôle principal est préférable car le ministère n'est pas seulement impliqué dans les situations humanitaires.

G. EFFETS NON INTENTIONNEL – POSITIVE/NEGATIVE

46. Le PAM n'a pas vraiment utilisé la carte de l'IPC jusqu'à présent. Ils ont récemment présenté une proposition à ECHO, mais l'ECHO a dû demander d'ajouter la carte IPC pour justifier le ciblage géographique. Même si le PAM est un partenaire mondial de l'IPC, la coopération au niveau national est sous optimal. Le PAM n'était pas disponible pour une entrevue.
47. L'IPC a été introduit dans la faculté agronomique de 4 universités. Un professeur est membre du GTI, et il est impliqué dans la formation au niveau provincial et dans les ateliers d'analyse. Les élèves effectuent des recherches sur l'IPC. Il est prévu d'élargir le programme à d'autres universités, ce qui peut contribuer à la durabilité.

SWOC DE L'IPC EN DR CONGO

<p>Points forts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • L'IPC a été en mesure d'identifier les lacunes des données et de contribuer à trouver des solutions, résultant en une amélioration de la qualité des produits • L'un des experts de l'IPC clé réside dans un institut stable à l'intérieur du ministère de l'Agriculture • La décentralisation permet un meilleur contrôle du processus et la participation des techniciens de haut niveau du gouvernement provincial 	<p>Possibilités</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Plusieurs universités sont impliquées à divers niveaux du processus de l'IPC
<p>Faiblesses</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. La capacité technique et financière du gouvernement au niveau national reste faible et la bonne gouvernance n'est pas toujours assurée. 2. La qualité, l'accès et la rapidité de la collecte des données ne sont pas toujours assurées et la rigueur de l'analyse est parfois discutable 3. Il n'y a pas eu assez de publicité et de sensibilisation et parmi les participants de l'IPC, il y a peu de conscience. 	<p>Contraintes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A cause de la taille du pays et la qualité de l'infrastructure, le contrôle de la qualité est difficile 2. Les ressources financières sont trop limitées à cause d'une vaste taille de pays, le coût de la sécurité, le coût élevé en général et la nécessité d'un grand groupe de participants 3. A cause de la décentralisation, la mise en œuvre de l'IPC prend plus de temps et de l'argent

A. COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Current FS and Nutrition status: short description

Kenya can be divided into three broad agro-ecological zones: (1) central highlands – rain-fed agriculture; (2) semi-arid lands - with agro-pastoralism and mixed farming; and (3) arid lands – pastoralism. The semi-arid and arid lands are typically subject to climatic shocks, drought as well as flash floods leading to reduced grain production and unavailability of rangelands for the pastoralists. Kenya has suffered from a number of droughts in the past 6-7 years with over 3 million people affected in 2005 and 2008. It has a population of around 38 million and the GNI per person is US\$770. The percentage of undernourished people among the total population for the period 2004-2006 is 30%.

Since the early nineties, Kenya hosts significant numbers of Somali and Sudanese refugees. Repatriation of these groups is perceived to be slow as a result of the difficult political and living conditions across the borders.

The results from the most recent Long Rains Assessments (August 2010) showed a positive outlook on the food security situation, especially if compared to the LRA of 2009. In the current situation analysis, only a small area has been classified under phase III (Marsabit), while a large part of the geographical space is classified under Phase II, with a significant part showing a risk of worsening phase.

Operational FSN information systems in country

The main food security and nutrition information system that is operational has been built up with the contributions from government, UN agencies (WFP, FAO and UNICEF), NGOs (Oxfam) and donors (WB, ECHO, EC, and USAID). Many of the efforts have been coordinated through the Arid Lands Resource Management Programme, an umbrella programme initially placed under the Office of the President. The collaboration between stakeholders is based upon an institutional structure that links the technical experts with the executive authority in the country as well as the implementing powers at the decentralized levels. The most important network is the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) that reports to senior management at the Kenya Food Security Meeting. From here recommendations for action are channelled through to the combined PSs and the Cabinet. The structure is currently not yet officially supported by a national drought management policy or strategy, but there are good hopes that such an appropriate policy framework will soon be approved by government and Parliament. This would provide legitimacy and funds for enhanced performance of dealing with transitory and chronic food insecurity in Kenya.

The KFSSG undertakes a long rain and short rain assessment and therefore is in control of much of the data on which conducting the analysis is based. The IPC is used for classifying the results from these assessments. Other sources used for the situation analysis are governmental information monitoring systems on agriculture, health, markets, etc.

Description of IPC key partners in-country and their capacity

The IPC is used for classifying the results from the assessments twice a year. All KFSSG members participate in the exercise. The most important partners include: WFP, FAO, OCHA, FEWSNET, Arid lands, MoA, and MoH. All external partners to the GoK are well-established and often can depend on their respective regional offices in Nairobi, the hub for many organizations for the Horn of Africa and Central Africa/ Greater Lake area.

It is interesting to note that the FAO Representation for Kenya does not have a specific emergency coordinator responsible for the implementation of emergency programmes. The sub-sectors both manage the emergency inputs as well as longer-term support. The FAO-Kenya team is convinced that this way the team ensures the best chances for linking emergency interventions to recovery, rehabilitation and long-term perspectives of the agricultural sector.

FAO has established a Regional Emergency Office for Eastern and Central Africa a few years ago. The project hosts the support function to the countries implementing IPC in the region. FAO Somalia is also based in Nairobi and provides a significant potential source of technical expertise for the application of IPC in Kenya. Technical as well as institutional capacity is among the highest in the region.

B. RELEVANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF IPC PROJECT:

- The IPC responds to a real demand in Kenya. It is widely accepted as the classification tool of the KFSSG's bi-annual assessments. It helps to prioritize the results of what is most relevant to food security status and its classification.
- IPC was introduced into an already functional national FSIS. It filled a specific gap of classifying outcomes of the assessment, making it easier to present results for a humanitarian response. The use of the IPC reference table has helped identify data gaps as to what should inform a humanitarian response. It has also emphasized the need to qualify statements, and enhanced understanding of depth and magnitude of problems.
- While the KFSSG assessments are broad socio-economic assessments with a strong participation from the decentralized levels (through training supported by IPC and others) the IPC exercise focuses on the humanitarian classification of the results. The templates 2 and 3 provide livelihood information that show the local context and inherent problems affecting food security status. There is confusion if the KFSSG uses these templates 2 and 3 consistently as the IPC exercise, unlike in other countries, only takes up 1 day rather than 5 days.
- The IPC tool works well as consensus streamlines existing differences. Kenya has added the 1a (high resilience) and 1b phase (low resilience) to distinguish the extent of food security within the generally food secure population. All stakeholders seem content with the adaptation.
- Problems perceived by the majority of the stakeholders include data quality availability plus a concern that IPC maps favour a humanitarian response over addressing the underlying causes.
- The project has made a significant contribution to increased awareness and knowledge about causes of food insecurity, mainly through training at central and decentralized

levels.

C. IS THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?

- The KFSSG provides the institutional structure for engagement between all actors. The IPC WG is placed under the Data and Information Subcommittee of the KFSSG (DISK). The DISK focuses on improving the quality, quantity and timeliness of food security and disaster management information through increased data sharing, coordinated investments in developing capacity and systems, and through continuous improvements in methodologies and techniques.
- The role of the IPC WG is much smaller than in comparison to other countries. It's the KFSSG and its DISK, chaired by GoK that has the capacity to absorb the instrument, network across sectors, and facilitate the application and use of the instrument.
- While the KFSSG Chair is seated within Arid Lands, the IPC National Coordinator or focal point is a Kenyan civil servant with a part-time link to the project. The technical support provided to the KFSSG and IPC for that matter rests with the (inter-) national experts from organizations such as WFP, FAO, UNICEF, etc.
- WFP is perhaps the biggest supporter of the KFSSG and the bi-annual assessments as they are key to the calculations of food needs underlying WFP's significant humanitarian and livelihood support programmes in Kenya.
- Perhaps the main contribution from FAO to IPC in Kenya is through support provided by the FSNAU and the Arid Lands Programme.
 - The WB funded Arid Lands Programme has facilitated the development of the KFSSG in the past 10 years, in part through the secondment of international technical experts to the GoK.
 - The FSNAU has provided initial support and guidance for the use of IPC in the Kenya context. FSNAU is a member of the IPC TWG for Kenya. It is unclear how much technical support the programme is currently providing to Kenya
- The FAO Kenya Representation provides direct technical support under the Arid Lands Programme. This may explain in part why Kenya doesn't have a fully employed IPC national coordinator. Although the regional project is operating from FAO's REOA is based in Nairobi, it is disappointing to see how little direct support has been provided to Kenya.
- Project technical support has been limited to training of government staff and ToT. More recently, representatives from other global IPC partners such as CARE, SAVE and OXFAM have seconded each a food security analyst to the region (with support from the ECHO funded IPC global project). They are based in REOA and generally try to gain support from the NGOs in the region. The CARE IPC technical advisor has been assigned the responsibility to technically support Kenya.

D. WHAT IS THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE PROJECT IN-COUNTRY?

- The main beneficiaries of CD are members of the KFSSG, representatives from government, NGOs, and UN agencies. The IPC training fits in within the general CD plan of the KFSSG/DISK. KFSSG members pool their training resources/ share costs in order to address the most important needs. NGOs such as WV and Oxfam share in the cost of assessment and training. Regular capacity assessments of skills and capabilities may be useful, especially due to the high turn-over among government staff.
- The project has not conducted a capacity assessment of relevant skills and capabilities at the start of the project as suggested. However, the the DISK had vetted the training and it has been viewed positively by almost all interviewees.
- The IPC training responded to a great need. The project has been flexible in providing additional training at the district level requested by the KFSSG (GoK). The training of relevant district staff was accompanied by an exercise to assess what indicators the IPC uses, to review the data available versus the indicators proposed in the reference table, etc. This exercise has made the learning very interactive and hands-on. Stakeholders and other interested parties may use a similar combination of activities to raise skills levels among staff. This includes the relevant staff of NGOs.
- The project conducted 1 ToT course in Kenya in the second phase. The knowledge was tested immediately afterwards and 80 per cent of participants successfully could reproduce the learnings. During interviews, the mission only heard of 1 Kenyan participant of the ToT that had organized an IPC training within his Ministry (Water) to train colleagues in IPC. Otherwise, it is assumed that the trainers participate in each of the bi-annual assessments in the field (except for the long rain assessment this year) and share knowledge and experience with other team members.
- The project has significantly increased the awareness of food security and FSIS in Kenya, especially at district level where awareness was low. The project developed and used a training package, which has been used widely. The IPC focal point in Kenya has had the opportunity to visit neighbouring countries to share experiences of the KFSSG. If not supported through other means (specific training for exchanges across borders and intense preparation beforehand) it may be unrealistic to expect too much from this sharing of experiences.
A website designed for the exchange of experiences between users (designed by the GSU) has not been used a lot. It is unclear why the website with functionality to communicate between IPC users was not used.

E. WAS THE INFORMATION GENERATED USED BY DECISION MAKERS (GOVERNMENT, DONORS UN, NGOS,)?

- The IPC map with its classification has been mentioned by almost all users (government, UN agencies, NGOs and donors) to be useful for strategic purposes. The maps have been used by many stakeholders to advocate for humanitarian interventions in geographical areas with IPC classification 3 and 4..
- The KFSSG has been using call-out boxes on the map with additional information on livelihoods, underlying causes, etc. These are very useful for the technical reader but have been left out for the main senior policy maker level. The call-out boxes are still used for a technical audience for areas in classification 4 and 5. Many of the people interviewed thought that the call out boxes for phase 1-3 also contained very useful

information on chronic issues that may need to be repackaged under a separate map. No evidence was found of the IPC map influencing policy formulation processes.

- The long and short rain assessments and the maps that are produced afterwards do take time to be completed. This year the results were particularly late as an urban FI assessment was conducted. The results were 2 months late.
- Stakeholders didn't complain about receiving the information late. Twice a year the map is produced, which is complimented by FEWSNET with regular updates (EW) on a monthly basis. Both are used as complimentary, FEWSNET products feeding into the IPC process.

F. SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT (2007-10)

- IPC has been incorporated into the national FSIS in Kenya. It is very likely that the IPC instrument has found its niche in the assessment and analysis process. The cycle of conducting the IPC has led to a gradually better product and also has given the participants the opportunity to understand the uses and limitations of the instrument.
- FAO-KEN has been successful in securing funds for the IPC exercises of the next 1 or 2 years through SIDA funding. SIDA specifically selected the IPC support from a number of project modules on offer. This is very encouraging. FAO-KEN is the only so far that has raised funds for facilitating the IPC process at (sub)national levels.
- Given the nature of the exposure to food insecurity in Kenya (and the wider Horn for that matter), and the case load of refugees residing in the region due to insecurity in the region, the IPC should remain a very useful instrument to be used, funded by government and its partners.
- The KFSSG – its assessment, analysis and classification system should become really part of the government system when it will formally adopt the new drought management policy, expected to be discussed and adopted by Parliament by end of 2011.

G. ANY UNINTENDED EFFECTS – POSITIVE/NEGATIVE:

- There has been very little competition between IPC and FEWSNET - mainly due to the excellent networking in Kenya with a strong coordinating role for the government. The mission feels that the government has rightly pushed for an introduction of IPC on their own terms, with additional support for the districts.

SWOC of IPC in Kenya

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPC well institutionalized within the KFSSG • Strong government ownership of the process and FSIS • Many partners/involved, which makes it easier to share cost for training, etc. • Strong institutional structure links all levels in government and partners – from the field to Cabinet level • 	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FSNAU is located in Nairobi • REOA is located in Nairobi • Technical expertise available in hub of Nairobi
<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPC as an humanitarian classification tool may further direct more resources towards humanitarian needs while the context requires drastic measures to deal with underlying causes • Despite the assessment that is conducted prior to an IPC, according to interviewees, much of the data quality still needs improvement 	<p>Constraints</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong ownership of government may prevent transparency at all levels and at all times, especially if quality control/peer review from outside is not allowed

ANNEX 4 COUNTRY REPORT TANZANIA

A. COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Current FS and Nutrition status: short description

The food security situation in Tanzania has been generally satisfactory for 2010, after good harvests during the year. Markets seem to function well and food is readily available in both rural and urban markets. The majority of Tanzania is classified as generally food-secure (phase 1a or 1b) with the larger part classified as food secure with low resilience (phase 1b). A few regions have been classified as moderate/ borderline food insecure (phase 2) following below-normal seasonal rains. Pastures in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country are also affected.

The September 2010 Food Security and Nutrition Situation report (FSNS) established that over 400,000 people in 19 Districts in 12 regions (Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa, Lindi, Kilimanjaro, Manyara, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mwanza, Shinyanga, Singida, and Tabora) were moderately food insecure with another 800,000 people vulnerable of becoming moderately food insecure at the height of the lean season (October till January/March). There has been some concern about increases in food prices for low-income households dependent on food purchases.

Tanzania is considered a very poor country in Sub-Saharan Africa, ranked at the bottom - 148 out of 177 worldwide - according to UNDP's Human Development Ranking in 2010. It is classified as a least developed, low-income and food deficit country with around a third of its population living below the basic needs poverty line, and around 20 per cent living on less than the equivalent of US\$1 per day. The majority of inhabitants are based in rural areas with a strong dependence on rain-fed agriculture.

Operational FSN information systems in country

The Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) has the core mandate of food security policy formulation, project implementation and analysis. A group of government and non-government stakeholders have collaborated as the Food Security Information Team (FSIT) from 2000 under the coordination of the the Disaster Management Department (DMD) in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The FSIT used to conduct two seasonal rapid vulnerability assessments (RVAs) with a focus on specific areas vulnerable to below-normal levels of precipitation for rain-fed agriculture, and focusing mainly on food availability indicators (on selected food crops). The seasonal reports are submitted by DMD to the Tanzania Disaster Relief Emergency Committee (TANDREC) – chaired by the PMO - the highest decision making body on FSN matters, which uses the findings and recommendations from the RVAs to effect responses and appeals, if necessary.

The IPC was introduced to Tanzania in 2008 when it was incorporated into the Joint Programme 1 (JP1) —“Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment,” one of the integrated joint programmes between the Government of Tanzania and the UN “Delivering as One.” Under JP1, a MUCHALI (Mfumo wa Uchambuzi wa Uhakika wa Chakula na Lishe)” framework has been developed to guide the establishment and implementation of a Livelihood-based Food Security and Nutrition Information System (LFSNIS) in Tanzania.

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FAO IPC Regional Project Evaluation (OSRO/RAF/907/EC)

January 2011

MUCHALI expands and formalizes the work undertaken by the FSIT. DMD is the overall coordinator for MUCHALI while MAFC coordinates the MUCHALI technical activities.

IPC has been incorporated in the bi-annual seasonal Food Security and Nutrition Situation assessments (FSNA), aiming at improving the data collection tools and situation analysis, and further classifying its outcomes according to IPC phases 1-5. The resulting report and map is used by various FSN decision makers in the country. MUCHALI is being piloted in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. Implementation of the LFSNIS nation-wide through MUCHALI framework is still in its early stages.

The MAFC is said to set up a MUCHALI Secretariat in 2011, which will bring together the various actors from within government and partners outside.

Description of IPC key partners in-country and their capacity

The key partners for IPC are the following MUCHALI members:

Government: DMD-PMO, MAFC, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries, Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC)-under the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA) and regional and local government authorities.

Independents: FEWSNET, Sokoine University of Agriculture;

UN: FAO, UNICEF and WFP (with reduced capacity in-country);

INGOs: CARE, OXFAM, WVI

B. RELEVANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF IPC PROJECT:

- IPC has been introduced as part of the bi-annual seasonal Food Security and Nutrition Situation assessments (FSNA), improving the data collection tools (expanding on key indicators based on the IPC reference table) and situation analysis, and further classifying its outcomes according to IPC phases. Results are submitted to TANDREC.
- IPC is therefore not used as a typical tool to analyse chronic food insecurity and malnutrition. Instead it has found to be relevant as part of the disaster management cycle, similar to applications run by all other project countries in the region. The report is the single document that is used for emergency intervention in the country.
- IPC has raised general awareness on all aspects of food security, especially on malnutrition and water. It has helped focus the situation analysis as well as helped identify key data gaps.
- The introduction of IPC in Tanzania has been timed to be within the framework of a GoT/UN Joint Programme.
- Initially, IPC was met with resistance from national stakeholders who doubted that a FSIS tool specially designed for Somalia could be “copied and pasted” to Tanzania. With time, IPC has been incorporated successfully into one of the One UN Joint Programmes to support the development of the LFSNIS.

- Tanzania uses to great satisfaction of all users the 1a (high resilience) and 1b phase (low resilience) classification to distinguish within the generally food secure population, similar to Kenya and Uganda.
- It is felt that FAO Tanzania (and MUCHALI partners) has applied too much caution with the introduction of IPC, and has not adopted some of the key strengths, mainly relating to communication. The country has gone through 4 cycles of analysis. The IPC maps produced are very basic and have only been published as part of the FSNS reports to illustrate the different phases and “risk of worsening phase.” No larger formatted maps have been produced with call-out boxes explaining the underlying causes, population affected, etc. No other spin off products have been published.
- The project should have hired a local GIS expert to assist with the mapping when it became obvious the output was inferior to other IPC products in the region. First responsibility for this lies with FAO Tanzania.
- The mission feels that the development of the LFSNIS could have gained from a higher profile by IPC products, particularly integration of different sources to emphasize the relations and combination of transitory and chronic issues. It is felt that these bi-annual food security classifications could add a useful dimension to the experiences of poverty under the PRSP monitoring framework.
- Non-availability of livelihood profiles, despite some preparatory work on short descriptions conducted by FEWSNET, may have added to the lack of depth in the situation analysis reviewed. Information is strictly sorted by administrative boundaries only.
- The FSNS results need official (government) approval and are circulated with a delay among a limited audience (TANDREC).
- It is not clear if findings are used to support interventions to address underlying causes of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition. Therefore, the role of IPC as an analytical tool for chronic food insecurity is still not convincing.
- Tanzania shows that with improving food security – the majority of population are within IPC phase classification 1a or 1b, the agencies that generally provide the detailed assessments necessary for updating the IPC indicators are gradually phasing out (WFP and FEWS NET). It may therefore be necessary to develop new partnerships to keep up the exercises.
- It is important to put continuous emphasis on the need for national and regional peer review. Some of regions are not covered by the FSNA teams and many of the local government staff has not participated in the training activities. The current sampling of villages was criticized by a few respondents as being not representative. Perhaps stronger or additional criteria can be developed for the selection of those.
- The project has made a significant contribution to increased awareness and knowledge about causes of food insecurity.

C. IS THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?

- The MUCHALI partners were drawn from the FSIT, the appropriate forum. FAO Tanzania has had a strong hand in coordinating all efforts. IPC has been completely absorbed into the agenda to promote the LFSNIS.
- The mission feels that FAO Tanzania has played the lead role in the management and implementation of the project activities while keeping the technical backstopping opportunities from the regional team on the tool to a minimum. This is felt to be a missed chance. It is believed more interaction would have led to better products, a better experience of piloting of the tool – and would certainly have produced valuable project documentation.
- The DMD-PMO and MAFC have proven their interest in the LFSNIS (IPC included) and are reliable counterparts in government. Funding may be available from the core government budget, starting with the (planned) establishment of the MUCHALI Secretariat at MAFC in 2011.
- The project in Tanzania has received technical backstopping from one international food security analyst. In June of 2010, the IPC regional expert from CARE has taken over the support function. He has attended a number of training events and one analytical workshop.
- Support to LFSNIS will continue under the JP1 – phase 2 will start in July 2011. FAO Tanzania is expected to continue its role as a strong facilitator of this process. It is unclear how much funding is available for the LFSNIS.

D. WHAT IS THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE PROJECT IN-COUNTRY?

- A detailed capacity assessment and review of the Tanzania FSNIS was undertaken by FAO in 2008 under the JP1. This detailed report has provided the basis for the formulation of the LFSNIS or MUCHALI framework and has been used with the development of IPC courses and selection of training beneficiaries.
- The main beneficiaries of CD are members of the MUCHALI (government and non-government) as well as district and council officials in the pilot regions. A core group of about 10 people are now considered to be well conversed with IPC, and so able to train others independently.
- The project has noticeably increased the awareness of food security and FSNIS in Tanzania, at national as well as a number of target districts. Despite significant numbers of people trained, many more need training to have a sustained impact.
- The team received a few complaints that people trained were not available at the time when the FSNA report was written. In addition, it was suggested that the follow-up to the ToT, with expectations for follow-up to be conducted by the trainers to be clearly discussed and jointly defined.

E. WAS THE INFORMATION GENERATED USED BY DECISION MAKERS (GOVERNMENT, DONORS UN, NGOS,)?

- The improved FSNA reports – with IPC map - have been appreciated by most stakeholders (government, UN agencies, NGOs and donors). The situation analysis and classifications are used by MUCHALI members in reporting on status within their own organization.
- The improved FSNA reporting has led to a number of interventions by GoT and partners. In October 2009, when assessment results showed high wasting in certain areas, a mission was sent to verify the results. With the findings verified, maize was distributed among the population. As a direct consequence, a Working Group on Nutrition in Emergencies was also established as it was felt that recommendations for appropriate nutrition responses were too limited.
- Also in 2009, the submission of the FSNA report through TANDREC/PMO lead to an intervention to support the Arusha pastoralists with insemination to restock their herds. This was a novel intervention.
- There is no evidence that the IPC situation analysis report also steers action in the non-emergency sector, while many interviewees feel it should.
- There is little evidence, if any, of publications that are focused/ timed with a particular audience outside the TANDREC framework.

F. SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT (2007-10)

- Sustainability of IPC has been achieved as it has been incorporated into the FSNA process – part of the LFSNIS. Data collection tools have been amended. The inception process may have been delayed but the IPC tool has been properly embedded in the national LFSNIS, operated by GoT and partners.
- FAO is expected to further support the establishment of MUCHALI (IPC included) through a new phase of the GoT/UN Joint Programme I (under the UNDAF).
- During the interviews, most MUCHALI members showed commitment to support the FSNA in the next few years. All said the hard facilitation by the FAO IPC national coordinator would be sorely missed. With diminishing roles for WFP and FEWSNET (the traditional strong partners of IPC at country level), contributions from partners to sustain the FSNA may become an issue in the near future.
- Quality control and peer review are not yet well defined. Some interviewees suggested that the process could be more transparent, with more stakeholders involved to build consensus.

G. ANY UNINTENDED EFFECTS – POSITIVE/NEGATIVE:

- Generally, IPC has not been in competition with FEWSNET or WFP. WFP does not participate actively in the FSNA anymore. Given the recent good performance of food security in Tanzania FEWSNET may leave Tanzania during the new phase.

➤ **SWOC of IPC in Tanzania**

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPC is perceived to have added scope and clarity on design, analysis and reporting of the FSNA, conducted bi-annually. • IPC has also been formally adopted by MUCHALI - the proposed Livelihood-based Food Security and Nutrition Information System (LFSNIS) for the country (sustainability). • MUCHALI is supported as a specific activity under the GoT/UN joint programme. • MUCHALI consists of a core group of dedicated professionals • Training and ToT has raised awareness on food security considerably, especially in government at district level of two pilot regions. • Coordination role played by the PMO under the TANDREC with MAFC playing a strong technical role as MUCHALI secretariat • IPC User Guide is much appreciated as a learning tool 	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One UN: Delivering as One/ Joint Programme: Further support from multi-agencies, including UNICEF under JP1 • MUCHALI Secretariat to be set up under MAFC in the coming months • Other user groups: PRSP/PMU • CAADP – programme design based on FSNA and M&E of Compact.
<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of mapping/ GIS protocols in IPC classification and communication has been minimal • Lack of training material in Swahili • Progress towards establishing MUCHALI is slow and is considered to be an expensive exercise with few funding sources known. • Many stakeholders involved were unaware that IPC project support for Tanzania ended. Reporting is mainly through a channel in government, other channels are not used • Training and TOT have been said to have limited follow-up. • Complaints were heard that feedback of FSNA results to the districts has been missing. 	<p>Constraints</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The data sets available underlying the situation analysis and their classification, are considered to be fairly poor. • Strong ownership of government may prevent transparency in some instances, and expanded networking • No donor, in addition to MAFC, has come forward with intent to co-sponsor MUCHALI (and IPC) in future

A. COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Current FS and Nutrition status: short description

Despite its fertile soil and favourable weather conditions, Uganda with over 29 million inhabitants is one of the poorest countries in the world. Socio-economic development has been challenged by prolonged insecurity in the north and north-east, high population growth, poverty and a growing disparity in distribution of income. Around 85 per cent of its population still lives in rural areas with agriculture the mainstay of the economy. The 2008 GNI per capita was US\$420 while 15 per cent of the population was classified as undernourished for the period 2004-6.

The geographical areas in the north have been a hotspot of insecurity due to LRA activities. Areas in Karamoja (northeast) are also often insecure because of the raiding that occurs, including across the border with Kenya.

In the past two years the food security situation has improved, due to good rains but also due to reduced insecurity in the north.

Operational FSN information systems in country

The national FSIS in Uganda, which incorporates relevant sectoral information management systems covering agriculture (crop/livestock), agricultural commodities' and food price information, health and nutrition etc. is not fully operational. OPM reported that MAAIF, the Meteorological Department and the Ministry of Water and Environment provide agro-met forecasts and early warning signals to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) but a National Early Warning System (NEWS) as such is invisible. FEWSNET has a high public profile through their widely accessible monthly early warning bulletins. In addition, national food balance sheets, another ingredient of NEWS is not readily available for analysis.

The IPC process has played an important role in networking of relevant FS partners in government, UN and NGOs and facilitating a process of consolidated analysis and consensus building on main results and classifying outcomes. Therefore the influence of IPC in Uganda is much broader as opposed to Kenya where an FSIS was well established.

In 2010, UBOS has conducted an agricultural census for the first time in 20 years. It is anticipated that the survey results will provide a reliable baseline for annual production projections. A livestock census was conducted in 2009. Other important data sets that become available for food security analysis is data derived from a national nutrition surveillance system that UNICEF has started in 2010 with support from ECHO. This system will report on anthropometric measurements, Vitamin A deficiency, sanitation, etc. three times a year.

The OPM and MAAIF have shown a strong interest in the IPC. MAAIF has the broader mandate of food security and early warning. It has also an important role to play under the new National Policy on Disaster Preparedness and Management that has been submitted for Cabinet for review and approval. The transfer of IPC leadership from FAO to MAAIF is in line with the draft policy. OPM is responsible for the coordination of all line ministries, and the MAAIF is the government body mandated to handle food security issues and manage the national Food security Information system. MAAIF has an Early Warning Unit found in the

planning department of MAAIF. The areas of expertise of the unit include policy and legislative development, prevention, hazard mapping, vulnerability assessment, early warning, preparedness, contingency planning, capacity building and mitigation of disasters. Currently the unit is run by an agricultural economist responsible for coordinating the functions of the unit, with the help of two statisticians. It no longer produces early warning bulletins because of lack of equipment and software to download satellite imagery to support the field data. It does, however, prepare and disseminate seasonal early warning messages to the farming community using field data and weather forecasts. Due to its presence within the government system, NEWS uses the existing administrative structures both at the national and district levels.

In the past few years, the IPC has been strongly led by actors from the humanitarian community anticipating and responding to food insecurity in particular vulnerable areas of Uganda, most notably the North and Karamoja. Most coordination and exchange of information between partners has been conducted under the umbrella of a Humanitarian Food Security Cluster, chaired by both FAO and WFP. According to many interviewees, it has been one of the most active and successful clusters. The IPC process, joint situation analysis plus classification of outcomes, has played a key role in the success of this cluster.

It is considered a risk for IPC that the GoU has decided to end the cluster system in 2010 and reorganize the partners through sectoral working groups. The Food Security and Agricultural Livelihood Cluster has been reformed into the Agricultural Sector Working Group lead by MAAIF. It is not clear if this committee will deal with the same issues and/or if all stakeholders will remain interested to the same degree. Therefore, the change in national coordination structure may impede negatively on the IPC. Strong facilitative powers (and funds) are still deemed necessary for a successful continuation of IPC in Uganda. It is not clear if MAAIF senior management is fully on-board and willing to allocate resources to the process. MAAIF mentioned that a budget line for FS and EW has been included in the new Agricultural Sector Investment Plan. Funds may become available by mid-2011 from which the IPC process can be supported.

Description of IPC key partners in-country and their capacity

The IPC key partners are the following:

Government: MAAIF, OPM, UBOS, MOH, MOWE,

Donors: ECHO, USAID-FEWSNET. The relationship with FEWSNET is perceived to be mutually beneficial as the improved networking generally improves the availability and quality of data.

UN: FAO, UNOCHA, WFP, UNICEF

INGOs: SAVE Children Uganda, OXFAM, Uganda National Red Cross Society, WVI, ACF-USA, Feed the Children Uganda, Pastoral Environmental Network for the Horn of Africa (PENHA). While SAVE and Oxfam are indeed involved in the IPC, their participation is probably more as users than strong contributors. Staff turnover among these agencies is perceived a major factor preventing sustained support.

B. RELEVANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE IPC PROJECT

1. The IPC responds to a real demand in Uganda. It is widely accepted as providing the platform for a bi-annual joint situation analysis and classification tool of its results.
2. Unlike in Kenya, there is no specific assessment linked to the bi-annual IPC process.
3. The OPM has shown a strong interest in the IPC as the coordinator of disaster preparedness and response. The OPM reports to Cabinet on a quarterly basis and uses the bi-annual IPC reports and map as the core for its Cabinet memo.
4. IPC was introduced into an environment with an underdeveloped national FSIS. It filled the specific gap of an absent joint situation analysis. As the IPC is not linked directly to an assessment the dependency on regular monitoring data from government is substantial. The data available is often outdated as most data are derived from national surveys (UBOS) or agencies surveys, which occur once a year. Despite these challenges, the majority of the IPC TWG members feel that the transparency of the process produces a fairly balanced and accurate situation analysis.
5. The country has gone through 6 cycles of analysis, producing 6 national maps in total. Most IPC stakeholders have therefore had a chance to get familiar with the process of IPC (use of templates 1, 2 and 3; open discussions around analytical results and classifications, etc.).
6. The IPC instrument works well as consensus streamlines differences in perceptions. Uganda also uses the 1a (high resilience) and 1b phase (low resilience) classification to distinguish within the generally food secure population. All stakeholders seem content with the result.
7. It is important to put continuous emphasis on national and regional peer review. After 6 rounds of IPC, one should not get too comfortable with the limited evidence base that supports the reports and map. A plan to deal with some of the key data gaps would be very welcome. In part, ground-truthing efforts (rapid assessment before each national analysis) have contributed to filling the gap even though it has not been sustainably implemented (depending on IPC funds).
8. The project has made a significant contribution to increased awareness and knowledge about causes of food insecurity, mainly through training at central and decentralized levels.
9. Lots of people have been trained. The GoU is particularly pleased with training of district staff, who now understand food security much better, and perhaps even more importantly feel part of a system that produces clear outputs. Districts representatives attend the national IPC analytical workshops that last for 5 days. They report back to the districts.
10. The OPM has assisted the project in the organization of so-called High-Level Meetings where relevant senior government officials (e.g. Ministers, PSs of line ministries, Head of Public Service), Foreign Diplomatic Missions, UN, INGOs, etc.) are presented with the main results from the last IPC exercise
11. There is scope for additional products based on the analysis conducted (template 2 and 3). There seems an opportunity to expand on the 1 map currently used. Perhaps an additional one can be contemplated: one focusing on chronic issues - phase classification 1 and 2; and the other one focusing on humanitarian classification

phases 3-5. Areas not considered may be painted grey rather than green. This would help in misleading the viewer that all green is food secure, while still many problems exist.

C. IS THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?

12. The IPC TWG has been established under the FSAL Cluster, with FAO and WFP chairing. This has worked very well. IPC products have been clearly linked to partners active in humanitarian response. It is not clear yet, if the transformation of the FSAL into an Agricultural Sector Working Group, now chaired by MAAIF (and based in Entebbe as opposed to all other actors) will prove an opportunity rather than a threat.
13. The OPM and MAAIF have proven their interest in IPC and are reliable counterparts in government. Some funding may be available from the core government budget, but additional support - in kind or in cash is deemed necessary to keep the IPC process alive.
14. The FAO Representation has supported the national IPC coordinator in Uganda in facilitating the IPC process. In particular, the M&E officer has provided important technical assistance in putting together the maps whereas the communication expert has reviewed all reports as a technical editor.
15. The project in Uganda has received technical backstopping from mainly 1 international food security analyst. This relationship already started under phase I of the project. At the beginning of 2010, the IPC regional expert from CARE has provided technical inputs, especially around training events and the national IPC analytical workshop. He is also based at FAO REOA in Nairobi. Day-to-day backstopping has been fairly minimal.
16. The project has been late in providing support to help fundraise for continuation of activities or help with a hand-over to the MAAIF. Support from the project manager or perhaps the Regional Emergency Coordinator at the more senior level could have perhaps allowed the contacts to go beyond the mid-level technical exchanges.

D. WHAT IS THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE PROJECT IN-COUNTRY?

17. A capacity assessment of relevant skills and capabilities was not conducted at the start of the project as scheduled. However, the awareness raising conducted on food security information systems and use of IPC reference table and analytical templates has been positively received by almost all interviewees. It has been particularly appreciated for district level officials where ownership seems to have been increased into the data management system. They are involved, see the results and are more appreciative of demands for data collection.
18. The main beneficiaries of CD are members of the IPC TWG, representatives from government, NGOs, and UN agencies. In 2010, the IPC training has focused on district staff – 3 per district: 1 representative from agriculture, 1 from livestock and 1 from the health sector. The training was organized through 4 regional training events. In total about 56 districts have received training. OPM has mentioned to be very pleased with the training provided to the districts.

19. Five people from Uganda participated in the regional TOT. All have subsequently participated in 1 or more (sub-)national training events. Therefore, the TOT can be said to have led to the desired result of TOT participants conducting training afterwards.
20. Limited HR resources for technical backstopping from the regional level could easily have derailed the introduction of IPC in Uganda, if not for a strong and committed national IPC coordinator with the back-up of a well written IPC user guide. All mentioned the user guide as a strong source of information.
21. The project has significantly increased the awareness of food security and FSIS in Uganda, especially at district level where awareness was low. The project developed and used a training package, which has been used widely.

E. WAS THE INFORMATION GENERATED USED BY DECISION MAKERS?

22. The IPC map has been appreciated by all stakeholders (government, UN agencies, NGOs and donors). The situation analysis, templates, map and classifications are used by many in reporting on status within their own organization. Many stakeholders use IPC to advocate for humanitarian interventions in specific geographical areas with IPC classification 3, 4 and 5.
23. During 2008, the IPC map convinced the GoU to take action in the north and Karamoja. An intervention (quick maturing seeds and free ploughing) was implemented to mitigate the drought conditions.
24. It is interesting that a representative of the donors made a statement that the IPC serves the regional user more than stakeholders in Uganda as the latter have access to a number of information sources and keep abreast of the situation throughout. The 6-monthly situation analysis report, map and classification do not really bring new insights to the table. Rather its usefulness is in networking of the stakeholders and finding consensus around severity and depth of the situation.
25. There is no evidence that the IPC situation analysis report also steers action in the non-emergency sector, while many interviewees feel it should.

F. SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT (2007-10)

26. Sustainability of IPC has not yet been achieved. No fund raising strategy has been implemented. It is surprising that the project management has not provided earlier support in this respect. Fund raising by FAO-REAO only seems to have occurred at the regional level.
27. Sustainability could be achieved if the FAO Representation would keep the national IPC coordinator on board as a food security analyst supporting both sections of the house – emergency/ rehab and core development of the agricultural sector.
28. During the interviews, most IPC TWG members showed an interest and willingness to support IPC in the next few years, either in kind or with cash. The IPC national coordinator had developed a concept note that addresses also some of the underlying data problems. The reviewer suggested to put together a project proposal with the minimum support necessary to keep the IPC alive. This would include the organization of the IPC national analytical workshops and a training component. Part-funding may be suggested for the national IPC coordinator. The estimated budget for IPC activities was estimated not to exceed USD250-300,000.

G. ANY UNINTENDED EFFECTS – POSITIVE/NEGATIVE

29. The FAO Representation has generated a TCP proposal to strengthen FSIS in Uganda through an initiative – once actively promoted by FAO called FIVIMS. MAAIF is very interested in support to FSIS through this proposal. It may also provide an opportunity to consolidate the IPC process in Uganda. For instance, a seasonal assessment aligned with the IPC – strengthening what has been developed with project support in the past years, may greatly improve the evidence base for the analysis and subsequent classification.

SWOC OF IPC IN UGANDA

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPC is perceived to be a useful process in Uganda. It consolidates a joint situation analysis plus a classification instrument of the outcomes. • Training and ToT has raised awareness on food security significantly, especially in government at district level • Strong coordination role played by the OPM – reporting on IPC to Cabinet every time a report/ map is published • MAAIF has bought into the process – at technical level at least • Bi-annual high-level advocacy meetings has resulted in awareness among senior government officials • FSAL cluster and IPC TWG very strong coordination mechanism • Competent IPC team at FAO Representation 	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of disaster management and response policy would provide a budget line for assessment and vulnerability analysis • Agricultural Investment Plan may also provide some funding to support IPC • FIVIMS proposal may (TCP) may also provide a means to address some of the underlying data weaknesses, in particular linking up IPC to seasonal assessments • Information from templates 2 and 3 provide a lot of information for further use – chronic issues
<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The well-functioning (Humanitarian) Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster has been reformed into an Agricultural Sector Working Group. Questions remain if the change in actors can adequately support the IPC process. • Technical and management support by regional project has been good during phase I of the project and has been under pressure in the final year of phase II. 	<p>Constraints</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evidence available underlying the situation analysis and classification are considered to be fairly weak. • Strong ownership of government may prevent transparency at all levels and at all times; • No donor has come forward with intention to sponsor IPC in future • GoU budget limitations • Donors do not always see benefit of IPC at national level

ANNEX 6 IPC ACTIVITIES PER COUNTRY

BURUNDI

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number of participants</u>
August 2007	Training level 1	32
August 2007	Analysis Workshop 2007B	32
February 2008	Training level 1	33
February 2008	Analysis Workshop 2008A	33
April 2008	Appearance IPC Map 2008A	37
	Training level 1	
July 2008	Analysis Workshop 2008B	37
	Appearance IPC Map 2008B	
	Distribution Workshop 2008	76
August 2008	Lessons Learned Workshop	25
February 2009	Analysis Workshop 2009A	42
	Appearance IPC Map 2009A	
July 2009	Analysis Workshop 2009B	37
	Appearance IPC Map 2009B	
August 2009	Distribution Workshop 2009	42
December 2009	Training level 2	41
February 2010	Analysis Workshop 2010A	47
	Appearance IPC Map 2010A	
July 2010	Training level 2	40
August 2010	Analysis Workshop 2010B	43
	Appearance IPC Map 2010B	
October 2010	Distribution Workshop 2010	73
December 2010	Training level 1	75 (estimated)

DR CONGO

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number of participants</u>
September 2007	Creation GTC-IPC at national level	
January 2008	3 Trainings of Trainers at provincial level	75
March-June 2008	13 provincial analysis workshops 2008	325
June 2008	1 national workshop 2008	50
July 2008	Appearance IPC Map 2008	
September 2008	Capitalisation workshop	25
November 2008	Update IPC Map 2008	25
April-June 2009	13 provincial analysis workshops 2009A	325
June 2009	1 National analysis workshop 2009A	50
July 2009	Appearance IPC Map 2009A	
December 2009	Update IPC Map 2009	25
February 2010	12 provincial analysis workshops 2010	300
March 2010	1 National analysis workshop 2010A	40
March 2010	Appearance IPC Map 2010A	
August 2010	Training	45
September 2010	Lessons learned workshop	45
September 2010	12 provincial analysis workshops 2010B	300
September 2010	1 National analysis workshop 2010B	45
October 2010	Appearance IPC Map 2010B	

KENYA

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number of participants</u>
3 April 2007	Short Rains Assessment	
23-26 April 2007	Lessons Learning Workshop	20
13 September 2007	Long Rains Assessment	
23-35 October 2007	IPC Learning and Planning Workshop	16
11 March 2008	Short Rains Assessment	
August 2008	Long Rains Assessment	
March 2009	Short Rains Assessment	
August 2009	Long Rains Assessment	
January + February 2010	ToT	
March 2010	Short Rains Assessment	
April/May 2010	Cluster Training at sub-national level	
26-30 July 2010	Lessons Learning Workshop - Nakuru	
November 2010	IPC/FS Technical Training	

Tanzania (funded by IPC project, GoT, and UN JP1)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number of participants</u>
March 2007	Technical Workshop on LFSNIS	40
March 2008	Debriefing to Senior Level Decision Makers on LFSNIS 13	13
March 2008	Training on IPC Concepts in Bagamoyo	26
June 2008	Training in Food Security Foundations	25
August 2008	Preparation of FSN Assessment Tools and Pre-field Training	40
August 2008	Training in data analysis with IPC tools in Dodoma	20
October 2008	Training in Analysis and Report Writing on RVA in Kibaha	20
January 2010	MUCHALI Inception and Training for District Level Professionals on Food Security and Nutrition in Mtwara and Lindi Region	65
June 2010	Foundations on FSN information systems: Lindi and Mtwara	38
June 2010	Training in food security and nutrition assessments, analysis and reporting for in Zanzibar	13
August 2010	TOT of National MUCHALI on LFSNIS and IPC in Dodoma. Review FSN assessment tools	25
August 2010	Training for LGA MUCHALI-IPC Lindi and Mtwara Regions in the 2010 food security and nutrition assessments, analysis and report writing in Lindi	30
September 2010	TOT on the Application of IPC in Integrated Food Security Analysis and Report Writing for the 2010/11 Market Year in Dodoma	35
October 2010	Technical and Lesson Learned Workshop Participants, Bagamoyo	39
November 2010	Regional Administration and Local Government Authority (RALG) Consultative Workshop on MUCHALI-IPC: at Oceanic View Hotel, Lindi	40

Uganda

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number of participants</u>
Dec 2007	Awareness raising session for FS Cluster	
Feb 2008	IPC training workshop	
June 2008	FS Foundation course and meta-analysis	39
2008-2010	Monthly IPC TWG meetings	10-15
Apr and July/Sept 2008, 2009 and 2010	National analytical workshops	35-60 per occasion
March/May 2008 and 2009	Sub-national IPC Workshop Karamoja region	
2008 and 2009	High-level Briefings	40
2008, 2009 and 2010	Lessons learning workshop	15-30 per occasion
December 2009	Pre-field data collection training	
Jan-April 2010	District FS/IPC training	86
Jan-Mar 2010	TOT training for districts training	

**ANNEX 7 REGIONAL STAFF, SUPPORT GSU, TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS ECA
REGION, FOCAL POINTS AND EXCHANGE VISITS**

LIST OF STAFF INVOLVED IN THE IPC AT REGIONAL LEVEL

Name	Designation	Period	
Aida Ndiaye	International FS Analyst	Phase 1 and Phase 2. Since Mar 2008	FAO STAFF
Daniele deBernardi	Regional Junior FS Expert Regional Deputy FS Analyst (since Sep 2010)	Since Oct 2009	FAO STAFF
Alexandra Crosskey	Food Security Adviser	6- 7 months (Apr – Nov 2010)	FAO STAFF
Floor Grootenhuis	IPC Learning Consultant	2 months ½ (Sep –Nov 2010)	FAO STAFF
Francesco DelRe	Food Security Adviser/ Project Coordinator	Phase 1 and Phase 2 (through Mar 2010)	FAO STAFF
John Anderson	Regional Junior FS Expert	Phase 1 (6 months)	FAO STAFF
Marc Prost	International FS Analyst	Phase 1 (6 months)	FAO STAFF
Calum Mclean	IPC Training Expert	Phase 1 (6 months)	FAO STAFF
Jonathan Brass	IPC NGO Expert	Phase 1 (June-Nov 2008)	Seconded by OXFAM
Justus Liku	IPC Technical Adviser	Start Jun 2010	Seconded by GSU and CARE
Buzz Sharp	IPC Technical Adviser	Start Aug 2010	Active in Region
Chachu Tadicha		Start Nov 2010	Active in Region

LIST OF COUNTRY IPC FOCAL POINTS (FAO)

Name	Country	Designation	Period
Stella Sengendo	Uganda	National FS Analyst	Current
Vedasto Rutachokozibwa	Tanzania	FS Consultant	Current
Méthode Niyongendako	Burundi	National FS Analyst	Current
Gerard Madodo	DR Congo	International FS Consultant	Current
Tiphaine Bueke	DR Congo	National FS Analyst	Current
Paul Busambo	DR Congo	National FS Analyst	Current
Simon Muhindi	Kenya	National FS Analyst	Current
Michael Makokha	Kenya	National FS Analyst	Previous
Tadesse Zerhuhin	Kenya	Technical Adviser FAO-K	Jun – Aug 2010
Calum Mclean	Kenya	Technical Adviser FAO-K	Phase 1
Fernand Mboutou	CAR	National FS Consultant	Current
Getachew Abate Mussa	Ethiopia	National FS Analyst	Current

LIST OF COUNTRY IPC FOCAL POINTS (Gov)

Name	Country	Institution	Designation
Hakuza Annuciata	Uganda	MAIIF	Senior Agricultural Economist
Mbabazi Mary	Uganda	MAIIF	Senior Veterinary Officer
Kiconco Doris	Uganda	MAIIF	Principal Veterinary Inspector
Pamela Komujuni	Uganda	OPM	Disaster Management Officer
Caroline Kilembe	Tanzania	MAFC	Principal Agricultural Officer
Geoffrey Chiduo	Tanzania	TFNC	Senior Planning Officer -Research
Isaac Nzitunga	Burundi	MINAGRIE	Conseiller au Cabinet
Robert Nsakala	DR Congo	MINAGRIE	Directeur SNSA
Ngonde			
Maviana Apata-One	DR Congo	MINISANTE	Chef de Bureau National-Nutrition
Mary Mwale	Kenya	Arid Land	IPC Focal Point/Nutritionist
Francis Wambua	Kenya	Ministry of Health	National Program Officer

LIST OF EXCHANGE VISITS

Name	Country	Event	Period
Méthode Niyongendako	CAR	IPC/FS Training	27 Feb – 1 Apr 2010
Méthode Niyongendako	DR Congo	National IPC Analysis	11 - 15 Oct 2010
Mary Mwale	UGANDA	National IPC Analysis	27 Sep – 2 Oct 2010
Mary Mwale	UGANDA	IPC Lessons Learned	20 – 22 Oct 2010
Mary Mwale	TANZANIA	IPC Lessons Learned	18 - 20 Oct 2010

TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT in the ECA region provided by the GSU

Region / Country	ACTIVITY	Operational & technical support from HQ	Technical support ON FIELD
Regional	Regional analysis workshop, Oct09	Prepared presentation on global level activities	Justus Liku, Kaija Korpi, Zoé Druilhe
	Training of Trainers (TOT) organized for country representatives, Nov09 GIS training for Country GIS focal points, May10	Materials & organization Translation of technical materials into French	Justus Liku Justus Liku
	NGO and donor awareness raising workshop, Sep10		Justus Liku
	Regional analysis and lessons learnt workshop	Support and help to preparation on communication	Justus Liku, Kaija Korpi, Rachele Santini ()
DRC	• Analysis workshop, October 2010	• Facilitation and technical support;	• Oriane Turot
Ethiopia	• Consultations, Nov-Dec09 • SNNPR workshop Jan10		• Kaija Korpi
Kenya	• Planning, Apr10 • District training, May10 • Analysis workshop, Apr10 • LL workshop, Aug10 • Monthly KFSSG & KFSM meeting	• Materials	• Justus Liku
North Sudan	• Analysis workshop, August 2010	• Presentation on IPC status at global level, in coordination with regional project team	
Somalia	• Analysis workshop, Aug09 • Analysis workshop, Jan10		• Kaija Korpi, Justus Liku, Angie Lee • (Kaija Korpi, Justus Liku)
Tanzania	• National training, April 2010 • Analysis workshop, Sep10	• Materials	• Justus Liku
Uganda	• Training Food security and IPC for Government officers, Jan10 • Analysis workshop, Apr10 • TWG training, Aug10 • Analysis Workshop, Sep10	• Materials • Presentation on IPC status at global level	• Justus Liku • Justus Liku • Justus Liku • Oriane Turot

TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ECA REGION – IPC Tech Manual Version 2.0 preparation

DATE/PLACE	EVENT	REGIONAL PARTICIPANTS	GSU PARTICIPANTS
June 2010 Nairobi (Kenya)	One-day consultation meeting dedicated to the ECA region (to review the list of technical issues to be addressed and discuss a selection of issues)	FSN WG, including IPC country focal points; ECA project team	Nick Haan, Thoric Cederstrom, Justus Liku, Zoe Druilhe
July 2010 Ispra (Italy)	Two-week technical retreat	ECA project team (Francesco Del Re, Aida Ndiaye) and other FSNWG members (WFP; FAO/FSNAU; Oxfam; CARE)	All GSU members
October 2010 Nairobi (Kenya)	One-day consultation meeting dedicated to the region (on proposed resolutions to key technical issues)	FSN WG, including IPC country focal points; ECA project team	Nick Haan, Justus Liku, Kaija Korpi, Oriane Turot
December 2010 Rome (Italy)	Three-day technical meeting (to finalize resolutions)	FSN WG members (WFP; FAO/FSNAU; Oxfam; CARE)	Nick Haan, Thoric Cederstrom, Justus Liku, Kaija Korpi
February 2010 Nairobi (Kenya) <i>forthcoming</i>	Three-day technical validation meeting	TBC, invitees from FSNWG and from most countries included in the regional project	Nick Haan, Kaija Korpi, Oriane Turot, Sid Krishnaswamy

ANNEX 8 LIST OF LITERATURE AND REPORTS USED

Regional/global

- Project Document, Consolidation of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in the Volatile Humanitarian Context of Central and Eastern African Region (ECHO format), December 2008
- Joint Monitoring Mission, Final Report, FAO and ECHO, June 2010
- Project progress report (ECHO format), June 2010
- Independent Mid-Term Project review, Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC), regional implementation in Central and Eastern Africa; Poulsen, L; Majid, N; draft 2008
- Regional IPC Technical Workshop Central and Eastern Africa Report, Nairobi, October 2009
- IPC Review and Consultation Report, Workshop Report, IPC GSU, Johannesburg, RSA, June 2009
- Atelier de la consolidation de la carte IPC, des leçons apprises et des meilleures techniques, Nairobi, 15-19 Novembre 2010
- IPC External Links and Relationships Study; Shoham; J, Borton J, July 2009
- Global IPC Partnership, Final Evaluation, Phase 1: September 2008-June 2009; Frankenberger, T; Verduijn, RJC, 2009
- FAO Regional Programme framework for Disaster Risk Management 2010-2013, FAO, REAO, Nairobi, 2010
- Summary Report Lessons Learned Workshop, Nakuru, Kenya, Justus, L; July 2010
- FAO/ OXFAM/WFP: Horn of Africa Food security Plan of Action, Process Description, 2010
- Regional Food Security Outlook Updates (various), FEWSNET, 2010
- FSNWG Regional Food Security Situation Updates, 2009 and 2010
- Report on IPC workshops for NGO decision-makers and donors, ACF, Nairobi, October 2010
- IPC Manual version 1.1, IPC Global Partners, 2008
- IPC User Guide, IPC Global Partners, 2009

Burundi

- République du Burundi : Analyse Comparative des Saisons 2007B et 2008A, Avril 2008
- République du Burundi : Rapport définitif –4ieme Cycle résumé, Février 2009
- République du Burundi : Rapport définitif – 5ieme Cycle résumé, Juillet 2009
- République du Burundi : Rapport de l’atelier d’analyse, Aout 2009
- République du Burundi : Leçons Apprises et Meilleures Pratiques de la Mise en Œuvre de l’IPC au Burundi, Juillet 2010

DR Congo

- République Démocratique du Congo : Capitalisation des Expériences d’Analyses, Septembre 2008
- République Démocratique du Congo : Rapport du 2ieme Cycle d’analyse, Juillet 2009

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FAO IPC Regional Project Evaluation (OSRO/RAF/907/EC)

January 2011

- République Démocratique du Congo : Rapport du 3ieme Cycle d'analyse, Mars 2010
- République Démocratique du Congo : Rapport du 4ieme Cycle d'analyse, Octobre 2010
- République Démocratique du Congo : Capitalisation des Expériences d'Analyses, Novembre 2010

Ethiopia :

- IPC Pilot Exercise in SNNPR of Ethiopia, November 2008 – January 2010, 2010

Kenya

- Government of Kenya : Cabinet Memorandum, Food Security, Water and Energy Crisis, August 2009
- KFSSG: Long-Rains and Short-Rains National Analytical Workshop Reports, 2007; 2008; 2009 and 2010
- KFSSG : Lessons Learning workshop reports, Nairobi, 2007; 2008; 2009 and 2010
- Kenya Food Security Outlook Updates, FEWSNET, 2010

Somalia

- Food Security & Nutrition, Quarterly Briefs, 2009 and 2010, FSNAU, Nairobi
- Nutrition Situation Post Gu '10, Technical Series : report No VI.32, FSNAU, Nairobi, September 2010

Uganda

- Government of the Republic of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister Disaster Preparedness and Refugees: National Food Security Assessment Report September 2009 – January 2010, 2010
- Government of the Republic of Uganda : The National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management, October 2010
- IPC National Analytical Workshop Proceedings, 2008; 2009 and 2010
- IPC Karamoja Analytical Workshop Reports, March 2008 and 2009
- Lessons Learning Workshop Reports, 2008 ; 2009 and 2010)
- Proceedings Foundation Training Workshop, June 2008
- High-Level Briefing Reports, November 2008 and 2009
- IPC Briefs and Brochures, 2008 ; 2009 and 2010
- Food Security and IPC Training for Districts report, March 2010
- Minutes of IPC TWG meetings, 2009 and 2010
- Uganda Food Security Outlook Updates, FEWSNET, 2010

Tanzania

- Tanzania Food Security Framework Analysis System – Framework Design, FAO, September 2009
- Food Security Foundation course documentation June/July 2008
- Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Reports (2008, 2009 and 2010)
- Lessons Learning workshop Reports (2008, 2009 and 2010)
- Mtwara District Training Report, June 2010
- Tanzania ToT National Training, August 2010
- Tanzania Food Security Outlook Updates, FEWSNET, 2010

END OF PROJECT EVALUATION

IPC Regional Project, Phase II

(OSRO/RAF/907/EC)

“Consolidation of the IPC in the Volatile Humanitarian Context of the Central and Eastern African Region”

BACKGROUND

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a promising approach for classifying the nature and the severity of food insecurity. The IPC is a standardized scale that integrates food security, nutrition and livelihood information into a clear statement about the nature and severity of a crisis and implications for response. IPC incorporates a meta-analysis approach drawing on an evidence-based analysis that includes a broad range of stakeholders, aiming to improve analysis and decision-making in emergency situations.

The IPC was originally developed in Somalia in 2004 under the FAO Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), and then developed and adapted as a standardized approach for food security classification. In 2007, a number of food security-oriented agencies formed an initial global partnership for the further development and roll-out of the IPC, including: FAO, WFP, USAID-funded FEWS NET, Oxfam GB, CARE, SCF-UK/US and the Joint Research Centre of the European Union.

IPC activities are supported along three main levels:

- The global level, mandated with the global coordination, supports fund-raising efforts, allocation and management of global resources, provides technical support to the implementation of activities, and ensures internal and external institutionalization.
- The regional IPC project coordinates regional activities in 7 countries (Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda; with introduction of activities in the Central African Republic and Ethiopia). The regional office allocates and manages funds and provides technical support and training at country level. FAO REOA acts as the secretariat for the FSNWG which disseminates the latest IPC maps and information and conducts regional comparative analysis to help regional decision makers prioritise their activities. Under the FSNWG sits the IPC Regional Steering Committee who provides the necessary technical support and guidance to introduce and institutionalize the IPC within each country.

- At national level, IPC national technical working groups gather the relevant national stakeholders from ministries and other governmental units, UN, international and local NGOs. They ensure the development of a common analysis and implementation of the IPC at national level.

The first phase of the Regional project took place from June 2007 to November 2008, and was funded by ECHO, CIDA and DFID. The second phase originally had an 18 months timeframe, from 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2010, with a budget of EUR 2,317,095 grant still managed by the FAO Regional Emergency Office for Eastern and Central Africa. A no-cost extension was requested for this project and granted by ECHO until December 2010 in order to line up with the time frame of the Global project.

The regional implementation of the IPC is supported by the IPC Steering Committee of the inter-agency Food Security and Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG) which includes FEWS NET, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, SC-UK and SC-US, Action Against Hunger (AAH), and Oxfam (GB).

The Global Support Unit and Regional IPC project in Eastern and Central Africa are working complementarily under ECHO funding. During a joint monitoring mission with ECHO in June 2010 both projects re-examined the linkages and refined the coordination between the two of them.

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation will cover IPC implementation activities at regional and country level from inception to today. The team will visit **the five core countries** of implementation to assess the specific experiences in different conditions (Ethiopia and CAR not included). The evaluation will (i) capture recent experiences in the set up and implementation of the IPC approach and (ii) assess the extent to which IPC associated processes and products are beginning to be used by decision makers. The standard evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability will be applied.

The objectives of the independent evaluation are to:

6. Determine the **relevance** of project objectives and the IPC framework and approach for the five countries in which it is being applied.
7. Evaluate project **efficiency**, assessing the process adopted during the project implementation at sub-national, national and regional level.
8. Evaluate project **effectiveness**, assessing the degree to which planned outputs and outcomes have been achieved at the time of the evaluation.
9. Identify any **impacts** or likely impacts (positive or negative) of the project.
10. Assess the likelihood of **sustainability** of the project, i.e. what the enduring results are likely to be after the termination of the project.
11. Identify lessons learned and formulate recommendations for any possible follow-up phase.

The review will achieve the above objectives by focusing on the following five key questions. Taking into account the fact that the programme may have not yet completed its activities, the review will concentrate mainly on relevance, efficiency and to a certain extent effectiveness criteria. Prospects for sustainability will be appraised mainly on the basis of the observed level of ownership of the process by national stakeholders. Other aspects of impact and sustainability will also be considered such as human capacity built, normative work accomplished and expectation of continuing impact of the project activities.

QUESTION 1: What is the current status of the implementation process?

This question is related to programme **efficiency** and **effectiveness** issues, and will assess:

- Progress made so far in the implementation at country level based on the "fourteen steps" foreseen in IPC implementation.
- Level of implementation of the cross cutting activities foreseen in the work plan.
- Main IPC related products produced with support of the programme.
- Appropriateness of the management and implementation setup (staff profiles, ToRs, regional support, etc).
- The extent to which the project has delivered activities on time and factors that have contributed to or hindered the implementation process.
- Estimation of implementation costs at country level and comparison between countries. Determination of the cost efficiency of the project and comparison of actual costs compared to alternatives.
- The extent to which the objectives are likely to be achieved by the end of the project period.
- The major factors which are likely to influence the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives.

QUESTION 2: Are coordination and partnership mechanisms appropriate?

This question is related to **relevance** and **efficiency** issues, and will assess:

- The extent to which the IPC is suited to the priorities and policies of the government and other stakeholders in each of the countries.
- Whether the project design is internally coherent. I.e. Are the activities and outputs of the project consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
- Partners involved at country and regional level and their roles in the Programme.
- Synergies/duplication created with similar initiatives at country and regional levels

QUESTION 3: What is the level of ownership and control of national stakeholders over the IPC process?

This question is related to **effectiveness** and **sustainability** issues, and will assess:

- Role of government institutions and national stakeholders in the IPC process at country level
- Appropriateness of identification and selection of national partners (e.g. issues of inter-sectoral coordination)
- Training activities at national and sub-national level
- Current and future expected capacities created at country level for managing the IPC process
- Initial perspectives for national contribution to cover IPC costs and potential for replication
- The extent to which the benefits of the project at country level are likely to continue after the project ends.

QUESTION 4: What is the actual and potential impact of the IPC on the process of decision making?

This question is related to **relevance**, **effectiveness** and, in the longer term perspective, **impact** related issues. It will assess:

- IPC products, dissemination, and their current use at national and regional level
- Examples of links between the IPC and decision making processes (if any). This includes the extent to which the IPC information and products have been used and incorporated into strategic planning and response documents of major partners involved in food security and nutrition interventions.
- Views of stakeholders (governments, UN agencies, International organizations, NGO and donors) on IPC role in future decision making processes

QUESTION 5: Is the process of IPC roll-out and/or consolidation at the country level demonstrating, as foreseen in the project concept, that the IPC is relevant to different contexts? And what are the main adaptation measures required?

This question is related to the **relevance** of the project concept and the **effectiveness** of the IPC tool, and will assess:

- Users' views on the technical merits and weaknesses of the IPC in specific country contexts
- Assessment of the technical adaptation of the IPC tools proposed in the various country roll-outs.

Any technical shortcomings of the IPC that would need to be addressed in the next version of the manual, or possibly that would call for a major reshaping of the IPC.

METHODOLOGY

The review will include the following steps:

1. Initial desk research
 - review of available literature, project document and IPC products
 - identification of key information requirements in support of the review
 - review of data availability/data set with IPC project Technical experts and strategic partners at regional/country level.
2. Preparation of an Inception report, including an evaluation matrix, based on the fine tuning of the questions of the evaluation, and related indicators to verify achievements for each of the review questions. Selected indicators should refer to standard criteria for programme review as noted above.
3. A real time rapid survey of key stakeholders from FAO, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, FSNWG partners, and major donors on their experiences with IPC at regional/country level. This will continue through field visits to the five countries including interviews of key stakeholders in government, the donor community, UN and other international agencies, NGOs. These should include both actual and potential users of IPC information products, including decision makers, as well as suppliers of information to the IPC, and owners of possible complementary or competing systems. At the end of all country visits, preliminary results will be shared with key stakeholders at country level and regional level through six (6) aide-mémoires [5 country aide-mémoires of around 2 pages each.
4. A feedback meeting in Nairobi with presentation of general preliminary findings, and likely conclusions to key stakeholders.
5. Data analysis and triangulation of information

COMPOSITION OF THE TEAM

The team will comprise two experts:

- A team leader with minimum 10 years of demonstrated relevant training and experience in food security information systems in emergency and crisis contexts, in institutional analysis, and in leading complex evaluations.
- A team member who is a food security analyst. Should also have evaluation experience.

The team will need to be able to work effectively in English and French. This could be resolved through having one team member able to work in both English and French, and the other only in English. The team may split up to cover the country visits, with one visiting Francophone countries and the other Anglophone countries.

Both team members should demonstrate a clear understanding of food security and nutrition early warning, monitoring and analysis work. Direct knowledge of the key agencies involved would be an advantage.

REPORTING AND FEEDBACK

The team leader is responsible for:

An Inception Report

This will be prepared after having finalized the methodology and tools to be used during the evaluation.

An Aide-Mémoire (5 pages max)

This document will be presented to the final workshop at the end of the field work. It will be a concise self-contained summary of the major findings and conclusions, and corresponding recommendations.

A Consolidated Final Report

The final report will include: a) a concise, self-contained executive summary with recommendations (in both English and French); (b) a core report (in English only) of 25 -30 pages; (c) annexes.

The draft version of the evaluation report will be submitted within 10 days of the completion of the field mission. Comments on the draft will require about two weeks and will result in the production of a final version to be submitted within 10 calendar days of the receipt of comments on the draft.

The content of the Final Report is under the full responsibility of the Team Leader and expresses his/her views and judgment regarding the project being evaluated.

LOCATIONS OF ASSIGNMENTS

Nairobi with missions to the five core countries targeted by the project (including Kenya)

TIME SCHEDULE AND ACTIVITIES

The duration of the evaluation study will be 45 days for the team leader and 36 days for the team member, **including travel time**. Preliminary preparation in the home country is five (5) and four (4) days for the TL and the TM respectively. The TL will spend twenty five (25) days in the field [Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda]; the team member twenty three (23) days [Kenya, Burundi and DR Congo). Following the field missions, the Team Leader will be given ten (10) working days for the first draft report and five (5) working days for its finalisation at home. The second team member will have in total nine (9) days at home to provide input as needed to the finalisation process.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: External End-of-Project Evaluation

0. Introduction on IPC

1. How would you define/ describe IPC?
2. What do you view to be the main strengths/weaknesses of the IPC? How does it compare to similar systems?
3. Shortly describe your role in this project/ relation to the introduction of IPC in your country?
4. In your view, what are the prospects for IPC in this region (for the coming two years/after funding has ended/without additional funding)?

I. Status of implementation

1. Do you feel the project has been generally successful in its implementation? Please explain.
2. List factors have facilitated or hindered the implementation.

II. Coordination and partnership mechanisms

1. How effective has the coordination been between partners in your country? Please explain and/or make suggestions what could have been done differently.

III. Level of ownership and control of stakeholders

1. How important is the role of government in the project in your country as compared to other stakeholders? Please describe.
2. Do you feel that a strong facilitating role for the government is key to the successful use of IPC? Please explain.
3. Has the general understanding of food security been improved by the project?
4. Has the analytical capacity for IPC been significantly improved? Please explain.
5. Do you think the project has generated enough buy-in for the IPC for the work to continue at the same level after the project's ending without external funding? Please explain.
6. Would you/ your organization be willing to commit funds/ support IPC if external funding would cease by year end?

IV. Actual and potential impact of the IPC on the process of decision making

1. List the IPC products you use and explain how you use them.
2. Have you made use of any IPC products for the following purposes:
 - a. resource mobilization YES/NO
 - b. resource allocation YES/NO
 - c. project formulation (geographical targeting) YES/NO
 - d. project formulation (population numbers) YES/NO

- | | |
|---|---------|
| e. project formulation (social targeting) | YES/NO |
| f. reporting | YES/NO. |

Please provide examples, if possible.

3. Do you feel the project has done enough for the actual use of the IPC products through awareness raising, communication and advocacy? Please explain.
4. Please give examples of decisions, influenced by or taken on the basis of IPC. Has a decision calendar been developed in your country?
5. What other information do you need/use apart from the information offered by IPC to support your decision making process?
6. Can IPC be used for comparison purposes between countries? Please describe possibilities and constraints.
7. If populations in a certain area were to be classified in a food insecurity crisis phase through IPC, would information easily be accessible on the pre-existing level of support in the areas, and would new support be coordinated between stakeholders?

V. Relevance of IPC in different contexts

1. List the technical weaknesses and merits of IPC in your country. Do you have suggestions for improvement?
2. Please elaborate on the possibilities and the constraints to use IPC in developmental/protracted crisis settings?

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: External End-of-Project Evaluation

Country:

I. Status of implementation

1. What progress has been made up to now (list number of trainings, persons trained, maps, analytical reports, workshops, budget and spending data)?
2. Please provide your observations if sufficient progress has been made to the actual use of the outputs (IPC maps, increased analytical capacity, better networking, etc.) YES/NO. Please explain.
3. List factors have facilitated or hindered the implementation process.
4. Did you face constraints at financial or human resource level? YES/NO. Please explain.
5. Has the general understanding of food security been improved by the project? Please specify in what areas and if possible, show evidence of a result.
6. Has the amount of information at secretariat level increased and is it also accessed by interested parties outside the IPC stakeholder group?
7. Do you feel the analytical capacity for IPC and FSNIS in general has improved significantly because of this project? Please elaborate.
8. How do you value the support received from the regional/global level? Please explain. Was it sufficient? If not, please list actual requirements? Please explain.
9. Has the project had positive or negative unintentional effects/ impacts? Please explain.

II. Coordination and partnership mechanisms

1. Do you feel the coordination mechanism for the introduction of the IPC in your country worked well? Please explain.
2. Do you feel the IPC partnership created under the project will be sustainable, even if external funding will end by December 2010? Please explain.
3. Has sufficient ownership being created with relevant government agencies/ ministries and partner agencies (UN, NGOs)? Please explain.

III. Level of ownership and control of stakeholders

1. Was the introduction of the IPC process well timed, and the external context (institutional, political, etc.) conducive to its introduction, local adaptation and use by multiple stakeholders? Please explain.
2. How important is the role of government in the project in your country as compared to other stakeholders? Please describe.
3. Do you feel that a strong facilitating role for the government is key to the successful use of IPC? Please explain.

4. Do you think the project has generated enough buy-in for the IPC for the work to continue at the same level after the project's ending without external funding? Please explain.

IV. Actual and potential impact of the IPC on the process of decision making

1. Do you feel the IPC partners have made use of any IPC products for the following purposes:

a. resource mobilization	YES/NO
b. resource allocation	YES/NO
c. project formulation (geographical targeting)	YES/NO
d. project formulation (population numbers)	YES/NO
e. project formulation (social targeting)	YES/NO
f. reporting	YES/NO.

Please provide examples, if possible.

2. Do you feel the project/ IPC TWG/ FSWG has done enough for the actual use of the IPC products through awareness raising, communication (and advocacy)? Please explain.

V. Relevance of IPC in different contexts

1. List the technical weaknesses and merits of IPC in your country. Do you have suggestions for improvement?
2. Do you need more support from regional or global level and what kind of support?

ANNEX 12 QUESTIONS FOR STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS

I. Status of implementation

1. Please provide an estimation of implementation costs (where possible including documentation).
2. What has your organisation contributed to the implementation?
3. Please describe your organisation's role in the project

II. Coordination and partnership mechanisms

1. What (bureaucratic) constraints have you faced? How have you addressed them?
2. How does IPC fit in with the food security information system, used by your organisation? Has this become easier over the last two years? (especially for WFP, FEWS NET)

III. Level of ownership and control of stakeholders

1. Describe the balance between the various stakeholders (government, international organisations, NGOs) in the implementation of the project.
2. What constraints do you expect after 2010 if the IPC system needs to be prolonged without international financial and technical support?
3. How much have other stakeholders invested in terms of finances and human resources and how would you describe their level of commitment?

IV. Actual and potential impact of the IPC on the process of decision making

1. Elaborate on the way your organisation has used/uses IPC products and tools in decision making and what additional possibilities you envisage. Do you use a decision calendar?
2. How is the coordination between IPC and other emergency response systems? Do you see room for improvement? Please explain.
3. Has IPC improved the
 - a. timeliness
 - b. quality and/or
 - c. flexibilityof your decision making? Please elaborate.

V. Relevance of IPC in different contexts

1. What specific technical weaknesses have you encountered in IPC and how have you solved or worked around them?
2. Please describe the way you collect information apart from IPC.

ANNEX 13 IPC ATTITUDES SURVEY

Statement	Level of agreement						
	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree	N/A
The capacity of our organisation has increased considerably as a result of IPC training							
Strength of national partners is a necessity for the successful implementation of IPC							
The lack of data and questionable quality of available data puts the entire IPC as an meta-analytical tool at risk							
The products of IPC have proven to be a useful tool in advocacy							
The national technical working group has sufficient capacity and resources							
The IPC has identified a number of significant weaknesses in food security analysis (and their response) that are key achievements							
Coordination and partnership mechanisms							
IPC is suited to the priorities and policies of the government and other stakeholders							
Quality of integration of IPC into existing FSNIS is sufficient							
Ownership and control of national stakeholders							
Implementation of IPC will continue after 2010 without international technical support							
Implementation of IPC in my country may be continued after 2010 without external financial							

support							
The insights and skills learned from IPC trainings I use very regularly in my work (on a weekly basis)							
The approach of IPC should be more demand driven							
The intra-agency cooperation and collaboration on IPC is of good quality							
Actual and potential impact of the IPC on the process of decision making							
The scope for use of IPC products can easily be enlarged through good communication and advocacy							
The technical problems associated with the IPC are relatively small and do not hinder a successful application							
The speed of decision making with regard to food security related problems has been improved							
To come to a proper decision, the use of the IPC map is insufficient							
IPC tools will play a major role in decision making after December 2010							
Relevance of IPC in different contexts							
IPC may be a useful new tool for countries in chronic food insecurity situation							
Implementation of IPC in my country benefits from global level influences							
Further decentralisation in my country will improve the implementation and use of IPC							

Please read the following statements and indicate your level of agreement:

ANNEX 14 QUESTIONS FOR FSNWG AND RHPT

1. How would you define/ describe IPC?
2. What do you view to be the main strengths/ weaknesses of the IPC? How does it compare to similar systems?
3. List the IPC products you use and explain how you use them.
4. Have you made use of any IPC products for the following purposes:
 - a. resource mobilization YES/NO
 - b. resource allocation YES/NO
 - c. project formulation (geographical targeting) YES/NO
 - d. project formulation (population numbers) YES/NO
 - e. project formulation (social targeting) YES/NO
 - f. reporting YES/NO.

Please provide examples, if possible.

ANNEX 15 QUESTIONS FOR THE IPC GLOBAL SUPPORT UNIT

1. Please clarify your official role and responsibilities versus the Regional IPC project implemented through FAO's REOA.
2. Please summarize the support provided to the project in the past two years by specific result area of the project. Please distinguish between support provided to the region and individual countries.
3. Please explain if there were any constraints in interacting with, and supporting the project – the region and countries involved.
4. Do you consider the project to be a success? Please explain. If applicable, please elaborate on recommendations to improve the support function to the region and countries.
5. Please share plans for the continued IPC support for project countries after January 2011, when dedicated funding through the project ceases (with exception of Kenya, where USUSD400k has been made available through FAO-KEN).
6. Please share ideas on plans for project countries' upgrade to IPC version 2 - with manual in 2011?

ANNEX 16 LIST OF PEOPLE MET

KENYA			
Time	People met	Designation	Organisation
Thursday, 25 November 2010			
12:20-16:15	Aida Ndiaye Daniele de Bernardi Floor Grootenhuis	International Food Security Analyst Regional Food Security Expert Lessons Learning Consultant	FAO regional office
16:15-17:30	Alexandra Crosskey	Food Security Adviser	FAO regional office
Friday, 26 November 2010			
9:00-11:00	Nick Maunder Jose Lopez	Sector Expert – Food assistance and disaster risk reduction Regional Food Assistance Expert	ECHO
12:30-14:00	Aida Ndiaye	International Food Security Analyst	FAO regional office
14:30-15:30	Rod Charters	Sub Regency Emergency Coordinator for Eastern and Central Africa	FAO regional office
16:00-17:00	Jurjen Draaijer	Regional Livestock Officer	FAO regional office
19:30-22:00	Buzz Sharp Justus Liku	Rural Development Specialist Field advisor	Oxfam Int Care Kenya
Saturday, 27 November 2010			
12:00-17:00	Aida Ndiaye	International Food Security Analyst	FAO regional office
Monday, 29 November 2010			
9:00-10:00	Simon Muhindi Mary Mwale	National Food Security expert IPC national coordinator	FAO Nairobi MoA
10:30-11:30	Nancy Mutunga	Country Representative	FEWSNET
12:00-13:00	George Odingo	Ntl consultant Agricultural Production	FAO Nairobi
17:00-17:30	Floor Grootenhuis	Lessons Learning Consultant	FAO regional office
Tuesday, 30 November 2010			
9:20-10:30	Eliud K. Wamwangi	Assistant Director Groundwater	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
11:00-12:00	Francis Wambua Angela Kaguara	Senior Officer Nutrition Senior Officer Nutrition	Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation
14:30-15:45	Allan Kute	Program Officer VAM	WFP
16:30-17:30	James O. Oduor	Drought Management Coordinator	Arid Lands Resource Mgmt Project

Wednesday, 1 December 2010			
11:00-11:45	Jan Helsen	Regional Emergency Officer Agricultural Sector	FAO regional office
11:45-12:45	Grace Bore	Administration and Finance Officer	FAO regional office
12:45-14:00	Sophie Green	Reporting and Communications Officer	FAO regional office
15:30-16:30	Maina King'ori	Senior Programme Officer Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs	World Vision
Thursday, 2 December 2010			
10:15-10:30	Chachu Tadicha	Emergency Livelihood Advisor	Save the Children UK
10:30-12:00	25 participants	FSNWG Meeting	FAO regional office
12:45-13:45	Nona Zicherman	Regional Humanitarian Coordinator	Oxfam
14:30-16:00	23 participants	RHPT meeting	OCHA
16:00-17:00	Gabriella Waaijman	Head of Office	OCHA
16:00-17:00	Greg Collins	Regional Advisor	USAID
Friday, 3 December 2010			
8:30-10:00	Rod Charters	Sub Regency Emergency Coordinator for Eastern and Central Africa	FAO regional office
10:00-11:15	Chele de Gruccio	Regional Coordinator	ECB
12:13-14:00	Luca Alinovi	Officer-in-Charge FAO Somalia	FAO

Burundi			
Time	People met	Designation	Organisation
Monday, 6 December 2010			
9:00-16:00	Méthode Niyongendako		FAO Burundi
Tuesday, 7 December 2010			
8:00-9:30	Hubert Chauvet	Coordinateur des Opérations d'Urgence et Réhabilitation	FAO Burundi
10 :00-11 :00	Floribert Kubwayezu	Coordinateur	OCHA
	Arlindo Braganca Gomes	Représentant	FAO Burundi
15 :00-16 :30	Beatrice Samandari Daphroze Niyoknizera Pierre-Claver Ntibakivay Issa Fabrice		Ministère du Plan 2 ^{ème} Vice Présidence Minagrie PACT Burundi
17 :00-17 :45	Muhimuzi Bonavanture	Nutrition Officer	UNICEF

Wednesday, 8 December 2010			
9:00-10:15	Duccio Staderini Alexis Mangona	Assistant Technique Burundi/Tanzanie Programme Officer	ECHO
11:00-12:00	Isaac Nzituwga		MinAgrie
16:30-17:30	Ndizeye Chrystosome Catherine Schillinger	Directeur de Programme Représentant	CED-Caritas Burundi Caritas International
Thursday, 9 December 2010			
8:30-9:30	Stephan Fox	Chargé de Programmes "Développement Rurale »	European Union
9:30-10:00	Jan van Renselaar	Directeur OS	Dutch Embassy
11:00-12:30	Joseph Nindorera Ndikuriyo Stanslas Hakizumana Isidore	Chef du Secteur Sécurité Alimentaire Assistant à l'ONG Programme Officer	Care
	Normand Ndayizeye	Program Manager	Help Channel
15:00/16:00	Melanie Rubavu	Assistant Principal/Programme	WFP
16:30-17:30	Méthode Niyongendako		FAO Burundi

DR Congo			
Time	People met	Designation	Organisation
Friday, 10 December 2010			
15:30-17:30	Gerard Madodo		FAO, DR Congo
17:30-19:30	Pierre Vauthier	Chef Dept Planification Sécurité Alimentaire	FAO, DR Congo
Monday, 13 December 2010			
10:00-11:00	Robert Ngonde	Directeur SNSA	MINAGRI
11:30-12:30	Mavianna Apataone	Nutrition-PRONANUT	Ministère de la Santé
14:00-15:00	Pierre Kadet	Chef de Mission RCC Ouest	ACF
15:00-16:00	Franck Ngongo	Directeur Générale	Bureau d'Etudes Marketing
Tuesday, 14 December 2010			
8:30-9:30	Luc Ounani Lompo	Coordinateur des Opérations agricoles d'urgence de la FAO en RDC	FAO, RD Congo
11:00-12:00	Corinna Kreidler	Chef de Bureau	ECHO
16:30-17:30	Ndiaga Gueye	Représentant de la FAO	FAO, DR Congo

Wednesday, 15 December 2010			
8:30-9:30	Max Hadorn	Head of Office	OCHA
9:30-10:30	Félix Ntumba Felly	Chargé des Affaires Associé Section de la coordination de terrain	OCHA
11 :00-12 :00	Jean Aunge Muhiya Zacharie Shaminga Mbakama	Professeur Chercheur en Sécurité Alimentaire	Université de Kinshasa
13:00-14:00	Dirk Jan Koch		Dutch Embassy
16:00-17 :00	Cécile Diaka	Food Security Officer	World Vision

UGANDA			
Time	People met	Designation	Organisation
Monday 6 December			
08:30-09:30	Stella Sengendo	FAO National IPC Coordinator	FAO-UGA
09:30-10:30	James Okoth	National Emergency Coordinator	FAO-UGA
11:00-12:30	Nelly Birungi Lilia Turcan Neil Fisher	Nutritionist Nutrition Specialist Nutrition Surveillance Consultant	UNICEF
14:00-15:00	Menya Emmanuel	Senior Statistician	UBOS
15:15-17:00	Hakuza Annunciata	Food Security and Early Warning	MAAIF
Tuesday 7 December			
11:00-12:00	David Mutazindwa + Stephen Hammond GAO delegation members (6 in total)	National programme Officer Agricultural Counselor	USAID USDA GAO
13:00-14:00	NK Shrestha Arthur Muteesasira	Head of IMU National GIS officer	UNOCHA
15:00-17:00	Agnes Atyang	FEWSNET Representative Uganda	FEWSNET
Wednesday 8 December			
09:00-10:30	Fausto Prieto Perez	Technical Assistant	ECHO
11:00-12:00	Richard Ofwono	Technical Manager, FS, Livelihoods	SAVE the Children
13:00-14:00	Mark Gordon	Regional VAM Officer	WFP
15:00-16:00	Martin Owor	Commissioner Disaster Management	OPM
Thursday 9 December			
10:00-11:00	Kenneth Anyanzo	National VAM Officer	WFP

14:30-15:30	Aine Reuben Tinka Lydia	Food Security Officer Food Security Officer	Red Cross NSociety
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TANZANIA			
Time	People met	Designation	Organisation
Wednesday 15 December			
08:30-09:30	Gerald Runyoro	Assistant Representative/Programme Officer	FAO
10:30-11:30	Vedasto Rutachokozibwa	IPC National Consultant/ MUCHALI focal point	FAO
12:00-13:00	Nsiima Longin Merisia Sebastian	Livestock Officer Fisheries Officer	MLDF
14:00-15:00	Nanchege Nanai Hudson Mwasambungu Jane Alfred	Assistant-Director, Disaster Management Department (DMD) DMD Officer DMD Officer	PMO
15:30-16:30	Benedict Jeje Geoffrey Chiduo	Managing Director Nutrition Specialist	TFNC
Thursday 16 December			
10:30-11:30	Brenda Muwaga	Nutritionist	UNICEF
14:00-15:00	Mohamed Kapukula	Meteorologist	TMA
15:30-16:30	Winnie Bashagi	FEWSNET National Representative	FEWSNET
Friday 17 December			
08:30-09:30	John Mngodo Caroline Kilembe	National Food Security, Director National Officer, FS and EW	MAFC
10:30-11:30	Vincent Akulumuka	Officer, Agricultural Development	Irish Aid
12:00-13:00	Enock Mangasini	Livelihoods Advisor	CARE